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abstract 
This thesis postulates the annihilation of the poor as the authorised end of development. 
This circumstance, I contend, is an effect of the entanglement – that is, the mutual 
affectability (Barad 2007) – of the human and capital as descriptors of ethical and 
economic value, respectively. Accordingly, I suggest that the annihilation of the poor by 
capital under the sign of development is authorised as the preservation of value. I 
designate this as the postcolonial capitalist condition. The argument unfolds through 
encounters with three sites that have become metonymic with destruction wrought by 
development: the state response to peasant revolt against land expropriation in 
Nandigram, the Bhopal gas leak, and the recently emergent surrogacy market. I offer 
these as different instantiations of the annihilation of the poor, each of which gives lie to 
the recuperative myth of development. Here, annihilation proceeds by leaving a material 
trace upon the body. I follow this trace to argue the indispensability of the body in 
performing the ideological work of development – that is, to preserve an idealised 
appearance as human through the eradication of the poor that appear as subaltern – even 
as it establishes itself as an emancipatory truth. Thus, in this thesis I offer an analysis of 
the violence of capital not as socio-materially imposed (per Karl Marx) but rather as an 
onto-materially authorised (following Georges Bataille). As such, I seek to explicate the 
differential mattering of bodies – as both, appearance and significance – under 
development.  
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introduct ion 
postcolonial excess: on the matter(ing) of bodies and  
the production of value in-/difference in India 
 
My project begins with an image: the body of a child, drained of life and colour. Its 
mouth slightly parted; white, unblinking spots where there were once, perhaps, seeing 
eyes. Its torso – broken flesh, broken bone – encased in broken stone1.  
Then the story: December 3rd, 1984. The populus of Bhopal is gassed with 27 tons of 
methyl isocyanate from Union Carbide’s pesticide factory. ‘It felt like somebody had 
filled our bodies up with red chillies, our eyes tears coming out, noses were watering, we 
had froth in our mouths’ (Champa Devi Shukla). Within 24 hours, this city-turned-gas-
chamber claimed over two thousand lives, devastated over 150,000 bodies, thousands of 
which were – which are – yet to be born. The next morning, a father buries – covers over 
with rubble – his child. ‘Unable to bear the thought of never seeing her again’, we are 
told, ‘he brushed away the dirt for one last look’2. 
What is this image? A seething presence: the resemblance of a particular child, violated, 
in a scene of destruction that we know as the Bhopal tragedy. But also a signification: a 
disassembled body – the disintegration of embodied matter into merely its organic state – 
that signifies the dangers of industrial expansionism, the horrors of global capital. This 
image, then, as Jacque Rancière’s (2009) description of the photographic image suggests,  
is constituted through a ‘double poetics ... as cipher of a history written in visible forms 
and as obtuse reality, impeding meaning and history…’ (2009, pp.11–12). Indeed, to 
encounter the ‘Burial of an unknown child’ is, at first, to be arrested by its sheer 
presence. As such, it is what Rancière designates a naked image – the presentation of a 
reality that insists solely upon its witnessing. Yet, witnessing, he continues, ‘always aims 
beyond what it presents’ (2009, p.26) so that the naked image is nevertheless a 
signification. We read, thus, upon the body of the child the inscriptions of an evental 
(Bhopal as a singular occurrence) and categorical (Bhopal as a manifestation of the 
violence of global capital) testimony. It is this latter moment of signification that marks 
the point of departure for this thesis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  This description refers to the image ‘Burial of an unknown child’, captured by the Indian photographer, 
Raghu Rai. 
2  Rai, describing the scene he encountered (Station Museum of Contemporary Art 2004) 
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Tara Jones (1988) has designated the catastrophe in Bhopal as an act of corporate killing. 
Citing systemic indifference to the well-being of labouring populations in favour of 
corporatist supremacy, she denies the singularity of the event, insisting ‘many Bhopals 
will happen’3. Indeed, other critical accounts, such as those by Suroopa Mukherjee (2010) 
and Kim Fortun (2001), describe the event – that is, the incident as well as its aftermath 
– as representative of the moral disregard of socioeconomically subjugated populations 
by subjects of power. The image, then, presents not the reality of a particular child but 
rather is the signifier of the many. It speaks the many futures brutally terminated, and 
those yet awaiting this fate, under the shroud of global capital. I write in concurrence 
with Jones, Mukherjee and Fortun – and with Rancière’s designation of the naked image 
as historical testimony – suggesting that the body of the child, in its brute presence, tells 
the story, in fact, of disappearance(s). Yet, rather than limiting the argument to 
corporatist critique, I seek to establish this disappearance as elemental to the postcolonial 
capitalist condition. 
I describe the postcolonial capitalist condition as the contemporary ethical circumstance 
wherein the annihilation of the poor is authorised as the preservation of value. My 
consideration of value proposes an entangled structure between the ethical and the 
economic, where the human and capital describe the registers, respectively. That is, 
drawing from Karen Barad’s description of entanglement, I suggest that the human and 
capital are ‘not simply intertwined with another, as in the joining of separate entities, 
but… lack an independent, self-contained existence’ (2007, p.ix; added emphasis). In developing 
this argument, I propose the human as a phenomenological descriptor of existence that 
is marked by material and ontological freedom. As such, the human describes an 
appearance that is idealised as ethical in opposition to that which appears as excess. The 
term excess, as used by Georges Bataille’s (1993), is all that has no use or that exceeds 
utility. Following Bataille’s conceptualisation of the human, I note this appearance as 
formalised in the conditions of existence associated with the body. In this thesis, I will 
describe how the bodies of the poor, extant in the situation of material depravation, are 
deemed differentially human. Keeping in mind Barad’s provocation that appearances are 
an effect of the separability of appearances within a given phenomenon – rather than a 
difference between phenomena and their ‘outside’ – I use the phrase differentially human 
to identify these appearances as separated from, and ethically degraded in comparison to, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 From the subtitle of her text. 
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that idealised as human. In the postcolonial context, I will suggest that this separation is 
effected by capital, under the sign of development, to produce the poor as subaltern and 
the postcolonial subject as differentially mattering appearances. Accordingly, I will 
explicate the violence proliferated by capital, such as that evidenced in Bhopal, as the 
unleashing of capital’s authority to eradicate the appearance of degradation as intended 
towards the preservation of an idealised appearance as human. Drawing from the work 
of development critics such as Arturo Escobar (1995) and Kalpana Wilson (2013), I 
explain how this eradication proceeds, in the first instance, as a recuperation intended 
towards the ‘humanisation’ of the poor through the enhancement of their material 
conditions of existence.  
Yet, as the cases considered in this thesis (Bhopal, Nandigram and the surrogacy market, 
each of which will be addressed towards the end of this chapter) will substantiate, 
recuperation is merely annihilation differed. I will argue this proposition by affirming, in 
line with the historical materialist writings of Karl Marx (1970; 1970; 1976) and Gayatri 
Spivak (1985), that the reproduction of capital is contingent upon the subjugation of the 
conditions of existence. To wit, bodies that appear as differentially human are the condition of 
possibility for the reproduction of capital. This represents the entanglement of the human and 
capital that I seek to explicate in this thesis. In this circumstance, as I will show, 
annihilation is, in the final instance, the actualisation of the imperative to preserve both, 
the human and capital, as value. Using Bataille alongside Marx and Spivak, I will explicate 
the necessity of preservation as an effect of the institution in modernity of the human 
and capital as prime descriptors of ethical and economic value, respectively.  
I introduce my project with the image of the body of the child because it captures the 
spirit and the substance of my project. In this thesis, I will propose the body – or, more 
specifically, matter – as revealing of entanglements that structure the postcolonial 
capitalis condition. Barad refers to matter as ‘phenomena in their ongoing 
materialization’ (2007, p.151). That is, matter is that which is constantly manipulated4 
through encounters with other matter to project a given appearance, or to institute itself 
as phenomenon. Yet matter materialises appearances differentially, bounding matter that 
matters against that which does not. This bounding produces spaces of intelligibility 
where intelligibility is ‘a feature of the world in its differential becoming’ (2007, p.149). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  This phrase does not derive from Barad but is one I advance myself and will be explained in detail in 
chapter 2.  
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All that lies beyond is unintelligible, and I will add through this thesis, degraded and 
devalued. To paraphrase Barrett, the preservation of matter that matters must thus 
proceed through the bounding against matter that does not. Writing in the scene of 
violation as objectified by the image of the child, this thesis unfolds as an exposition on ‘how 
matter comes to matter’ (Barad 2007).    
By thus approaching differentiation and subjugation through matter, I offer an analysis 
of this condition not as socio-materially imposed (following, Marx) but rather as an onto-
materially authorised (following Bataille). As such, I present an intervention into 
materialist descriptions of capital. I do so by eschewing the logic that proposes the poor 
as an effect of subjugation to capital, and approach this figure instead as the condition of 
possibility for the propagation of capital. Using Bataille, I will show that the material 
conditions of existence bear ontological significance so that the conditions of 
degradation that mark the poor signify differential humanness. This signification 
authorises a recuperative gesture whereby the poor may restore ethical value to 
themselves. This recuperation proceeds through the manipulation of matter signifying 
excess into a productive form. Indeed, the subjection of labour for the production of 
economic value (in the form of capital) is made to appear as the securing of ethical value 
(in the form of humanness). Yet, just as the labourer is alienated from economic value, 
so are they from ethical value. In other words, the recuperative gesture of capital is a ruse 
directed towards the production of economic value and, as such, confirms the ethical 
value of those existences that already appear to it as ideal while consolidating the ethical 
devaluation of the labourer, the subject of onto-materialist difference.  
Consequently, this thesis will propose ethical devaluation as the condition of possibility 
for the production of economic value. Writing with Didier Deleule (2014), I suggest that 
devaluation of the poor is an effect of their situation of survival – specifically, their 
subjugation to necessity as evidenced in its degraded material circumstance. This 
appearance as ethical excess is ‘made to matter’ through its appropriation by capital, i.e. 
through its materialisation as a productive body. Deleule describes the productive body 
as instituted through the fragmentation of the living form in order to produce 
individuated organs that can be made to interface efficaciously with capital. As such, the 
productive body is actually intended towards its functioning as a dead machine. 
Consequently, recuperation reveals itself here as a tendency at least towards a symbolic 
annihilation. In fact, in this thesis I will argue that recuperation is merely annihilation 
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deferred. Here, the destruction of the body of the poor by capital is the actualisation of 
its degraded value. As such, eradication secures the human. Thus, it is in the interaction 
between the body and capital that humanness, as ethical value, is consolidated. The 
appearance of the body as materially violated is the actualisation of ethical devaluation. It 
is this circumstance that is substantiated in the body of the child captured in Rai’s image. 
The child in Rai’s image signifies differential humanness. It exists in a situation of 
unfreedom as substantiated by its presence in the factory slums, the scene of material 
depravation. Its body appears as excess and, hence, a signifier of ontological degradation. 
The body of the child, of course, is the metonymic representation of all those that share 
its scene and appearance. These are the bodies of the poor, materialised in the first 
instance as degraded matter and always already vulnerable to disappearance in order to 
preserve the figure of the human. In the case of Bhopal, the bodies confronting the 
chemical factory were made to matter for capital – i.e. materialised as productive – 
through their subjugation to labour. This subjugation proceeds as recuperation – the 
promise of liberation from degradation – but ultimately reveals itself as annihilation. As 
such, the destruction of these bodies by capital is always already authorised as the 
eradication of degraded matter. The violation of the child’s body is thus the culmination 
of what Denise Ferreira da Silva (2007) calls the logic of obliteration whereby ethical 
value is secured through the disappearance of its excess. The marks on the child’s body 
merely reveal, or restage, its primordial situation as degraded. Simultaneously, the security 
of the bodies on the other side of capital – of capitalists and their representatives, or 
what for the purpose of this thesis I will call the postcolonial subject – affirms their 
bodies as matter that matters. The differential materialisation of bodies when facing 
capital represents a differential mattering – where mattering implies both substance and 
significance (Barad 2007, p.3).   
The signifying moment of the body generally relates its institution in modernity as a 
‘cultural text’ congealed through material-discursive practices of race and sex (cf. Butler 
2011; Silva 2007). Here, race and sex are ontological categories that come to describe the 
human. The figure of the human is inaugurated by Reason and Freedom – the twin 
pillars that ground the ethics of Enlightenment thought. Man, the subject associated with 
this figure, expresses himself through understanding and will. Yet, even as Man actualises 
himself as such through rational, self-determined activity, the figure of the human is 
reified through matter. In particular, matter materialised as European/(white)-male-
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propertied body appears as human, and hence constitutes ethical value. As a corollary, 
differentially materialised bodies appear as if non- or sub-human, and hence empty of 
ethical content. The materialisation of bodies in racial and sexual difference is the 
material manifestation of ontological and ethical difference. The differential mattering of 
the body under modernity, then, is a coincident effect of phenomenological description 
(bio-social appearance) and ontological ascription (ethical possibility). The presumption 
of ontological difference institutes bodies materialised in racial and sexual difference as 
naturalised targets for eradication. This describes the transparency thesis as explicated by 
Silva (2007). Building from this, I propose bodily violation is the anticipated condition of 
the racial and sexual body ontoepistemologically marked as differentially human5.  
Staying with her, I note that the contemporary postmodern moment, however, attempts 
to rearticulate the human, so that bio-social (racial and sexual) markers that signify non- 
or sub-humanness are sublated into exteriorised differences equally comprehensible by 
the category of human. In this circumstance, all conscious life is postulated as capable of 
expressing humanness. Postmodernity’s attempted reassemblage notwithstanding, the 
category ‘human’ continues to exist as a differential, so that the containment of existence 
within this idealised figuration continues to unfold as violence. Drawing from Bataille 
(1993), I will show in this thesis that, under the aegis of postcolonial capital, this 
idealisation is an effect of the material conditions of existence. In other words, the 
possibility of being a subject of Reason and Freedom is signified through the appearance 
of the body in relation to the conditions under which it materialises itself – that is, in 
relation to capital. On the one hand, the body that appears as what Bataille describes as 
luxurious – i.e. the body that is materialised through exuberant expenditure – signifies 
freedom from necessity, and hence is the material instantiation of the figure of the 
human. On the other, the bodies of the poor – those that materialise under conditions of 
deprivation as excess – signifies unreason and unfreedom. The body thus materialised 
represents degradation, anticipating final destruction. As such, the interaction of capital 
with the body as appearance unfolds as the arbitration of ethical value intended towards 
securing the figure of the human.  
In contemplating differential mattering under the postcolonial capitalist condition, I offer 
in this thesis an intervention into the field of postcolonial critique. While the postcolonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Refer to page 4 for an explanation of the distinction I propose between human difference and 
differentially human. 
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idiom retains racial and sexual difference as descriptors of differential humanness, this 
description is not sufficient to comprehend the violence of the preservation of the 
human. This is particularly evident in the contemporary moment of globalisation wherein 
economic stratification occurs within both, spaces marked geohistorically as postcolonial 
wherein biosocial (and especially phenotypical) differentiation does not bear similar 
import, as well as the deterritorialisation of these spaces effected by various levels of 
labour migration (Spivak 1999). For instance, in addition to Bhopal, my thesis addresses 
the emergence of a surrogacy market in India. The surrogacy industry – the latest 
formalisation of technologically interpellated labour in India – recruits working class 
mothers to carry ‘third-party foetuses’ to term. While the possibility of the industry is 
effected by advancements in reproductive biotechnologies, it is actualised only through 
the availability of cheap(ened) labour. Here, the cheapness of the surrogate’s labour is 
not solely an effect of her devaluation as racial and sexual other. While the 
materialisation of the body of a poor woman as surrogate is indeed an effect of her 
sexual difference, it appears as such even as it faces other bodies materialised in racial 
difference, including those that appear as ‘Indian’. Instead, the body of the surrogate is 
materialised as such by the conditions of material depravation. That is, her body faces 
capital as underproductive matter.   
By being materialised as such, however, the body becomes open to consumption, both 
material (the direct depletion of physiological matter in growing the foetus) and symbolic 
(the direct transfer of maternal affect to the intended parents). Through this process of 
consumption the body of the surrogate mother is rendered a thing emptied of ethical 
value6. The other side of the exchange, however, entails the consolidation of ethical 
value. Intended parents face the surrogate mother as capitalists facing capital. This 
relation is an effect of their material conditions of existence that exceed that of the 
surrogate. As such, intended parents appear as onto-materially free. To the extent that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  In her address of racial and sexual subalternity in ‘To be announced’ (2013), Silva writes the body of the 
racial and sexual subaltern as a referent of the Thing (2013, p.49). Following Hegel, she posits the Thing 
as that which has no value. But it is precisely as such that it mediates between I and the Other: ‘Without 
space/time, and the categories of social scientific knowledge it sustains, The Thing immediately/ 
instantaneously registers (mediates without transforming, reducing, or sublating) the relationships 
(violent and otherwise) that constitute our conditions of existence’ (2013, p.58). The body of the 
racial/sexual subaltern is not, but carries the trace, of the Thing. As such, it is the bearer of, and 
threatens the unleashing of, excess. While the postulation of the Thing as ‘no value’ is useful to my 
argument, it does besides that more than I require it to do. My use of thing is intended to signify not in 
the ontological but in the objective register. That is, the thing represents an objectification effected by 
the emptying out of ethical value rather than the scene for the constitution of the Subject and its 
Others. 	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they appear subjected, this is an effect of their procreative inability – i.e. their inability to 
fulfil the heteropatriarchal imperative to reproduce. Yet any ensuing threat of ethical 
deprivation is resolved in confrontation with – that is, through the productive 
consumption of – the surrogate mother. This transaction – the end of which is 
parenthood – confirms the ethical value of the intended parents. 
I thus offer Bhopal and the surrogacy market as different manifestations of annihilation 
operating under the cloak of recuperation. Each moment reveals the violence of ethical 
arbitration performed by capital. However, while the material mutilation of Bhopal is a 
spectacular actualisation of ethical devaluation, the horror of surrogacy is far more 
ambivalent, appearing as it does primarily in the symbolic register of ‘Third World 
exploitation’. In neither case, however, does destruction appear as an effect of direct 
force. Here lies the perverse brilliance of the postmodern turn. For in rewriting the 
colonial logic of rescue as effected through sovereign command, it situates the 
recuperative gesture of power in consciousness and self-determination. That is, colonial 
reason – that which decreed the instrumentalisation and eventual extermination of the 
other of human – is reconfigured to usher these existences into a disciplinary regime. 
This is effected by systematised tools that subject these others to its reason. Of course, 
the very fact of subjection signals the differential valuation of existences that must be 
recuperated in order to align with the figure of the human as the valued form. Here, 
however, subjugation is posited not as a consequence of external force but rather of self-
determined will, so that disciplinary force projects itself as the inevitable outcome of 
rational choice. On the other hand, for those existences that refuse disciplining, 
differential ethical valuation advances to the point of radical devaluation, justifying 
symbolic or material punishment as a function of self-determined unreason – i.e. a self-
determined turning away from Reason. This disobedience authorises sovereign violence 
tending towards death. This describes the case of Nandigram wherein the 
developmentalist state unleashed the full effect of its force against peasants who were 
resisting the expropriation of their land for economic development. This resistance, 
appears under the transition narrative – transition to modernity, transition to capitalist – 
as irrational behaviour that threatens the extant order of the state (Chakrabarty 2000). 
Consequently, the violence of the state is legitimised as self-preserving violence – what 
Silva calls necessitas (Silva 2009) – against the threat posed by irrational subjects. 
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Yet, even where external force is not mobilised, death manifests as the logical end of 
disciplinary power. Death, then, is the anticipated condition of differential mattering. 
Consequently, death, as represented in the image of the child, is not evental (a historical 
happening) but rather definitive (the culmination of a condition). In the case of Bhopal, 
the Union Carbide factory constitutes the scene – material and ontological – of the 
child’s mutilation. The factory, as the site of labour, signifies subjection to necessity. 
Indeed, the factory in Bhopal is one of the early moments of India’s neoliberal, 
globalising trajectory. As such, it propagated itself as an intention towards economic 
growth and social progress. Consequently, it drew from the rural masses turning them 
into an urban proletariat. Yet, as is the wont of capitalising states, the lack of 
infrastructural resources to support the newly emergent population reiterated their 
deprived circumstance. This was nowhere more evident than in the slum colonies 
pressed up against the factory walls. Most of those killed that night lived in these, their 
presence there a reminder of their subjection. This subjection – which materialises their 
bodies as subservient to the chemical factory – is the restaging of an ontological 
difference instantiated through dispossession that barred their historical existence from 
humanness. While the specific relation, if any, of the child to the factory or its adjacent 
colony is unknown, her proximity suggests a sharing of this historical circumstance. The 
fragmentations of her body, then, are the writing of her ontological descent.  
Similarly, in the case of the surrogacy market, surrogate mothers are recruited from 
situations of material depravation. While this circumstance identifies her as 
underdeveloped, hence cheap, labour, she is hailed by the surrogacy market, specifically, 
as an incomplete mother. The economic condition of the potential surrogate hinders her 
from providing fully for her children/family. Women enter the market in order to 
accumulate resources that would allow them to educate their children – especially their 
girl children who might otherwise be deprived of the opportunity – as well as to provide 
other forms of material stability such as building a house of one’s own. This possibility is 
represented by the surrogacy market because the payment therein far exceeds the wages 
available to women otherwise dispossessed of the fullness of their capabilities. 
Consequently, by entering the surrogacy market, the surrogate worker reconfigures her 
matter as productive, not only to alleviate her economic condition, but more crucially, to 
fulfil her maternal affect. Yet, even as the market promises human advancement as an 
effect of the advancement of her material conditions of existence, the consumptive 
exchange of which she is object alienates her from ethical existence.  
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In this thesis, I offer Bhopal and surrogacy as different manifestations of the force of 
development imprinting itself upon matter, thereby revealing it as an instrument of 
ethico-economic negotiations. If, as already noted, ethical devaluation is the condition of 
possibility for the production of economic value, then the body itself, as the appearance 
of ethical value, must be destroyed – i.e. returned to matter – so that capital may endure.  
Of course, this destruction, as a function of labour, is not uniform. Rather, it is 
determined by the circumstance of survival as signified through the subjection to 
necessity. The body is materialised as the substance of ethical value or degradation in its 
relation to capital. This appearance is appropriated by capital in order to reproduce itself 
even as it secures humanness as the idealised expression of existence. Indeed, under the 
postcolonial condition, the reproduction of capital proceeds as the preservation of the 
figure of the human. Capital, then, is the medium through which ethical value, or 
humanness, is differentially distributed and is finally realised in its encounter with the 
body. It is this arbitration of humanness as played out in the relations between the body 
and capital – the negotiation of how matter is made to matter – that my thesis seeks to 
explicate.  
The remainder of this chapter charts the unfolding of the thesis. 
chapter summaries 
This thesis seeks to explicate the annihilation of the poor as elemental to the postcolonial 
capitalist condition. Consequently, my argument unfolds through an encounter with 
various sites that demonstrate this circumstance. In particular, my examples will recount 
spectacular instances of violence enacted by capital. These encounters, however, are not 
intended to be sensational. Rather they are used to grasp the structure of violence – 
specifically, the entanglement of the human and capital as appearances of value – that is 
otherwise elided by its dreadful repetition. I begin with this caveat in order to distinguish 
my motivation from endeavours wherein the spectacle of the violated subaltern – of 
broken poor black and brown bodies – are deployed to draw sentimental association. 
For instance, in her text, Scenes of subjection (1997), Saidiya Hartman begins with a 
repudiation of spectacles of violence – a move precisely opposed to the gesture that 
introduced this thesis. In refusing to (re)-present the violence enacted upon the bodies of 
the enslaved – in this case, specifically, upon Frederick Douglass’ Aunt Hester – she 
seeks to ‘call attention to the ease with which such scenes are usually reiterated, the 
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casualness with which they circulate, and the consequences of this routine display of the 
slave’s ravaged body’ (1997, p.3). She pronounces herein an objection to the 
overdetermination of slave existence through acts of terror and violation; an 
overdetermination that obscures the violence not only of ‘the quotidian and the 
mundane’ (1997, p.4), but, more crucially, of the separation, indeed the separability, of 
the slave from the reader/spectator.  
Hartman argues that the spectacle of violence as objectified through the slave body, as 
well as any disgust or empathy this might evoke in the (usually white male) spectator are 
both formed through the ‘kinds of expectations and the qualities of affect distinctive to 
the economy of slavery… [i.e.] the relation between pleasure and possession of slave 
property’ (1997, p.21). For the arousal of empathy is made possible only by re-placing the 
body of the slave with one’s own, thereby rendering it ‘an abstract and empty vessel 
vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values’ (1997, p.21). 
Through this re-imagination, the body of the slave continues to be possessed for, and 
dominated through, the production of another’s fantasies. The witness of the spectacle 
also, then, embodies the role of the master, the dominator. Consequently, Hartman 
writes, ‘[the] imagined beating is immune neither to the pleasures to be derived from the 
masochistic fantasy nor to the sadist pleasure to be derived from the spectacle of 
sufferance’ (1997, p.21). Thus, in her view, the act of witnessing transfers the relation of 
power – between pleasure and pain – from the master and slave, to the spectator and 
those existences represented by the slave body.  
Yet, in his text, In the break, Fred Moten notes that Hartman’s ‘refusal of recitation… 
reproduces what it refuses’ (2003, p.5). That is, he suggests that reference to the event – 
even if devoid of detail – is itself an acknowledgement of the primal violence, one that 
reasserts itself as such in every future address of the systemic violence, be it quotidian or 
spectacular. Indeed, if Hartman’s project is to shift focus from explicit renditions of 
terror in order to re-present slavery as the violence enacted under ‘the rubric of pleasure, 
paternalism and property’ (1997, p.4), then each of these articulations signifies, in fact, 
‘the ongoing (re)production of that performance [the beating of Aunt Hester] in all its 
guises and… each of those guises is always already present in and disruptive of the 
supposed originarity of that primal scene’ (2003, p.4). Moten’s critique of Hartman is 
intended not as a dismissal of her gesture but rather to grasp at its productive possibility 
in considering how one might ‘subject this unavoidable model of subjection to a radical 
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breakdown’ (2003, p.5). This requires, in his view, a recognition of the spectacular as ‘the 
conjunction of reproduction and disappearance [that is] the condition of possibility, [the] 
ontology and [the] mode of production’ (2003, p.5). Accordingly, my encounter in this 
thesis with various sites of violation follows from the notion that spectacles of violation 
produced by capital are the suturing of reproduction and disappearance – reproduction 
because they replay ad infinitum violation effected by capital, and disappearance because 
they elide the differential distribution of humanness under global capitalism. It is 
specifically this latter moment of disappearance that I will seek to explicate.  
Consequently, Chapter 1 will introduce the project through the case of Nandigram, a 
region in the state of West Bengal that has become synonymous with the violence of 
development in India. This event entails the brutalisation of peasants who were resisting 
the expropriation of land for industrial use. I discuss this case in order to demonstrate 
the ideological (ethico-economic) function of development under postcolonialism. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explicate a method for comprehending development as an 
instrument that confirms, and hence preserves, the human and capital as appearances of 
value. I begin this process by investigating the methods of analysis that have been used 
to comprehend the violence in Nandigram. The disparities between these approaches 
reveal the differences in apprehending the figure of the subaltern as a subjugated subject. 
This is indicative, I suggest, of the tensions between the frames of postcolonial criticism 
and historical materialism within which the circumstance of subjugation is typically 
scrutinised. Consequently, the first half of the chapter provides a review of each method 
in order to highlight its respective limitations. In so doing, I advocate a method that is 
constituted through a combination of the ontological imperative of the former with the 
materialist imperative of the latter. Such an onto-materialist method, I submit, is offered 
by Gayatri Spivak’s explication of postcolonial critique.  
Accordingly, the chapter continues by investigating the terms of applying a postcolonial 
critique to comprehend the circumstance of annihilation as apparent under the 
postcolonial capitalist condition. Since annihilation is spectacularised through its material 
trace of the body, I demonstrate the imperative of accounting for the body – or more 
precisely, matter – in the method of postcolonial critique. I do so by engaging the works 
of Karen Barad (2007) and Hortense Spillers (1987) to explicate the significance of 
matter in the appearance of subalternity. Specifically, I demonstrate how their focus on 
onto-materialism enables a recognition of the violation of the subaltern as the material 
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instantiation of its separation from the figure of the human. Indeed, the appearance of 
this separation as difference, according to Barad, is an onto-materialist effect of a given 
instrument that effects separations within a given phenomenon. The final section of the 
chapter outlines ethico-political critiques of development in order to demonstrate it as 
the instrument that institutes a separation between the human and the subaltern under 
the postcolonial capitalist condition.  
Chapter 2 demonstrates how this separation authorises the eradication of the subaltern – 
specifically the poor – by capital under the sign of development. As such, the chapter 
aims to underscore this sanction as an effect of the entanglement of the human and 
capital as appearances of ethical and economic value, respectively. I explicate this 
circumstance by first engaging the appearance of value as it structures development. 
Commencing with Marx’s labour theory of value (1976), I outline the parameters of the 
production of economic value under capitalist modes of production. In so doing, I will 
suggest that his explication of the social character of value – as produced through 
relations of domination and subjugation – opens towards, but does not account for, the 
role of subalternity. I substantiate this critique using Leopoldina Fortunati’s (Fortunati 
1995) feminist intervention in order to highlight how sexual subalternity enables the 
erasure of female labour in the production of economic value. This erasure marks the 
intensification of domination by capital as an effect of ontological subjugation thereby 
revealing subalternity as a necessary condition for the expansion of value by capital. This 
argument pertains as well to the economic subaltern as demonstrated by Gayatri Spivak’s 
(1985) critique of Marx. Using Spivak’s explication of the devalorisation of labour in the 
comprador countries, I show how this circumstance institutes the poor as ontologically 
degraded. That is, given that the devalorisation of labour results in the suppression of 
consumptive possibilities, the poor appear as ethically marginal to the space of 
humanness. I draw this argument from Hannah Arendt’s (1998) intervention into Marx 
wherein she rewrites consumption rather than labour as the expression of Man par 
excellence. This produces a circumstance, she suggests, wherein no object is safe from 
destruction as an effect of consumption. Within the comprador theatre, the ruse of 
development renders the poor as such objects of consumption through their almost 
complete reduction to use in the production of economic value. The first half of the 
chapter thus explicates how the subjugation of the poor as subaltern constitutes the 
condition of possibility for the production of economic value. This relationship 
constitutes the structure of development.  
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The second half of the chapter seeks to highlight annihilation as the necessary end of 
development as authorised by the entanglement of the human and capital. This 
proposition is explicated through Georges Bataille’s (1993) description of the human as a 
phenomenological descriptor of ethical existence instituted through the negation of 
excess. He describes excess as that which exceeds utility. The body, as organic sensuous 
material, is the expression of excess in the first instance and hence must be negated 
through its subjection to labour. To wit, only those bodies that appear productive 
express humanness. As already indicated, under the capitalist mode of production, the 
poor as subaltern appears as differentially human. I use the description of the productive 
body as outlined by Didier Deleule (2014) in order to comprehend this circumstance. For 
Deleule, the productive body under capitalism is that which subjects itself to dead and 
other living machines. The possibility of sociality granted to productive bodies is an 
effect of the degree of their subjection – or more precisely, is determined by what he 
calls their conditions of survival. Indeed, the primacy of biological survival compels the 
poor to subject themselves to maintaining the enhanced conditions of survival of 
postcolonial subjects. Thus, I will show that the subjugation of the poor is the condition 
of possibility not only for the production of economic value but also for the appearance 
of postcolonial subjects as human. This circumstance represents the entanglement of the 
human and capital. In order to establish the annihilation of the poor as the inevitable 
effect of this entanglement, I read Bataille’s explication of the relation between sovereign 
and servile into Deleule’s account of the differential institution of productive bodies. 
Bataille posits luxurious consumption – that is, the surplus consumption of the products 
of another’s labour – as the expression of sovereignty. Indeed, this is precisely the form 
of relation between the poor and the bourgeois in the postcolonial circumstance. In so 
far as the exercise of sovereignty is an expression of humanness, par excellence, the 
preservation of the human proceeds through the guarantee of surplus consumption 
achieved through an ever-expanding production of commodities. This guarantee 
authorises the subjection of the poor tending towards annihilation. I make this argument 
by juxtaposing Bataille’s account of sovereignty with Achilles Mbembe’s (2003) 
necropolitical account wherein sovereignty describes the exercise of control over death. 
In so doing, I confirm annihilation as the necessary end of development intended 
towards the human and capital as appearances of value. By demonstrating this 
circumstance as an effect of the entanglement of the human and capital, this chapter 
provides a theoretical framework for the remainder of the thesis.  
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Chapter 3 returns to Bhopal in order to demonstrate the imperative of the body in 
actualising this entanglement. In particular, it seeks to demonstrate how the material 
traces of annihilation left upon the body perform the ideological work of development. 
That is, I show how the violation of the body is made to serve as a material record of 
differential humanness thereby validating the recuperative myth of development as truth. 
The chapter begins with a historio-political account of Bhopal that seeks to contextualise 
the event within a developmentalist frame. I describe the circumstances under which the 
factory was set-up in Bhopal with minimal infrastructural investment, planning 
regulation, or knowledge transfer. This situation resulted in catastrophe, not in the form 
of the leak itself but with regards the extent of destruction caused. I also detail the 
juridico-political aftermath of the leak that has prolonged the tragedy into the present 
day. Here, I provide a brief overview of political and legal debates with regards redress in 
order to establish the discursive figuring of the poor as ethically degraded. The chapter 
then moves to describe how this degradation is naturalised through the material 
conditions of the existence of the poor. In particular, I use the works of Mary Douglas 
(2002) and Bataille (1993) to demonstrate how the appearance of dirt or filth, associated 
with the condition of poverty, produces the bodies of the poor as filth themselves. This 
appearance, Bataille notes, signifies animality – i.e. the failure to actualise humanness. As 
such, it warrants eradication as a means to preserve an idealised appearance as human. I 
argue this latter proposition through an explication of the logic of obliteration as outlined 
by Denise Ferreira da Silva (2007). Following this description, I will suggest that the 
violations of the bodies of the poor are confirmation of a truth always already imprinted 
upon their bodies and realised, finally, through the intervention of capital. As such, they 
give lie to the recuperative gesture of development. Even so, under the postcolonial 
capitalist condition, development proceeds as truth. 
Accordingly, the chapter advances by speaking to the indispensability of the body in 
validating development as an emancipatory project. Here, I use Elaine Scarry’s (1985) 
account of the body in pain to outline how power registers itself through injury. The 
experience of pain is, in fact, that of a differentiated self – of the self reduced to matter 
in contradistinction to the subject who exists through the absence of pain. The violation 
of the body by capital, I thus suggest, is confirmation of the differential humanness of 
the poor. The efficacy of this strategy lies not only in the experience of pain but also in 
its spectacle. I will corroborate this argument through accounts of capital punishment as 
offered by Peter Linebaugh (2006) and David McNally (2011) to affirm how the 
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proletarian body has historically been made to perform as a record of the truth of capital 
by marking it as criminal. The chapter will conclude by locating the violation of Bhopal 
within the history of capital as it unfolds in post-/colonial India. I will introduce the 
notion of ‘flesh’ as articulated by Hortense Spillers (1987) to suggest that the injuries 
inflicted by Bhopal are the eruptions of a primordial writing by colonial capital on the 
bodies of those instituted as poor. The chapter thus underscores how the bodies of the 
poor are the congelation of negat(ed)(ive) value so that the erasure executed by the gas 
leak confirms the posit(ed)(ive) value of the bodies of postcolonial subjects that appear 
as human. To wit, I will affirm that under the postcolonial capitalist condition the 
securing of bodily integrity is the promise of humanness. 
This argument is further substantiated through an engagement with surrogacy in 
Chapter 4.  Surrogacy is a relationship wherein a woman, the surrogate, is sought to bear 
a child for a third-party parent or parents – commonly referred to as intended parents. 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate surrogacy as a moment of annihilation because it 
causes the depletion of the surrogate body through its productive consumption in the 
process of procreation. I will posit this depletion as an injury to the body committed by 
intended parents thereby confirming the surrogate mother as differentially human. This 
critique is not intended as a condemnation of intended parents but rather seeks to 
recognise the differential production of subjectivities in the context of the 
heteropatriarchal imperative to reproduce. Accordingly, the chapter begins with a brief 
overview of the discourses that structure the surrogacy market. Here, I focus especially 
on the role of choice and agency in relation to both, surrogate mothers and intended 
parents, in mobilising the market. I thereby highlight the differential stakes of their 
participation in the market. Whereas for surrogate mothers participation promises the 
possibility of the enhancement of ethical value as an effect of the improvement of their 
economic circumstance, for intended parents participation entails the exercise of a 
consumptive subjectivity intended towards the actualisation of their ethical value through 
kinship.  
The possibility of this transaction between surrogate mothers and intended parents relies, 
however, on an always already implied ethical differentiation. I make this argument by 
considering the history of stratified reproduction wherein the reproductive capacities of 
poor women and women of colour are devalorised. In India, this history is manifest in 
the practice of sterilisation. I will use the concept of bioavailability as articulated by 
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Lawrence Cohen (2008) in order to argue that sterilisation and surrogacy are two sides of 
the same reproductive coin. That is, I will show how surrogacy is an alternate form of 
biopolitical control wherein the presumed reproductive excess of poor women is made 
‘available’ to intended parents. This circumstance, I suggest, negates the recuperative 
promise of the market for poor women. In particular, I use critiques of the employment 
and marriage contract, as offered by Carol Pateman (1988), Patricia Williams(1991) and 
Robyn Wiegman (2003) to refute the possibility of choice and agency as attributed to 
surrogate mother in their participation in the surrogacy contract 
The history of stratified reproduction, as that which by corollary entails the valorisation 
of reproduction by white and wealthy women, also interpellates intended parents as 
subjects of the surrogate market. This is an effect of the ethical value accorded to the 
family as a signifier of bourgeois subjectivity. I will demonstrate this through the 
genealogy of the family as a juridico-economic unit as outlined by Jacques Donzelot 
(1979), Michel Foucault (1990) and Ludmilla Jordanova (1995). Moreover, the surrogacy 
market not only promises the fulfilment of genetic kinship ties for intended parents but 
also activates them as consumptive subjects. As such, and recalling Bataille, the surrogacy 
market enables the expression of sovereignty by intended parents in relation to the 
servility of surrogate mothers. This relation of domination and subjugation, however, 
pertains to the transfer of ethical rather than economic value from surrogate mother to 
intended parents by means of the baby. I will argue that in the case of surrogacy 
sovereignty is not limited to the acquisition of the products of another’s labour – here, 
the child – but extends to the productive consumption of the surrogate mother herself. 
This is a result of the position of the surrogate mother as a means of production. 
Consequently, using Sylvia Federici’s (2004) materialist critique of reproductive labour, I 
will show how the accrual of ethical value for intended parents is a form of accumulation 
by dispossession. This process constitutes an injury to the body and subjectivity of poor 
women while preserving the bodily and subjective integrity of heteronormative subjects. 
This circumstance, I contend, confirms the surrogacy market as the scene of the 
abjectification of the poor intended towards the preservation of the heteronormative 
subject qua human. 
In sum, this thesis attempts to highlight the differential mattering of the subaltern body 
under the postcolonial capitalist condition. It concludes, however, by reaffirming the 
ethical challenge of comprehending this figure.  
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chapter 1  
encounter ing the subaltern: 
on the method of postcolonial critique 
On March 14th 2007, a contingent of police, 3000-strong, was set upon the villagers of 
Nandigram, a region comprised of 27 villages in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal. 
These villagers had been involved in a long stand-off with the state government, 
protesting the plan to grant corporate access to the region for the purpose of developing 
a chemical hub. This plan entailed not only the take-over of agricultural lands but would 
also incur the displacement of the approximately 65,000 people living in the region. 
Upon receiving notification of removal, the people of Nandigram began occupying their 
villages, driving out government and party operatives, arming themselves, and 
establishing political autonomy in the region. For almost two months, they were locked 
in violent confrontation with cops-and-cadre, fighting back the take-over of land and 
livelihood. Finally, on March 14th, the state unleashed the full force of itself. 
What followed has been referred to as carnage, massacre and civil war. But these 
descriptors indicate not so much the numbers killed as the nature of atrocities 
committed. For torture, mutilation and rape were far more pervasive in the violence in 
Nandigram than actual murder. 
The revolt in Nandigram is one of many in a long line of peasant/tribal/indigenous 
movements launched against industrialisation and globalisation in India. This event 
stands out, in particular, because it aligned with the 150th anniversary of the 1857 uprising 
against the British East India Company that marked a major turning point in the 
country’s colonial history. This uprising not only produced a more violent entrenchment 
of colonial power via dispossession, but also formed the backdrop to a surge in anti-
colonial resistance. The events of 2007 were precipitated by a similar motive of 
dispossession by the state. The plan to build a chemical hub in Nandigram was 
authorised under the Special Economic Zones Act, or SEZ Act, which is designed to 
promote the rapid economic development in the country. In fact, SEZs mobilise colonial 
era imminent domain laws to appropriate ‘underdeveloped’ land into circuits of 
productive capital (Sanyal & Shankar 2009).  
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The focus of this chapter is to explicate a methodology for comprehending the violence 
of capital as it unfolded in Nandigram, and as it appears in the remainder of the sites 
discussed in the thesis – Bhopal and surrogacy. As such, I situate my method of analysis 
– what I will in the course of this chapter explicate as a postcolonial critique that is 
concerned with entanglements – against what Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) calls ‘transition 
narratives’ and in alignment with Gayatri Spivak’s (1999; Spivak 1988a) call to expresses 
responsibility towards the subaltern. Let me commence by describing the former. 
A transition narrative is a method of historicisation that takes a universal(ised) concept as 
a telos – Chakrabarty offers as examples of this ‘end of history’ figuration, the modern 
individual as posited by Enlightenment thought and capitalism as proffered by Marx – 
and compares the historical location/trajectory of the object of investigation with respect 
to this end. In other words, transition narratives are concerned with identifying a lack or 
lag in the development of a given subject and charting the movement, or progress, of 
said subject towards a pre-determined end. The situation in Nandigram may well be read 
as a transition narrative – in particular, as a narrative of the transition to capital. Here, the 
villagers appear as ‘primitive’ as an effect of their removal from capital and their 
attachment instead to ‘unproductive’ land and ‘unproductive’ modes of existence. The 
plan to introduce a chemical factory, then, is instituted as a motive to make them 
productive. As such, the event may be considered as a move by the state not only to 
integrate Nandigram into a capitalist system but also, in so doing, to institute the villagers 
as modern subjects.  
While this argument is attractive from the perspective of the Marxist analysis of primitive 
accumulation, Partha Chatterjee (2008) has suggested that the situation of peasants in 
postcolonial India can no longer be accounted for in these terms. Instead of signifying 
the process of primitive accumulation by the state, in his estimation, situations such as 
Nandigram represent efforts by the state to reverse the effects of such accumulation. That 
is, while he acknowledges the tendency of the postcolonial capitalist state towards 
dispossession7, he rehabilitates the state as charged with reversing the consequent effects. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Chatterjee retains the Marxist concept of ‘primitive accumulation’ to describe this circumstance of 
dispossession. This is curious considering his central argument depends on the description of the 
peasant as no longer extant as such – that is, peasant life, he notes, is now almost completely assimilated 
into the market economy. Indeed, he describes contemporary peasant society as marked by non-corporate 
capital (2008, p.58). The force of dispossession, then, does not disrupt pre-capitalist modes of 
production as much as it entails the consolidation of corporate capital. Consequently, as Aditya Nigam 
(2008) notes in his response to Chatterjee, the process of dispossession described by the latter can more 
accurately be described by David Harvey’s framework of ‘accumulation by dispossession’.      
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‘Under present globally prevailing normative ideas’, he notes, ‘old-fashioned methods of 
putting down peasant resistance [to dispossession] by armed repression have little chance 
of gaining legitimacy. The result is the widespread demand today for the rehabilitation of 
displaced people who lose their means of subsistence because of industrial and urban 
development’ (2008, p.55). This statement is not an expression of naiveté. Rather, it 
represents Chatterjee’s conviction with regards the influence of what he names civil 
society – the realm of ‘proper citizens’ – on the state. Civil society – composed mainly of 
educated, middle-class, urban individuals – holds sway over the contemporary Indian 
state, exercising itself through the demand for ‘the legal rights of proper citizens, to 
impose civic order in public places and institutions and to treat the messy world of the 
informal sector and political society with a degree of intolerance’ (2008, p.58). Under this 
description, the violence of Nandigram appears not as the eradication of ‘primitive’ 
existences but rather as the imposition of civil order on an otherwise chaotic political 
society – the space inhabited by those that are ‘not-yet citizens’8. More specifically, given 
the putative responsibility of the state to mitigate the effects of dispossession, the 
resistance of the villagers appears to civil society as a demand to be recused from the 
national polity. Consequently, in Chatterjee’s view, events such as those that unfolded in 
Nandigram could be avoided if civil society interacted with political society through the 
recognition that ‘the bulk of the population in India lives outside the orderly zones of 
proper civil society [and hence] it is in political society that they have to be fed and 
clothed and given work, if only to ensure the long-term and relatively peaceful well-being 
of civil society’ (2008, p.62). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  The formulation of ‘not-yet citizens’ does not imply a denial of recognition as being a part of the 
national polity – e.g. these ‘not-yet citizens’ still have voting rights. Instead, as Chatterjee notes, the ‘not-
yet’ refers the form of integration, or lack thereof, of these existences into civil society as the domain of 
bourgeois citizenship. In other words, ‘not-yet citizens’ appear as such because they are part of the 
informal economies that operate on the basis on non-corporate capital. Their resistance to the state, as 
the bearer of the interests of civil society, then, is to protect this non-corporate capital from dissolution 
thereby safeguarding themselves against the fickleness of the market. Chatterjee suggests that the chaos 
of political society emerges from its demand to be treated as an exception to the rule:  
[W]hen a group of people living or cultivating on illegally occupied land or selling goods 
on the street claim the right to continue with their activities, or demand compensation 
for moving somewhere else, they are in fact inviting the state to declare their case as an 
exception to the universally applicable rule. They do not demand that the right to 
private property in land be abolished or that the regulations on trade licences and sales 
taxes be set aside. Rather, they demand that their cases be treated as exceptions. When 
the state acknowledges these demands, it too must do so not by the simple application 
of administrative rules but rather by a political decision to declare an exception. The 
governmental response to demands in political society is also, therefore, irreducibly 
political rather than merely administrative. (2008, p.61) 
 This demand for exceptional treatment – which requires the contravening of the government’s own 
rules of order – appears as corruption, and the violation of properly adduced rights, to civil society, and 
hence as chaos that impedes social/national advancement.   
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Thus, even though Chatterjee disavows, specifically, a transition to capitalism narrative in 
his analysis of Nandigram, his positing of peasant communities as political society in 
opposition to civil society – as well as his argument with regards restitution – retains the 
form. Indeed, the difference between political and civil society is presented as a lack (of 
order) and a lag (in integration) of the former in relation to the latter wherein the role of 
the state is to negotiate some form of restoration. In a critical response to Chatterjee, 
Aditya Nigam (2008) dismisses his construction of political society as a waiting-room9 for 
the ‘not-yet citizens’, describing it instead as the space of the ‘unthinkable because 
unrepresentable’. This unrepresentability is an effect of its being a ‘hidden transcript’ (a 
term he borrows from James Scott’s text of the same title10) wherein the forms of living 
are always illegible under the gaze of the state. That is, even as political society interfaces 
with the state, it always does so in translation. It is thus the space of double-existence. Its 
appearance as interfacing with the market economy and speaking the language of rights is 
a mere performance that allows visibility under the gaze, yet represents the ‘continuations 
of other forms of life reinvented and reconstructed to deal with or survive in the world 
of capitalism’. Consequently, Nigam recognises peasants – those subjectivities that 
constitute political society – as subalterns. Here, subaltern is used in the precise sense of 
the term as offered by Gayatri Spivak – i.e. those that exist as if ‘without identity. … 
where social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a 
recognisable basis of action’ (2005, p.476). As such, these doubled existences remain 
illegible, hence illegitimate, and can be destroyed whenever and wherever they appear as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  I borrow this term from Chakrabarty (2000) who suggests that historicism sets-up history as a waiting 
room wherein the ‘not-yets’ are held awaiting transition into universal instantiation – e.g. modernity, 
capitalism. Thus, for instance, he notes how ‘Indians’ were posited by the British as in the waiting-room 
of modernity awaiting an actualisation that would render them fit for modern forms of political 
organisation such as self-rule and citizenship.       
10  Scott’s text, Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts (1990), is concerned with comprehending 
the resistance of subordinated groups though a consideration of their ‘offstage’ discursive practices of 
the subordinated, as well as of those in power, in relation to the public record, or ‘public transcript’. He 
refers to discursive practices isolated from the public gaze as ‘hidden transcripts’: 
If subordinate discourse in the presence of the dominant is a public transcript, I shall 
use the term hidden transcript to characterize discourse that takes place “offstage,” beyond 
direct observation by powerholders. The hidden transcript is thus derivative in the sense 
that it consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, 
contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript. … What is certain is that the 
hidden transcript is produced for a different audience and under different constraints of 
power than the public transcript. (1990, pp.4–5)  
In positing political society as a ‘hidden transcript’, Nigam attempts to reframe it as an active, even if 
socially uncomprehendable, space that is disruptive of civil society’s pretensions as a ‘master narrative’, 
rather than merely lacking/lagging behind it.  
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a threat to civil society11. The violence in Nandigram, in Nigam’s evaluation then, is the 
actualisation of subaltern existence as unlawful.  
Indeed, the villagers of Nandigram represent what, borrowing from Georges Bataille 
(1993), we may refer to as excess. Excess is all that lies beyond utility and serves no 
purpose. In the context of humanity – which, per Bataille, is instituted as the scene of 
utility – it represents all that must be abandoned in the realisation of an ethical 
subjectivity. Excess, then, as that which represents the failure of this actualisation, signals 
an ethical degradation. More crucially, it stands in opposition, and as a threat, to 
humanity and must hence be eradicated in order to preserve humanness. While excess is 
not a ‘hidden transcript’ per se – that is, it is not an active production but an external 
imputation of ontological difference – it operates similarly. To wit, excess is that which 
appears as illegible, hence illicit, within the space of humanity and thus authorises 
annihilation. In the next chapter, I will explicate in greater detail the condition of excess 
and the imperative of its eradication in order to describe the role of capital in 
accomplishing this end. However, at this juncture, the intervention of the concept of 
excess helps elucidate Nigam’s articulation of the difference between political and civil 
society as an ethical difference, or more specifically an ethical differentiation. In other 
words, the terms upon which political society organises itself appear unlawful in 
accordance with the master code of the human. In this context, and under the gaze of 
civil society, the villagers of Nandigram are deemed to have abandoned the ethical duty 
to actualise themselves as fully, or properly, human. This circumstance posits them as, 
what in this chapter I will explicate as, differentially human.  
I use the phrase ‘differentially human’ (or, sometimes, ‘differential humanness’) rather 
than ‘human difference’ so as to underscore a potentiality not yet actualised rather than 
an absolute distinction. This choice is informed by critiques of humanism that challenge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  By way of example, Nigam offers the figure of the pirate as epitomising this double, hence politically 
vulnerable, existence:  
[T]he figure of the ‘pirate’ … has now become a pervasive metaphor for the illegal, the 
unruly and the unregulated. The pirate today is one who copies, multiplies and 
distributes or sells with scant respect for the original except as object of consumption. 
The pirate produces the ‘copy’ or the ‘fake’ and throws it alongside the ‘original’ into 
the market, duping the original branded producer. Often, though, s/he who is called the 
pirate, merely shares information and products with others. ‘Intellectual property’, 
copyright and trade mark have thus become the new banners of capitalist aggression – 
as it stands threatened by such pirate or contraband capital – its own cheap copy. To 
the state, it poses another kind of threat by depriving it of what it believes are its 
legitimate revenues – all the transactions in this domain being completely ‘off the 
record’.  
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the institution of the figure of the human as the measure of all things ethical. The tacit 
corollary to humanist thinking, notes Leela Gandhi (1998), is the implication of 
differential humanness – i.e. that ‘some human beings are more human than others – 
either on account of their access to superior learning, or on account of their cognitive 
faculties’ (1998, p.29). According to this articulation, to situate the villagers of 
Nandigram as differentially human would seem to imply an adherence to the ‘not-yet’ 
logic of transition narratives. This, however, need not be the only possibility. Rather, in 
this chapter I propose differential humanness as the condition of subalternity wherein to 
approach the ‘not-yet’ is to interrogate not a lack or lag but rather the very constitution 
of the universals that makes divergence from them appear as such. That is, to historicise 
the subaltern – or, to consider the appearance of existences as differentially human – 
necessitates asking ‘how this seemingly imperious, all-pervasive code might be deployed 
or thought about so that we have at least a glimpse of its own finitude, a glimpse of what 
might constitute an outside to it’ (Chakrabarty 2000, p.93). This, in fact, is the work of 
the postcolonial critic.  
From this perspective, it is important to note that the difference between Chatterjee and 
Nigam’s descriptions of the violence in Nandigram is not the imputation of a lack or lag 
on the villagers – or rather the acknowledgement of such an imputation – but rather is 
their respective understanding of the role this imputation plays in the analysis of 
violence. For Chatterjee, the violence in Nandigram is an effect of a forestalled 
transition, effected by a mutual misrecognition between peasants 12  defending the 
circumstances of their subsistence from the precarity of the market and a state that views 
them as obstinately sticking to their ‘traditional’ modes of existence. For Nigam, on the 
other hand, the transition narrative puts under erasure the state’s determination of 
particular existences as always already unlawful and hence exterminable. Thus, while 
Chatterjee appears to leave unquestioned the very terms upon which the transition 
narrative stands – i.e. the modern individual and capital – Nigam proffers a postcolonial 
critique that challenges the teleology implied by these terms and charges them with the 
inevitability of violence. It is in this spirit, of postcolonial critique, that I undertake the 
following project.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  In Provincializing Europe, Chakrabarty notes that his use of the term peasant, rather than following a strict 
sociological definition, is intended to encompass all ‘seemingly nonmodern, rural, nonsecular 
relationships and life practices that constantly leave their imprint on the lives of even the elites in India 
and on their institutions of government’ (2000, p.11). This expanded meaning is, I reckon, intended by 
Nigam and Chatterjee too, and it is certainly implied in my usage in this chapter. 
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In this thesis, I posit development as the formal ruse – or, the ‘public transcript’ (Scott 
1990)13 – adopted by the state to ratify the eradication of those forms of existence that 
appear to it as a threat. From Nigam’s perspective, political society is the explicit object 
of development because it sustains and secures itself through ‘contraband capital’ which 
undermines both formal capital, by threatening its profits, and the state, by not only 
depriving it of revenue but also by eluding ‘mechanisms of disciplining and policing that 
are put in place by state elites in countries like India in order to bring the entire 
‘economy’ within the domain of the ‘formal’’. In my reading of Nigam, political society is 
constituted through the category of the poor. Indeed, it is existence circumscribed by this 
category – one that identifies the economic subaltern as differentially human – that I am 
concerned with in this chapter, and in my thesis, in general.   
I introduce this chapter with the story of Nandigram because it typifies the experience of 
development in India. The unfolding of the event unambiguously explicates the 
annihilation of the economic subaltern as authorised by development. As such, it is a 
spectacular representation of the sites addressed in this thesis – i.e. Bhopal and surrogacy 
– wherein the act of extermination in Nandigram proceeded through the exercise of 
brute force. Here of course, force was deployed by the state in the service of capital. In 
the other two cases, annihilation appears as the direct effect of capital. Whereas in 
Bhopal the primary act of injury is committed by the Union Carbide factory, in the case 
of surrogacy injury is an effect of the capitalisation of one’s own reproductive capacities. 
This does not imply the non-complicity of the state but rather that the violence by capital 
is sanctioned by state under the sign of development. As such, I suggest that 
development is the manifestation of necessitas. 
In her work on the violence of the state, Denise Ferreira da Silva posits necessitas as ‘the 
epistemological figuring of reason as violence’ (2009, p.219) wherein the annihilation of 
the racial subaltern is authorised as a self-preserving violence – i.e. as a duty and right of 
the state as sovereign. This formulation derives from Silva’s rehearsal of the transparency 
thesis (2007) which will be detailed later in the chapter. However, suffice it here to note 
that this self-preserving violence is sanctioned by the institution of the racial subaltern in 
affectability – the circumstance wherein reason is not comprehended through interiorised 
judgement and self-determination, but through its exteriorised forms as law and its 
enforcements (2009, p.224). As such the racial subaltern constitutes a threat to the ethical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  See fn. 4 
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order of the state. This logic, I suggest, pertains as well to the economic subaltern as 
indicated by Bataille’s notion of excess explicated above. I will elaborate on this 
relationship between economic subalternity and excess in the following chapter. 
However, at this point we can note that the operation of development as necessitas is an 
effect of the appearance of the poor as illicit hence threatening to the order represented 
by the state.  
Yet, as I will outline in this chapter, development presents itself as a strategy of 
economic intervention intended towards human progress and, thereby, progress towards 
humanness (Wilson 2013; Nederveen Pieterse 2001; Escobar 1995). Under this transition 
form, development is advanced as a recuperative gesture intended towards the 
restoration of old subjectivities – those regarded as ‘primitive’ or ‘not-yet’ – into those 
designated as modern, or more precisely, human. In this circumstance it is, in fact, capital 
that appears as a restorative force. In this context, regions such as Nandigram are subject 
to the truth of capital whereby peasant, tribal and indigenous subjectivities that are 
associated with it must be dissolved and coerced into new ‘worker’ subjectivities. 
Resistance to this truth represents a turning away from Reason, expressed as economic 
development, and hence is the actualisation of the threat posed by their unlawful 
existence. This authorises the unleashing of sovereign force intended towards submission 
or, otherwise, disappearance. Development thus confronts its objects as existence that 
must be eradicated – through recuperation or annihilation – as an effect of their 
unknowable hence threatening difference. Consequently, annihilation is intended towards 
the preservation of the human and capital as truth.  
In the next chapter, drawing mainly from the writings on value of Bataille, Spivak (1985; 
1999) and Lindon Barrett (1998), I will demonstrate that the imperative for this 
preservation is the institution in modernity of the human and capital as descriptors of 
ethical and economic value, respectively. Consequently, the annihilation of the poor, as described 
above, is authorised as the preservation of value. I posit this circumstance as the postcolonial capitalist 
condition. My aim in this thesis is to demonstrate development as the manifestation par 
excellence of this condition. I will develop the framework for this argument in the next 
chapter by revealing development as structured through the entanglement of ethical and 
economic value, i.e. of the human and capital. Entanglement, as defined by Karan Barad, 
‘is not simply to be intertwined with another, as in the joining of separate entities, but to 
lack an independent, self-contained existence’ (2007, p.ix). To propose the entanglement 
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of the human and capital, then, is to propose the inseparability of these two figurations 
in engagements with value. This circumstance, I will suggest, is definitive of the 
postcolonial capitalist condition. Consequently, I will show that under this condition, the 
reproduction of capital proceeds not as the subjugation of labour, as proposed by Marx, 
but rather as the eradication of excess, as described by Bataille. As will be explicated in 
this chapter, this shift represents the intervention of postcolonial critique into historical 
materialism.  
Postcolonial critique is a methodological approach offered by Gayatri Spivak that 
remains faithful to the subaltern (cf. 2005; 1999; 1988a). That is, she proposes this 
method as grounded in a recognition of the subaltern as instituted in excess – here, an 
excess of meaning – that renders it unknowable and hence unrepresentable within the 
Western epistemological tradition that has instituted master categories for the 
comprehension of existence. For the postcolonial critic, this unrepresentability should 
neither call for a translation, or ‘recovery’ into representation – i.e. making the subaltern 
speak – nor should it provoke an abandonment. Rather, a faithfulness to the subaltern 
necessitates a responsibility to their trace – to chart the itineraries of power that have 
instituted them as such, in opposition to and foreclosed by, the figure of the human 
(1988a; 1999). The writing of this thesis draws inspiration from this articulation and, 
hence, it from this point that I begin.    
The first section of this chapter aims to situate this thesis as a work of postcolonial 
critique. Consequently, the section outlines the debates that constitute this practice. I 
begin by locating the emergence of the subaltern as a figure of ‘postcolonial’ analysis 
within the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective 14. Taking its cue from Marxist 
materialism, the intellectual project of this group was to re-instate existences written out 
of history – specifically the figure of the peasant – into the field of historical analysis. 
However, as some critics have charged, the particularity of Subaltern Studies to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  The Subaltern Studies Collective was initially comprised of the historians Ranajit Guha, Shahid Amin, 
David Arnold, Partha Chatterjee, David Hardiman and Gyanendra Pandey. Vinayak Chaturvedi credits 
Guha’s teacher at Presidency College Calcutta, Susobhan Sarkar, with introducing his student to the 
works of Gramsci ‘at a time when most Marxists in the West were unfamiliar with [it]’ (2000, p.viii). 
Indeed Guha’s 1983 text Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency in colonial India, is a foundational text in the 
collective work of the Collective. Most of the important writings of the Collective were published as 
collected volumes. Some of the more known of these include ‘The prose of counterinsurgency’ (Guha 
1983), ‘Peasant revolt and Indian nationalism’ (Pandey 1982), ‘Conditions for knowledge of working-
class conditions’ (Chakrabarty 1983) and ‘Touching the body: Perspectives on the Indian plague’ 
(Arnold 1987). 
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Indian context as a postcolonial place (Shohat 1992), combined with the growing 
entrenchment of poststructuralism as an academic practice (Dirlik 1994; Ahmad 1995), 
morphed the former project into a more expansive, yet more generalised, project of 
‘postcolonial criticism’. In this section, I will provide a review of these critiques. In 
particular, I will focus on the charge that the abandonment of materialism in favour of 
the discursive divests the practice of any relevance to explicating the lived effects of 
subalternity. Building on the provocation of authors such as Dirlik and Ahmad to be 
attentive to the implications of class – or, the effects of capital – on the production of 
the subaltern, the second section discusses the possibilities and limitations of the practice 
of historical materialism to elucidating the postcolonial capitalist condition.  
on the limits of postcolonial criticism 
That the situation in Nandigram unfolded under the aegis of a leftist party that 
constituted the state government of West Bengal – the Communist Party of India – 
Marxist (CPI-M) – caused substantial global consternation amongst leftist activists. It 
called into question the possibility of a united front against the encroachments of global 
capital. The plea for unity within the left issued by intellectuals located elsewhere was 
met with agitation by activists in India. In a letter titled ‘To our friends in Bengal’, 
intellectuals such as Tariq Ali, Noam Chomsky, Mahmood Mamdani, Vijay Prashad and 
Howard Zinn appealed to left unity, writing: 
The balance of forces in the world is such that it would be impetuous to split the 
Left. We are faced with a world power that has demolished one state (Iraq) and is 
now threatening another (Iran). This is not the time for division when the basis 
of division no longer appears to exist. (Chomsky et al. 2007) 
Leftists in India, including Aditya Nigam, Mahashweta Devi, Nivedita Menon, Arundhati 
Roy and Sumit Sarkar, voiced concern at this appeal, noting the contemporary CPI-M’s 
appetite for ‘unbridled capitalist development, nuclear energy at the cost of both 
ecological concerns and mass displacement of people (the planned nuclear plant at 
Haripur, West Bengal), and the Stalinist arrogance that the party knows what “the 
people” need better than the people themselves’ (Nigam et al. 2007). These values, they 
suggested, hardly reflected those they believed to be held by the original signatories and, 
anyhow, could scarcely be considered leftist. Moreover, alluding to the reference to Iraq 
and Iran, they posited the resistance against SEZs as an integral part of the struggle 
against US imperialism, and hence posited opposition to the state’s actions in Nandigram 
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not as a distraction but rather a different manifest of the same struggle. In response to 
this critique, the original signatories issued a clarification, emphasising their 
condemnation of the strategies of the CPI-M. The intent of their statement, they noted, 
was to encourage left critics in ‘putting pressure on the CPI-M in West Bengal to correct 
and improve its policies and its habits of governance, rather than dismiss it wholesale as 
an unredeemable party’, thereby holding it accountable to its ‘laudable traditions… that 
once brought extensive land reforms to the state of West Bengal and that had kept 
communal tensions in abeyance for decades in that state’ (Chomsky et al. 2007a).  
I read in this debate between Chomsky et al. and Nigam et al. the question of 
representation as posed by Spivak in her introduction to ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ 
(1988a). Here, she underscores the two ‘related but irreducibly discontinuous’ (1988a, 
p.275) meanings of the word: to speak for another and to re-present one’s own reality. 
The call for ‘accountability’ issued by the first group – indeed the implication of 
restoration of the CPI-M – seems to express a conviction that the party, needed to be 
rehabilitated as part of the global left movement, so that the work of representing 
(speaking for) the global poor in the midst of increasing capitalist and imperial hostility 
could continue unabated. The response of Nigam et al. seems to question the ability, and 
need, for a party – and especially this one – to do the work of representing. Indeed, in 
accusing the CPI-M of pretending to know the interests of the people, they affirm the 
resistance of the poor as a re-presentation of their reality par excellence. For Spivak, it is 
through the encounter with this second register of representation that the postcolonial 
critic must operate. 
Another related point of contention that differentiates the two responses to Nandigram 
is their evocation of what Chakrabarty designates as the two histories of capital (2000). 
Here, he refers to the history of capital – ‘the past that is internal to the structure of 
being of capital’ (2000, p.66) – as History 1. History 2 is made up of the heterogeneous 
histories that contribute to, but can exist apart from, capital. They are pasts that ‘enable 
the human bearer of labor power to enact other ways of being in the world – other than, 
that is, being the bearer of labor power’ (2000, p.66). This, according to Chakrabarty, is 
where the possibility of the ‘politics of human belonging and diversity’ (1999, p.67) lie. 
As such, History 2 is the space of resistance to the logic of capital15. Yet, the plea for ‘left 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Chakrabarty notes that, according to Marx, History 1 seeks to subjugate the various pasts that are of 
History 2. Yet, the character of History 2 is such that it persists in interrupting History 1. In other 
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unity’ issued by Chomsky et al. seems to miss this, situating Nandigram instead within 
resistance conceptualised as a response to the logic of capital as exemplified in History 1. 
For the second group, instead resistance is linked to the history of capital, yet is 
differentiated by its particularities. In other words, from their perspective, faithfulness to 
a global left movement is an empty gesture in so far as this movement can never be a 
unity but rather is an assemblage of resistances constituted through History 2.  
To approach Nandigram, then, from the perspective of a postcolonial capitalist critique 
requires that the resistance ‘it speaks of is [recognised as] something that can happen 
only within the time horizon of capital, and yet it has to be thought of as something that 
disrupts the unity of that time’ (2000, p.95). In other words, to bring Spivak and 
Chakrabarty together, it requires interaction with History 2 as the site of re-presentation. 
The purpose of this section is to identify the possibilities and challenges of postcolonial 
criticism – constituted as an academic practice – in enabling this interaction. 
Consequently, the section begins with an overview of Subaltern Studies – the practice of 
insurgent historiography developed by historians of India – as a harbinger of 
postcolonial criticism. I focus, in particular, on descriptions of the subaltern as the 
figuration of difference. The work of Ranajit Guha (1983; 1981) will be instructive here. 
Thereafter, I use the writings of Gayatri Spivak (1988b) and Gyan Prakash (1994) to 
demonstrate how the poststructuralist essence of Subaltern Studies is transmogrified into 
the field of postcolonial criticism.  
Following a brief description of the possibilities offered by postcolonial criticism, I will 
highlight critiques of the practice itself as outlined in texts by Aijaz Ahmad (1995) and 
Arif Dirlik (1994). These critiques underscore the tendency of contemporary postcolonial 
criticism to conflate subalternity with normative difference, i.e. that which appears as 
marginality and underrepresentation. Ahmad and Dirlik implicate bourgeois intellectuals 
in the execution of this shift, charging an investment in explicating their own positioning 
as other rather than in engaging the lived effects of subalternity. They advocate, instead, 
an attentiveness to the work of capital in producing the political existence of the 
subaltern. By thus outlining the limitations of postcolonial criticism, this section seeks to 
identify the need for a historical materialist intervention therein. This will be elaborated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
words, even as capital attempts to subsume life under its universalised logic, life’s specificities continue 
to counteract and therefore transform it. This resistance of life to capital is what necessitates an 
attentiveness of History 2 – i.e. to particularities – when considering struggles against capital. 	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upon in the following section. But let me begin with a brief review of the precarity of the 
term ‘postcolonial’.   
In ‘Notes on the “Post-Colonial”’, Ella Shohat (1992) posits postcolonial studies as a 
effect of an academic instrumentality rather than of organic intellectualism. The coinage 
of the term in the late 1980s represents, she suggests, ‘a terminological shift indicat[ing] 
the professional prestige and theoretical aura the issues have acquired, in contrast to the 
more activist aura once enjoyed by “Third World” within progressive academic circles’ 
(1992, p.100). Here, Third Worldism evokes the radical circumstance of ‘First World 
leftists and Third World guerrillas [walking] arm in arm toward global revolution’ (1992, 
p.100). The ‘postcolonial’, on the other hand, signals a politico-intellectual safe space 
engendered by the relegation of the colonial to the past ‘and marked with a closure – an 
implied temporal border that undermines a potential oppositional thrust’ (1992, p.106). 
That is, for Shohat, the term represents a problematic temporality – a false historical 
rupture – between the period designated as colonial and the present. This deceptive 
temporality not only obscures the persistence of the colonial paradigm of domination 
and subordination – material, spatial/territorial, and political – but, more significantly, 
mitigates a militant comprehension and confrontation with these relations16.  
Shohat thus objects to ‘[t]he globalizing gesture of the “postcolonial condition” or “post-
coloniality” [as it] downplays multiplicities of location and temporality, as well as the 
possible discursive and political linkages between “post-colonial” theories and 
contemporary anti-colonial, or anti-neo-colonial struggles and discourses’ (1992, p.104). 
She shows favour, instead, to the language of ‘neo-’ for it signals new manifestations of 
colonialism (or new manifestations of the colonial mode of power) rather than a closure 
and a moving beyond. Contemplating a shift in the description of the world historical 
circumstance, she writes:  
Perhaps it is the less intense experience of neo-colonialism, accompanied by the 
strong sense of relatively unthreatened multitudes of cultures, languages and 
ethnicities in India, that allowed for the recurrent usage of the prefix “post” over 
that of the “neo”. Now that debt-ridden India, where “post-colonial discourse” 
has flourished, has had to place itself under the tutelage of the International 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  Shohat, in fact, begin her notes by citing her experience with a curriculum committee at CUNY that 
demonstrated discomfort with any reference to issues such as “imperialism and third worldist critique”, 
“neo-colonialism and resisting cultural practices”, and “the geopolitics of cultural exchange”. They were 
visibly relieved, however, at the sight of the word “post-colonial”. Only the diplomatic gesture of 
relinquishing the terrorising terms “imperialism” and “neo-colonialism” in favor of the pastoral “post-
colonial” guaranteed approval’ (Shohat 1992, p.99). 
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Monetary Fund, and now that its non-aligned foreign policy is giving way to 
political and economic cooperation with the U.S., one wonders whether the term 
“neo-colonial” will become more pervasive than “post-colonial”. (1992, p.106) 
Shohat’s jab at the Indian context in particular, stems from her postulation of ‘Indian’ 
academic discourse (at least, in its institutionalised form in U.S. academia) as the 
fountainhead of the postcolonial form. This claim emerges from the history of 
postcolonial studies as germinated by the Subaltern Studies Collective.  
In his introduction to Mapping subaltern studies and the postcolonial (2000), Vinayak 
Chaturvedi posits Subaltern Studies as the (institutional) precursor to the postcolonial 
studies project. Introduced as the practice of insurgent historiography, the concern of the 
Subaltern Studies Collective was to ‘revise the ‘elitism’ of colonialists and bourgeois-
nationalists in the historiography of Indian nationalism’ (2000, p.vii). Nationalism, in the 
first instance, was the primary strategy and authorisation of the Indian anti-colonial 
movement. As Gyan Pandey notes, ‘nationalism… attributed agency and history to the 
subjected nation, [even as] it staked a claim to the order of Reason and Progress 
instituted by colonialism’ (1994, p.1475). Consequently, national/ist historiography 
became a critical tool of anti-colonial practice. Yet, as Ranajit Guha states in the 
inaugural volume of Subaltern Studies (1981), this form of historiography emulates its 
colonial counterpart insofar as it produces the native elite as the proper bearers of the 
national/ist project. This approach is limited, then, in its inability to  
acknowledge, far less interpret, the contribution made by the people on their own, 
that is, independently of the elite to the making and development of this nationalism. 
… The involvement of the Indian people in vast numbers, sometimes in 
hundreds of thousands or even millions, in nationalist activities and ideas is thus 
represented as a diversion from a supposedly ‘real’ political process, that is, the 
grinding away of the wheels of the state apparatus and of elite institutions geared 
to it, or it is simply credited, as an act of ideological appropriation, to the 
influence and initiative of the elite themselves. (Guha 1981, p.3; original 
emphasis) 
The ‘people’ that Guha refers to are the subalterns, those who represent ‘the 
demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those whom we have 
described as the ‘elite’ (1981, p.8)17. The failure of elitist historiography, then, is the 
effective dismissal of the possibility of subaltern agency, indeed of subaltern 
consciousness.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Elsewhere, in the Preface to the volume, the subaltern is posited as the name for ‘the general attribute of 
subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender and 
office or in any other way’ (Guha 1981, p.vii). 
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Borrowing the term from the writings of Antonio Gramsci, the Subaltern Studies 
Collective18 instituted itself as such, seeking to re-articulate Indian history ‘from below’. 
Specifically, ‘[t]he six-point methodological programme on the history of the subaltern 
classes in Gramsci’s ‘Notes on Italian History’ was taken up as a framework for writing 
about and, more distantly, shaping an authentic ‘politics of the people’’ (Chaturvedi 2000, 
p.viii). This form of subaltern politics is located, according to the Collective, within 
peasant consciousness. Guha notes that even instances of rebellion by urban working 
classes and the petty bourgeoisie replicate this paradigm. While traditional historiography 
describes these insurrections either, negatively, as law and order problems or, positively, 
as influenced by elite ideology, Guha insists on their subaltern particularity, one that was 
sharply distinct from and, in fact, in strong opposition to elite domination. Moreover, 
these moments of resistance were diversely manifest based upon ‘the outlook of its 
leading elements dominating that of the others at any particular time and within any 
particular event’ (1981, p.5). Thus, even while the various acts of rebellion were united in 
their subaltern positionality and the common experience of domination and exploitation, 
they appeared messy and incoherent and, hence, beyond political comprehension. 
Consequently, as Guha remarks in his writings of peasant movements, they became 
relegated to the idiom of natural phenomena – ‘they break out like thunderstorms, heave 
like earthquakes, spread like wildfires, infest like epidemics’ (1983, p.2) – or were 
explicated as reactionary effects wherein ‘insurgency is regarded as external to the 
peasant’s consciousness and Cause is made to stand in as a phantom surrogate for 
Reason, the logic of that consciousness’ (1983, p.3; original emphasis).  
Instead, the Subaltern Studies Collective envisioned its work as the recuperation of 
subaltern, principally peasant, existence as conscious and its resistance as political. This 
was materialised through an epistemology founded upon ‘meticulous thick descriptions 
of insurgency’ (Chaturvedi 2000, p.x) that accounted for their own particular (religious, 
social, cultural) forms of existence. This entailed interventions not merely into colonial 
and national/ist historiography, but, significantly also Marxist historiography. Indeed, 
given the centrality of the figure of the peasant, Marxist analyses of modes of production 
crucially substantiated the Collective’s writings. However, the intent here was not to 
comprehend peasant rebellion within the narrative of transition to a capitalist mode of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  The Subaltern Studies Collective was initially comprised of the historians Ranajit Guha, Shahid Amin, 
David Arnold, Partha Chatterjee, David Hardiman and Gyanendra Pandey. Chaturvedi credits Guha’s 
teacher at Presidency College Calcutta, Susobhan Sarkar, with introducing his student to the works of 
Gramsci ‘at a time when most Marxists in the West were unfamiliar with [it]’ (2000, p.viii). 
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production. Rather, they sought to intercede therein, comprehending peasant resistance 
in India as the incorporated effect of domination within their specific, yet heterogeneous, 
political, cultural, and religious and economic circumstance. Of course, this necessitated a 
radical re-reading – a reading against the grain – of colonial, national and even Marxist 
discourse. The project thus emerged as one of rectification and recovery, making it 
vulnerable to charges of being a positivist project – i.e. the supposition that ‘if properly 
executed, it will lead to firm ground, to some thing that can be disclosed’ (Spivak 1988b, 
p.10). Yet, as both Spivak and Gyan Prakash (1994) note, the project unfolded in time as 
an account of the itinerary of colonial, and ultimately ‘Western’, power. That is, rather 
than re-/un-covering an authentic subaltern, the writings of the Collective came to 
record the failures and foreclosures wrought by hegemonic ideas and representations that 
mis-/displaced her. This was perhaps effected, to some extent, by the lack of sources left 
behind by the subaltern (Prakash 1994, p.1480), yet it was substantiated, in the main, by 
the influence of post-structuralism that questioned the possibility of an autonomous 
subject and consciousness-in-general.  
Thus, as Spivak and Prakash both suggest, in attending to the historicisation of subaltern 
existence, the Collective ultimately took up the task of unpacking dominant discourse 
that constituted the subaltern (and itself) as such: ‘[s]ubalternity thus emerges in… the 
functioning of the dominant discourse as it represents and domesticates peasant agency 
as a spontaneous and “pre-political’ response to colonial violence. … [I]t refers to that 
impossible thought, figure, or action without which the dominant discourse cannot exist 
and which is acknowledged in its subterfuges and stereotypes’ (Prakash 1994, p.1483). In 
this, the description of subalternity took on a more critical form, so that the subaltern 
came to signify a liminality between the known and unknowability – ‘the “native” was at 
once an other and entirely knowable; the Hindu widow was a silenced subaltern who was 
nevertheless sought as a sovereign subject asked to declare whether or not her 
immolation was voluntary’ (Prakash 1994, p.1488). Similarly, Spivak describes the 
subaltern as an ‘allegory of the predicament of all thought, all deliberative consciousness’ 
(1988b, p.12). She thus marks the subaltern not as a recuperable subject-position but 
rather as the intransigent object of thought. In so approaching the subaltern, Spivak’s 
intention is not to propose the figure as a dehistoricised theoretical figment but rather to 
acknowledge the various forms of existence that (are made to) persistently occupy the 
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lacunae and aporias of knowing19. By thus highlighting its post-structuralist gist, and the 
consequent refining of the definition of subaltern/ity, Spivak and Prakash pose Subaltern 
Studies as a practice that anticipates postcolonial critique20.  
In her text on Postcolonial theory, Leela Gandhi describes colonialism as ‘the historical 
process whereby the ‘West’ attempts systematically to cancel or negate the cultural 
difference and value of the ‘non-West’’ (1998, p.16). Following from this description, 
postcolonial critique marks an opening towards these negations that approaches what is 
lost therein. Specifically, it signals an attentiveness to subjugations, or foreclosures, of 
particular modes of existence and knowing as effected in the universalising of ‘Europe’ – 
i.e. the institution of a spatio-temporally specific ontoepistemology as world historical. 
Consequently, Prakash describes postcolonial critique as the practice of traveling the 
‘fault lines [of dominant discourse] in order to provide different accounts, to describe 
histories revealed in the cracks of the colonial archaeology of knowledge’ (Prakash 1994, 
p.1486). This colonial archaeology entails an accounting of humanism, the fundamental 
proposition of Enlightenment that enabled the imposition of universality as the 
condition of ontoepistemic subjugation. Gandhi describes humanism as the contention 
that ‘underlying the diversity of human experience it is possible, first, to discern a 
universal and given human nature, and secondly to find it revealed in the common 
language of rationality’ (1998, p.27). Humanism thus institutes the figure of Man – the 
subject idealised as human – as the measure of all things ethical. Yet, as Gandhi notes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Spivak’s project in this text, which introduces the volume Selected Subaltern Studies, is to affirm the project 
as   deconstructionist: 
If seen in this way, the work of the Subaltern Studies group repeatedly makes it possible 
for us to grasp that the concept-metaphor of the ‘social text’ is not the reduction of real 
life to the page of a book. … 
 It can be advanced that their work presupposes that the entire socius, at least in so far 
as it is the object of their study, is what Nietzsche would call… a ‘continuous sign-
chain’. The possibility of action lies in the dynamics of the disruption of this object, the 
breaking and relinking of the chain. This line of argument does not set consciousness 
over against the socius, but sees it as itself also constituted as and on a semiotic chain. It 
is thus an instrument of study which participates in the nature of the object of study. To 
see consciousness thus is to place the historian in a position of irreducible compromise. 
I believe it is because of this double bind that it is possible to unpack the aphoristic 
remark of Nietzsche’s that follows the image of the sign-chain with reference to this 
double bind: ‘All concepts in which an entire process is comprehended… withdraws 
itself from… definition; only that which has no history is definable.’ At any rate, these 
presuppositions are not, strictly speaking, consonant with a desire to find a 
consciousness (here of the subaltern) in a positive and pure state. (1988b, p.5) 
20  It is worth flagging, at this juncture, a distinction between postcolonial critique and postcolonial 
criticism. While I do not see this distinction as explicit within the field itself, I highlight it in order to 
establish my interest in the critiqueform. What follows, however, is primarily an elaboration of what has 
been designated postcolonial criticism. I engage it to tease out this distinction in order to highlight my 
investment in critique. I will return to this towards the end of this section. 
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the tacit corollary to humanist thinking is the implication of differential humanness. 
Indeed, this is the place of difference occupied/signified by the subaltern. Given that 
colonial subjugation is the instantiation of native modes of existence and knowing as 
differentially human, postcolonial critique, including Subaltern Studies as its inaugural 
form, advances itself through anti-humanist contention.  
The description of postcolonial as such assigns a reflective modality to the prefix ‘post-’ 
rather than the temporality attributed by Shohat. Yet, it also substantiates her charge of 
the field as academically orientated, rather than conducive of radical praxis. Gandhi 
concedes this claim, writing, ‘there is little doubt that in its current mood postcolonial 
theory principally addresses the needs of the Western academy. It attempts to reform the 
intellectual and epistemological exclusions of this academy, and enables non-Western 
critics located in the West to present their cultural inheritance as knowledge’ (1998, p.ix). 
This claim follows from the description of postcolonial criticism as operating within a 
symbolic terrain making it an exercise in academic or theoretical posturing that bears 
little consideration, or resemblance, to the lived existence of the subaltern. Providing an 
insight into anti-postcolonialist arguments, Gandhi notes how these  
repeatedly foreground(…) the irresolvable dichotomy between the woolly 
deconstructive predicament of postcolonial intellectuals and the social and 
economic predicament of those whose lives are literally or physically on the 
margins of the metropolis. Critics like Arif Dirlik and Aijaz Ahmad, in particular, 
are unrelenting in their exclusion of all theoretical/intellectual activity which lacks 
adequate referents to ‘everyday’ sociality. (1998, p.56) 
Here, the criticism put forth pertains to, at best, the dismissal by, and, at worst, the 
complicity of, postcolonial criticism in restaging modes of domination and exploitation 
prevalent under the present condition of global capitalism.  
In his text The postcolonial aura (1994), Arif Dirlik laments the poststructuralist 
investments of postcolonial theory as being unable to offer a cogent response to 
contemporary social and political challenges. This, he notes, is a consequence of its 
commitment to anti-Eurocentric critique that has devolved into a concern with questions 
of identity and difference. In Dirlik’s reading: 
[t]he affirmation of “difference” is basic to a postcolonial epistemology. 
Difference is important not just as a description of a situation, but more 
importantly because it shapes language, and therefore, the meaning of identity; 
every representation of the self carries upon it the trace of the “other.” Identity, it 
follows, is never “essential,” but the product of relationships. Whether informed 
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by Bakhtin’s dialogics or Derrida’s “differance,” difference and the negotiation of 
difference becomes crucial to the construction of identity and, by extension, of 
culture. (1994, p.5) 
Here, the materiality of difference is displaced in favour of materialisations. That is, 
directed by its postmodernist method – one that dispels the possibility of a ‘real’ – 
postcolonial criticism concerns itself with the determination of the social, and differences 
therein, as constructs. This gesture, Dirlik acknowledges, is productive in exposing the 
role of power in the institution of global difference, and of revalorising its subordinated 
forms. Yet, the reduction of all to construction eliminates the possibility of a radical 
politics, one that can emanate only from a localised, historicised analysis of structures. 
This, he notes, is consonant with the workings of global capital: ‘The postcolonialist (and 
postmodernist) insistence on the world as a social construct, against a representation of 
the world that recognizes to it a reality beyond human will and cognition, expresses a 
voluntarism that is very much synchronous with contemporary capitalism (Disney 
professes a similar epistemology). … An epistemology that offers no means to 
distinguish different “differences,” or even reality and fiction, opens the way to such 
social and political manipulation’ (1994, p.xi). Dirlik attributes this impossibility of 
‘distinguish[ing] different differences’ to the relegation of all forms of master-narratives 
as the founding anti-Enlightenment (anti-structuralist) gesture of postcolonial criticism. 
Indeed, while the distinction against Europe as an epistemic (socio-cultural) signifier is 
allowed to hold, given its originary valence, the dismissal of all ‘foundational thought’21 
proceeds to the detriment of difference within what is given as the postcolonial (previous 
Third) world. This, however, is not to suggest that postcolonial criticism dismisses or 
homogenises difference therein but rather that it evacuates it of historical substance.  
In a particularly cutting critique of Homi Bhabha’s The location of culture (1994), Aijaz 
Ahmad (1995) argues that (Bhabha’s) postcolonial criticism sublates difference into 
descriptive vocabulary such as hybridity, multiplicity, heterogeneity and ambivalence. 
According to Ahmad, the possibility of these descriptions is contingent upon the notion 
of displacement, not one that is coercive but rather agential: ‘These hybridities, cultural 
and philosophical, lead then to a certain conception of politics which Bhabha outlines in 
his essay ‘The postcolonial and the postmodern: the question of agency’, where we are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Dirlik quotes Gyan Prakash’s definition of it as such: ‘According to Prakash, a foundational view is one 
that assumes “that history is ultimately founded in and representable through some identity – individual, 
class, or structure – which resists further decomposition into heterogeneity”’ (1994, p.56). 
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again told that ‘the individuation of the agent occurs in a moment of displacement’, 
because ‘contemporary postcolonial discourses are rooted in specific histories of cultural 
displacement’’ (1995, p.14). That is, in seeking to describe the heretofore subjugated 
others of Europe as subjects, postcolonial criticism attends to their self-making. 
However, opposing the structured determinants of subjectivity as instituted by 
Enlightenment (colonial) thought, it approaches postcolonial subjectivity as unfolding 
through symbolic and spatial migratory practices. In this iteration, notes Ahmad, the 
postcolonial comes to mark the dissolution of the nation-state form. This constitutes a 
radical political rupture for, if under colonialism, and in anti-colonial thought, the nation-
state signified the horizon of politics, its notional disappearance in the postcolonial 
situation signals the need for a new basis of political action – one that comes to be 
fulfilled by ‘identity’, the postmodern descriptor of existence. Yet, this ascent of identity, 
he notes, does not capture the political existence/possibility of the marginalised within 
the spatio-temporally postcolonial world – rather it displaces the specificities of their 
subalternity onto the general scatter of subordination plotted along the Europe-Other 
axis. Dirlik regards this approach as culpable for the restaging, rather than the undoing, 
of hegemonic power as postcolonial criticism intends:  
The spatial homogenization that accompanies a “unified temporality”…, to the 
extent that it “fails to discriminate between the diverse modalities of hybridity,” 
may end up in “the consecration of hegemony.” … “Postcolonialism’s” 
repudiation of structure and totality in the name of history, ironically, ends up 
not in an affirmation of historicity, but in a self-referential “universalising 
historicism: that re-introduces an unexamined totality by the back door by 
projecting globally what are but local experiences. (1994, p.66; quotes from 
Shohat 1992) 
Moreover, if, as Bhabha suggests, ‘the language of critique… is a sign that history is 
happening’ (quoted in Ahmad 1995, p.18), then the language of identity and its qualifiers 
– hybrid, heterogeneous, etc. – represents, according to Ahmad, the 
economically/culturally fetishist critic reading their own itinerary into and against that of 
colonial/imperial domination. This reveals, in fact, the class(ed) basis of postcolonialism 
and its project of criticism: 
That one is free to invent oneself and one’s community, over and over again, as 
one goes along, is usually an illusion induced by the availability of surpluses – of 
money-capital or cultural capital, or both. That frenzied and constant 
refashioning of the Self, through which one merely consumes oneself under the 
illusion of consuming the world, is a specific mode of postmodern alienation 
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which Bhabha mistakenly calls ‘hybridity’, ‘contingency’, ‘postcoloniality’. (1995, 
p.18) 
Consequently, for Ahmad, as for Dirlik, postcolonial criticism is an effect of the 
postcolonial intellectual – the bourgeois, often male, generally migrant, subject resident 
within ‘Western’ academic institutions: ‘[it] is a discourse that seeks to constitute the 
world in the self-image of intellectuals who view themselves (or have come to view 
themselves) as postcolonial intellectuals; … Third World intellectuals who have arrived 
in First World academe, whose preoccupation with postcoloniality is an expression not 
so much of agony over identity, as it often appears, but of newfound power’ (Dirlik 
1994, p.62). 
Yet, despite their charges, neither Dirlik nor Ahmad proposes an abandoning of the 
project. Dirlik, in fact, acknowledges that the in(ter)vention of ‘postcoloniality’ has 
offered a necessary response to the ‘crisis of understanding produced by the inability of 
old categories to account for the world’ (1994, p.73). Yet, as already noted, they both 
take issue with its institution principally as a discursive construct, that which proceeds by 
ways of the ‘“flattening” of global relations by the insistence on heterogeneity without 
structure’ (1994, p.151). What they promote, instead, is an engagement with structure, 
and in particular, that of class/capitalism, in so far as it offers an analytic position for the 
launching of radical praxis against contemporary conditions of domination and 
exploitation. ‘Postcolonialism’, Ahmad asserts, ‘is also, like most things, a matter of class’ 
(1995, p.16). Similarly, Dirlik insists that ‘attention to structural context, especially the 
context of a globalized capitalism, is necessary not just to grasp contemporary global relations, 
but the very phenomenon of postcolonial criticism, with its insistence on the autonomy of culture 
and the priority it gives to questions of ethnicity and culture over earlier concerns with 
class and gender’ (1994, p.viii; emphasis added). Indeed, it is only through a recognition 
of structures that the ‘critic’ can reckon with their own difference, and complicity, 
therein. By thus rendering themselves, too, an expropriative object of their own thought, 
they may seize the possibility of professing a pertinent politics. I will return to this 
proposition in the third section of this chapter where I will I elaborate upon Spivak’s call 
for critique – a methodological approach distinct from criticism – as a space of intellectual 
and political possibility. There I will argue that Spivak’s method of critique, while being 
attentive to Dirlik and Ahmad’s call for the centring of materialism, also recognises the 
dangers of direct application of historical materialism to postcolonial contexts. This risk 
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entails coercing a representation of the subaltern within a universalist framework that 
marks, in fact, the restaging of colonial epistemology.  
In order to affirm the imperative of this methodological approach, however, it is 
necessary to comprehend the humanist underpinnings of historical materialism. 
Accordingly, the next section outlines the limitations of Marxist concepts in giving an 
account of the subaltern’s encounter with capital. Using the work especially of Cedric 
Robinson (2000), I demonstrate how Marx’s appropriation of Man as the historical 
subject par excellence comprehends alterity only in relation to capital. As such, it cannot 
account for subalternity as an ontologically instituted difference. I acknowledge there, 
along with Kevin Anderson (2010) and Tom Jeannot (2007), that Marx’s writings do 
demonstrate a concern with, at least, racial and national difference. However, with the 
help of critiques proposed by Denise Ferreira da Silva (2007) and Spivak (1999), I will 
demonstrate how these differences appear as mere descriptions of relations of 
subjugation consolidated by capital; they do not represent an ontological critique of the 
human. Consequently, the purpose of the following section is to identify the imperative 
of postcolonial critique, as an onto-materialist practice, in undertaking an analysis of 
postcolonial capitalism. 
on the limits of historical materialism 
As noted earlier, Chatterjee views the violence in Nandigram as a fundamental failure of 
politics. That is, he considers it a double effect of the underdevelopment of peasant 
politics in addressing their ‘unsure and inadequate’ ability to deal with the world of 
capital (2008, p.61), as well as the failure of the state to provide adequate measures for 
the reversal of dispossession by capital. This circumstance, however, is an effect not of 
peasant transition into/within a capitalist system, but rather of the bourgeois 
transformation of civil society. That is, contemporary peasant society, having already 
been integrated into the market economy, is marked by non-corporate capital. Peasant 
society is thus concerned with being protected against the uncertainties of a market 
dominated by corporate capital as well as against potential decapitalisation by it. On the 
other hand, the ‘passive revolution’ underway in India by means of civil society demands 
the imposition of law and order on political society so as to secure national growth, 
without, however, converting political society into ‘dangerous classes’ (2008, p.62). This 
passive revolution, Chatterjee claims, represents a transformation of the political 
structures civil society. The violence in Nandigram marks the failure of both, peasant 
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society and the state to adequately respond to this bourgeois transformation. Chatterjee’s 
intervention thus seeks to outline the limits of Marxist concepts, such as primitive 
accumulation, and descriptions of historical figures, such as the ‘peasant’, in 
comprehending the events in Nandigram. 
For Nigam, on the other hand, historical materialist analyses never seemed to offer a 
sufficient explication of the peasant condition. In the first place, as he notes, the notion 
of primitive accumulation is historically contingent, pertinent from late 15th to early 16th 
century English history. This particular analysis of the transition from ‘pre-capitalist’ to 
capitalist history cannot be universalised because the figure of the ‘peasant’ (through 
which the transition is described) also bears a historically specific form. Instead, for 
Nigam, the identity that appears as peasant in India always already constitutes a 
‘dangerous class’. This appearance as a political identity within the modern capitalist state 
is a forgery of the modern capitalist subject. The peasant is a pirate in civil society who 
‘produces the ‘copy’ or the ‘fake’ and throws it alongside the ‘original’ into the market, 
duping the original branded producer’ (2008). As such, she is dangerous to the state since 
her very existence as a double – as a ‘hidden transcript’ whose truth neither be known 
nor controlled – undermines its legitimacy. As an appearance that constitutes political 
society she is subaltern, but as identity under the gaze of the modern capitalist state she is 
peasant. Consequently, the very positing of the peasant as an identity is precarious since 
they can be dissolved whenever and wherever the state finds them a threat. This, for 
Nigam, is the circumstance of the violence in Nandigram. Since a historical materialist 
analysis would approach the peasant as an identity rather than an appearance, Nigam 
argues that it bears limited implication for analysing the violence of capital in a space like 
India.  
In order to underscore the postcolonial capitalist context of my thesis, this section 
outlines a racial/postcolonial critique of Marxist materialism, so as to identify spaces for 
intervention. I begin with a brief account of Cedric Robinson’s critique of Marx in his 
seminal text Black Marxism (2000). As such, his critique demonstrates Marxism as a 
specifically ‘Western’ construct that was rewritten, with profound effect, by Black 
revolutionaries committed to racial liberation. Here, I outline specifically his examination 
of Marx’s conceptual production wherein race appears as additive to, rather than 
constitutive of, the capitalist project. Robinson’s account has received some response in 
recent recuperations of Marx’s writings on race and nationality. I heed these in the works 
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of Kevin Anderson (2010) and Tom Jeannot (2007) as presented below. Yet, I argue that 
these recoveries do not respond to the substance of Robinson’s critique. For the 
inadequacy of Marx’s comprehension of race stems from his assumption of this as bio-
socially, rather than ontologically, constituted category. This, according to Robinson, 
prevents Marx from appreciating capitalism as an always already racial project. I support 
this reading of Robinson through the interventions of Gayatri Spivak (1999) and Denise 
Ferreira da Silva (2007) who observe how Marx’s investment in a normativised 
description of self-consciousness as the driver of history effectively precludes the racial 
subaltern – the one who is instituted in affectability and hence can make no claim to 
consciousness. Indeed, as I will later show, it is this preclusion that authorises capital to 
objectify the racial other for the expropriation of labour. Thus, in this section I 
demonstrate Marx’s inability to recognise racial subalternity as the condition of 
possibility for the development of a capitalist mode of production. This circumstance, I 
will finally note, eliminates the racial subaltern from his vision for human liberation.  
In Black Marxism (2000), Robinson expounds on the Black Radical Tradition as a 
profound response to – not negation or dismissal but expansive refiguration of – 
Marxism as a ‘Western construction’ (2000, p.2). The first section of this text, however, 
wherein he sets up his argument, is concerned with demonstrating capitalism as a racial 
project. Here, Robinson suggests that the notions of race and nation anticipated, and 
hence were fundamental to, the capitalist organisation of production and exchange 
(Robinson 2000, p.9). More significantly, these conceptions were pertinent, in the first 
instance, to the European circumstance – emanating from the organisation of labour in 
its Roman as well as feudal history – rather than, as often posited, emergent only from 
the moment of the colonisation of the Americas and the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Thus, 
race figures not as a biosocially descriptive category but as a particular strategy of 
domination, ‘its epistemology, its ordering principle, its organizing structure, its moral 
authority, its economy of justice, commerce, and power’ (Robinson 2000, p.xxxi). 
According to Robinson, Marx’s engagement with race as that which is external to, and 
emerges in relation to, Europe, escapes a reckoning with race as axiomatic, rather than 
additive, to expropriation and exploitation under capitalism.  
Robinson substantiates his position by recounting the situation of enslavement under the 
Roman and Middle Ages. His intent here is not merely to assert the figure of the slave as 
pre-dating the African slave trade, but more so to set up it up as the condition of 
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possibility for the emergence of the western European bourgeoisie. Robinson counters 
Marx’s evolutionary thesis of the bourgeoisie as a revolutionary class that emerged in 
opposition to feudalism, and suggests that rather than being ‘the “germ” of a new order 
dialectically posited in an increasingly confining host – feudalism – [they signified] an 
opportunistic strata, willfully adaptive to the new conditions and possibilities offered by 
the times’ (2000, p.19). The implication here is that the western European bourgeois 
class did not negate feudalism to institute mercantile capitalism, but rather appropriated 
its ‘social, cultural, political, and ideological complexes’ (2000, p.10) in order to overcome 
the decline of the feudal system. The consolidation of the bourgeois as the ruling class 
required not only the arrogation of a ‘labouring class’ produced of the serfs, slaves and 
vagabonds of the Middle Ages, but more significantly of the creation of a bourgeois 
mythology that narrated its superiority as authorisation for the force required to produce 
the requisite ‘masses’. The promulgation of this mythology through the construct of the 
‘nation’ – as a short-hand for the ‘historical, racial, cultural, and linguistic entity that [it] 
signifies’ (2000, p.24) – ascertained that: 
[t]he bourgeoisie that led the development of capitalism were drawn from 
particular ethnic and cultural groups; the European proletariats and the 
mercenaries of the leading states from others; its peasants from still other 
cultures; and its slaves from entirely different worlds. The tendency of European 
civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate – 
to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into ‘racial’ ones. 
As the Slavs became the natural slaves, the racially inferior stock for domination 
and exploitation during the early Middle Ages, as the Tartars came to occupy a 
similar position in the Italian cities of the late Middle Ages, so at the systemic 
interlocking of capitalism in the sixteenth century, the peoples of the Third 
World began to fill this expanding category of a civilization reproduced by 
capitalism. (2000, p.26) 
Thus, racialism, as a strategy of domination and exploitation, was endemic to Europe’s 
politico-economic organisation – one that eventually manifests itself as capitalism. This 
racialism received further rearticulation as the western Europe bourgeoisie extended its 
reach beyond, and with the epistemological authorisation of, its nation-state into colonial 
lands, through the incorporation of indigenous labour (including that within Europe, 
itself) and, finally, through the commodification of African slaves.  
In an apparent rejoinder to Robinson’s work, however, Kevin Anderson argues that 
Marx was keenly attuned to race/ism and nation/alism as crucial factors of capitalist 
subjugation. In Marx at the Margins (2010), he reviews Marx’s personal correspondence 
and his journalistic articles, primarily in the New York Tribune, to outline his thought 
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regarding the place of colonialism within European capitalism. Anderson here argues 
that Marx’s increasing attention, especially, to the anti-British uprisings in India and the 
nationalist movement in Ireland demonstrate not only his recognition of colonial 
subjugation as a practice of capitalist expropriation, but, more significantly, his 
recognition of the ‘internally generated emancipatory potentials of these societies’ (2010, 
p.124). Indeed, he saw within anti-colonial movements the potential for forging domestic 
and international solidarities for a world labour movement. Thus, for example, writing 
about the Indian mutiny of 1857, he describes the rebelling soldiers as ‘the “best ally” of 
the revolutionary movement in the West’ (2010, p.41). Similarly, conveying his support 
for Irish national liberation a few years later, he notes: 
I have become more and more convinced – and the thing now is to drum this 
conviction into the English working class – that they will never do anything 
decisive here in England before they separate their attitude towards Ireland quite 
definitely from that of the ruling classes, and not only make common cause with 
the Irish, but even take the initiative in dissolving the Union established in 1801, 
and substituting a free federal relationship for it. ... Every movement in England 
itself is crippled by the dissension with the Irish, who form a very important 
section of the working class in England itself. (quoted in Anderson 2010, p.145) 
Thus, Marx viewed anti-colonial struggles as a particular manifestation of, indeed the 
vanguard movements for, revolutionary struggle against capitalist oppression.  
In a similar vein, Tom Jeannot asserts that for Marx, ‘racism and capitalism are cut from 
the same cloth’ (2007, p.87). He substantiates this argument through Marx’s writings on 
the U.S. Civil War. Most pertinently, Jeannot highlights Marx’s communication with 
Lincoln at his re-election as evidence of the former’s recognition of the abolition of the 
enslavement of black and African people in the U.S. as a truly world revolutionary cause. 
Marx, here, does not conceive of the Civil War in purely economic terms but also as the 
necessary overthrow of racial subjection:    
While the working men, the true political powers of the North, allowed slavery to 
defile their own republic, while before the Negro, mastered and sold without his 
concurrence, they boasted it the highest prerogative of the white-skinned laborer 
to sell himself and choose his own master, they were unable to attain the true 
freedom of labor, or to support their European brethren in their struggle for 
emancipation; but this barrier to progress has been swept off by the red sea of 
civil war. 
The working men of Europe… consider it an earnest of the epoch to come that 
it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, 
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to lead his country through the matchless struggle for the rescue of an enchained race and the 
reconstruction of a social world. (quoted in Jeannot 2007, p.75; added emphasis)  
This is not to suggest that Marx’s theoretical concern with slavery is not as a primarily 
economic category. But rather, that he recognises its historical particularities as founded 
on racial difference – whether it be black enslavement in the U.S. or Irish subjugation by 
the English.   
Beyond the racial character of slavery, Jeannot seeks to demonstrate that Marx’s 
indictment of slave labour in the U.S. was simultaneously a condemnation of its racist 
nature. He does so by citing a few quotes from Capital wherein Marx remarks upon the 
hateful and abhorrent nature of black slavery22. But perhaps the most significant of these 
is from Wage labour and capital, where he comments upon the false equivalence of 
blackness and the slave:  
What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good 
as the other. A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A 
cotton spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It only becomes capital 
in certain relations. Torn away from these conditions, it is like capital as gold by 
itself is money, or as sugar is the price of sugar. (quoted in Jeannot 2007, p.86) 
This Jeannot reads as Marx’s affirmation that the equation between African and slave is 
not an effect of nature but ‘only in the context of “certain” capitalist social “relations”’ 
(2007, p.86). Consequently, he notes, ‘Marx was aware of the social construction of 
“race” as a category in the first place, and he demonstrated the systematic role that racist 
practices and ideology play in the history and development of the capitalist mode of 
production’ (2007, p.87) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  ‘In the United States of America, every independent workers’ movement was paralyzed as long as 
slavery disfigured a part of the republic. Labor in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a 
black skin. However, a new life immediately arose from the death of slavery. The first fruit of the 
American Civil War was the eight hours’ agitation, which ran from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from New 
England to California, with the seven- league boots of the locomotive.’ (quoted in Jeannot 2007, p.85) 
 ‘While the cotton industry introduced child-slavery into England, in the United States it gave the 
impulse for the transformation of the more or less patriarchal slavery into a system of commercial 
exploitation. In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage-laborers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of 
the New World as its pedestal. ... [Capital] comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with 
blood and dirt. … The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginning of the conquest 
and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of black 
skins. … The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement and murder 
flowed back to the mother country and were turned into capital there.’ (quoted in Jeannot 2007, p.86) 
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The evidence presented by Anderson and Jeannot, then, would seem to run counter to 
Robinson’s claim that ‘driven… by the need to achieve the scientific elegance and 
interpretive economy demanded by theory, Marx consigned race, gender, culture, and 
history to the dustbin’ (2000, p.xxix). Despite the command of this accusation, I believe 
this statement to be somewhat of a rhetorical flourish elevated by critics as encompassing 
the spirit of Robinson’s critique. Instead, I contend that his charge pertains more 
specifically to Marx’s implicit gloss over the specificities of each encounter, and regarding 
them from the perspective of subjugated, not merely as ‘labouring masses’ but each 
determined by their epistemologies and cultural logics. Thus, Robinson asserts, ‘Marx’s 
conceit was to presume that the theory of historical materialism explained history; but, at 
worst, it merely rearranged history. And at its best (for it must be acknowledged that 
there are some precious insights in Marxism), historical materialism still only 
encapsulated an analytical procedure which resonated with bourgeois Europe, merely 
one fraction of the world economy’ (2000, p.xxix). 
Against this claim, too, the work of Anderson and Jeannot offers a response. By 
providing an account of his, until recently unpublished, Ethnological notebooks, they assert 
the prevalence of Marx’s multilinear thinking. The notebooks consist primarily of Marx’s 
study of various anthropological texts with a view to comprehending non-Western and 
pre-capitalist societies. In particular, Anderson’s reading of the notes suggests that Marx 
was concerned with understanding ‘the social relations within contemporary societies 
under the impact of capitalist globalization’ (2010, p.201). Thus, for instance, Marx 
studied the condition of gender relations in clan-based society, such as the Iroquois and 
other indigenous communities in Australia and India; and communal social relations in 
pre-colonial India, Indonesia and Algeria as well as their transformation under colonial 
rule.  To Anderson and Jeannot, these studies represent not only Marx’s growing interest 
in understanding geo-historical specificities as grounds for different manifestations of 
economic liberation but also his abiding concern with a ‘philosophy of liberation’ 
(Jeannot 2007, p.79) in general. What we have, then, is an affirmation of Marx’s multi-
linear thinking through diverse geo-histories. Indeed, Marx is seen to be interested in 
how the specificities of these geo-histories would produce their own trajectories of 
liberation. Moreover, within the context of the western European and North American 
bourgeois order, he recognises the production of racial and national difference as an 
instrument of not only economic, but more generally, of human subjugation. What then 
is to be made of Robinson’s critique?  
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In order to address this, I offer two more quotes from his text:   
Both [Henri] Pirenne and [K.G.] Davies understood that the biological metaphor 
of a bourgeoisie emerging out of the Middle Ages, nurturing itself on the 
“mercantilisms” and administrations of the Absolute Monarchies of the 
traditional period between feudalism and the capitalism, and on the lands and 
titles of impoverished nobilities, then finally achieving political and economic 
maturity and thus constituting industrial capitalism, is largely unsupported by historical 
evidence. Rather it is a historical impression,  a phantom representation largely 
constructed from the late eighteenth century to the present by the notional 
activity of a bourgeoisie as a dominant class. This history of “the rise of the 
middle class” is an amalgam of bourgeois political and economic power, the self-
serving ideology of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class and thus an intellectual and 
political preoccupation-mediated through the constructs of evolutionary 
theory… (2000, p.19; added emphasis) 
and 
Marx had not fully realized that the cargoes of laborers also contained African 
cultures, critical mixes and admixtures of language and thought, of cosmology 
and metaphysics, of habits, beliefs, and morality. These were the actual terms of their 
humanity. These cargoes, then, did not consist of intellectual isolates or 
deculturated Blacks – men, women, and children separated from their previous 
universe. African labor brought the past with it, a past that had produced it and 
settled on it the first elements of consciousness and comprehension. (2000, 
pp.121–122; added emphasis) 
The first quote identifies Marx’s conceptual point of departure – i.e. the bourgeois figure 
– as based in historical fabrication; the second, his incomprehension of the implications 
of epistemological difference and specificity. Reading these two quotes in conjunction 
reveals, I believe, the core of Robinson’s account. Robinson’s critique of Marx as 
Eurocentric, and of Marxism as a western construction, stems from a recognition of the 
grounding of his categories – the terms of his analysis – in a particular (mis)apprehension 
of European social and political history. Indeed, it is this history that Marx posits as the 
ruptural instantiation of a capitalist order, and hence the origin of world history. Yet, if 
we are to accept that the emergence of western European bourgeois history as history as 
such is constructed through a ‘language of error’ (Robinson 2000, p.19), then Marx’s 
endeavour to produce a universalist account of capitalism (or, an account of capitalism as 
if universal) already suffers a false start. It follows, too, that the subject and concepts of 
this history are figured through epistemological assumptions identical to the mythology. 
So that, even as Marx shifted his gaze from Europe to other geo-histories, and 
recognised difference in the trajectories and the play of racial difference in the institution, 
functioning and potential revolution of capitalist relations, his thought retained the 
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western European bourgeois figure as his subject of analysis. It is this limitation that 
Robinson underscores in pointing to Marx’s disregard of linguistic, cosmological and 
metaphysical specificity as the terms of one’s humanity. Indeed, what this observation 
anticipates is a critique of Marx’s appropriation of Man as the subject of history and 
hence the primary figure in his materialist analysis.   
Marx’s materialist approach is founded on the consideration of Man as animal plus. That 
is, while man is of Nature, subject to physiological needs and the primordial drive 
towards survival, what distinguishes Man from animal is consciousness. Consciousness 
consists in man directing his faculties towards appropriating things external to him and 
thereby establishing himself in relation of the world beyond his being. It is through 
consciousness that man confirms the objective reality of the self – that is, locates himself 
within the world of things (cf. Fromm 1970; Marx and Engels 1970)23. In so far, then, as 
productive activity – the process of making the world one’s own – is the basis of human 
existence, Marx shares a common articulation of Man with an idealist approach. 
However, rather than positing the thinking mind as the producer of the world – the 
mind, through concepts, actualises ontological essence into objective existence – and 
hence the substance of history, Marx posits the ‘actual life-process’ of man as his primary 
expression of productive activity: ‘Consciousness can never be anything else than 
conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process’ (Marx and 
Engels 1970: 47). Consequently, labour is Man’s primordial mode of self-realisation and, 
consequently, of historical movement. Indeed, this description of Man propels Marx’s 
historicist analysis of labour in charting the trajectory to, and beyond, capitalist society. 
Yet, when Marx expands his gaze beyond Europe, he observes difference – what in fact 
appears to him as a lag – in the development of class structure, the essential effect of 
capitalism, in various regions of the globe.    
In A critique of postcolonial reason (1999), Spivak postulates that Marx develops his 
formulation of the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) in order to approache this 
question of difference. She describes AMP as ‘the name and imaginary fleshing out of a 
difference in terms that are consonant with the development of capitalism and the 
resistance appropriate to it as “the same”’ (1999, p.79). Spivak’s argument proceeds from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and consciousness. He has a conscious life activity. 
It is not a determination with which he is completely identified. Conscious life activity distinguishes man 
from the life activity of animals. Only for this reason is he a species-being. Or rather, he is only a self-
conscious being, i.e. his own life is an object for him, because he is a species-being. (Marx 1970, p.101) 
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an account of Species-Life and Species-Being as the two forms of human existence 
proffered by Marx as crucial to the unfolding of history. Whereas the former is man’s 
natural condition – i.e. wherein he is of nature, where ‘nature is [his] “great body without 
organs”’ (Spivak 1999, p.76) – the latter names the self-conscious, self-intending human 
being, he who understands and acts against the given. By actively transforming his given 
conditions of existence, the Species-Being institutes himself as the subject of history24. It 
is for this reason that Marx views capitalism not merely as an economic project but a 
historical one, so that existences that are consonant with Species-Life belong not only to 
the pre-history of capital, but to that of Man. This differentiation is evidenced, according 
to Spivak, in Marx’s figuration of the AMP.  
Since capitalism is concerned with the production of value, the Species-Being reveals 
himself as such through his capacity to produce value in excess of his own need, a 
circumstance that produces the possibility of further production and exchange:  
When human self-conscious activity (Species-Being) appears in the value-form… 
it shows itself capable of producing value in excess of what is needed to sustain 
being-natural in Species-Life (subsistence). Yet it is a difference between need 
and making that means not only the possibility of exchange, but also the 
possibility of a surplus accessible to further exchange (or use).  (1999, p.79) 
This description conceives class differentiation and struggle as an effect of man’s 
conscious activity, and indeed, the condition of possibility for his ultimate emancipation. 
Within this historical account, the AMP – signified by the appearance of property as ‘the 
relation of the individual to the natural conditions of labour and of reproduction as 
belonging to him as the objective, nature-given body without organs of his subjectivity’ 
(quoted in Spivak 1999, p.80) – is offered as a descriptor of a geo-temporality yet 
associated with Species-Life, i.e. of human activity mediated externally, here by the figure 
of the oriental despot, rather than by self-consciousness. Marx’s engagement, then, with 
geo-historical difference does not evidence a consideration of (the possibility of) onto-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  ‘We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the 
development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the 
human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable 
and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their 
corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have 
no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material 
intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking.’ 
(Marx & Engels 1970, p.47)  
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phenomenological difference, but rather is an endeavour to fit ‘historical presuppositions 
into a logical mold’ (Spivak 1999, p.81). 
Even if we are to grant, with scholars such as Anderson and Jeannot, that Marx began to 
distance his thought from a teleological view to history and that, in fact, he appreciated 
geo-historical difference as offering varied models of revolution, it remains that his 
account of world history relies upon the primacy of a particular elaboration of the self-
conscious subject (the one he names Species-Being) as universal. Indeed, as Denise 
Ferreira da Silva notes in her engagement with The German ideology, ‘the rewriting of 
History and self-consciousness as effects of a double exteriority – that is, that of 
universal regulation (laws of production) and social relationships – retains self-
determination as the singular attribute of the homo historicus’ (2007, p.189). Along with 
Spivak’s observation above that for Marx class differentiation and struggle are the 
condition of possibility for human emancipation, she notes that their historical 
materialist method fashions self-consciousness as a thing of necessity for the production 
of conditions of existence, and hence integral to the unfolding of history. In this, Marx’s 
scientific schema does not activate an alternate social ontology that displaces the human 
subject as instituted by a western European bourgeois onto-epistemology but merely re-
maps the priority of self-consciousness from an idealist conception of the subject to a 
materialist one. This is the proper content of Robinson’s critique of Marx’s disregard of 
racial and national difference in the institution and functioning of capital – one that is 
substantiated by Silva’s address of Marx’s implication in the transparency thesis. 
The transparency thesis identifies the Enlightenment subject of Europe as the transparent 
I, determined as such through a self-determined ability to act in accordance with reason. 
The transparent I is a subject of ‘universal poesis… [wherein] reason [is conceived] the 
sovereign interior producer of the universe’ (Silva 2007, p.xvi). In this evaluation, the 
mind is privileged as the seat of rational action, displacing the body as a site of self-
determined action. In radical opposition to the transparent I stands the affectable I, an 
existence determined as being a ‘thing of world’, not of understanding and judgement. 
Indeed, the affectable I is subject to ‘universal nomos… [wherein] reason [is conceived] as the 
exterior regulator of the universe’ (2007, p.xvi). That is, incapable of recognising, let only 
actualising, its own essence, the affectable I functions, instead, by reason exterior to itself. 
Reason thus institutes the transparent I and the affectable I in unresolvable difference. This 
difference, notes Silva, is captured through the notion of raciality. Raciality names the 
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epistemological tools used to objectify (ethical) difference through outer determination, 
wherein the body, and the territories attached to it, are written as signifiers of the mind. 
Put differently, descriptions of racial and national difference that rely on visual/aesthetic 
or geo-historical markers signify, in fact, an unsublatable onto-epistemological, therefore 
ethical, difference in existence as S/subject.  
Once more, given that Marx locates self-determined activity, and hence consciousness, as 
the instrument of History, Silva notes:  
[B]ecause historical materialism does not relinquish interiority, it rewrites self-
consciousness in transparency. In other words, its limits reside precisely in that, 
… in its centering of materiality (of the laboring body [the principal instrument] 
and of human relationships [at once agent and effect] of production), the 
privileging of the “real/divided” society over the “ideal/unified” nation, as the 
subject of History [it] retains recognition as the sine qua non of proletarian 
emancipation. 
This is the certain implication of difference as it emerges in Marx’s thought – so that, 
while he recognises difference, and even more the constructedness of it, this recognition 
pronounces the ultimate possibility of incorporation within the universal condition of 
self-determination rather than noting it as an effect of a geo-historically situated 
description of existence. Thus, for example, when Marx denounces the presumed natural 
equivalence of ‘Negro’ and ‘slave’, he posits that African/black peoples, too, have the 
capacity for self-determination, and hence historical activity, that is degraded under the 
condition of enslavement – not that the dehumanisation of the enslaved manifests 
through the sublimation of their present onto-epistemologies into, and their beings’ 
subsequent disavowal from, a remote instantiation produced as universal25. 
Thus, it is the mere pretension of universality, in fact, that always already renders 
deceptive gestures that aim to recuperate him as a non-reductionist, multilinear, 
intersectional theorist of liberation. That Marx maintains a universalist aspiration, even as 
he encounters the historical productivity of difference, is an effect of the assumption of 
phenomenological sameness – i.e. of identical structures of experience and consciousness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  This argument with regards the preclusion of the racial subaltern is pertinent, as well, to the role of 
women in Marx’s thought. Marxist feminists have critiqued the diminishing of socially reproductive 
labour as non value producing, and its consequent relegation to ‘women’s work’ (cf. Federici 2004; 
Fortunati 1995). This ‘blind-spot’, it is commonly argued, represents his inability to comprehend socially 
reproductive labour as the condition of possibility for the production of market value, and hence the 
primordial instantiation of value. However, it could further be argued that Marx’s categorisation as such 
stems, rather, from his unconsidered acceptance of women, as posited in Enlightenment thinking, as 
affective things lacking the capacity for self-consciousness and, hence, entities incapable, in general, of 
being historical agents. I will address this in greater detail in Chapter 5.   
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across time and space. This has profound implications for the possibility of political 
emancipation not only in practice but also as theory. It is for this reason that the critique 
inaugurated by Robinson, and continued in Spivak and Silva, is important – not as a 
disavowal of Marx’s work but rather as an attentiveness against the deployment of his 
‘speculative morphology as an adequate blueprint for social justice’ (Spivak 1999, p.82)26. 
Accordingly, the following section outlines the possibilities of postcolonial critique in 
response to this caution.  
I begin by outlining the significance of Spivak’s call for ‘a deconstructive politics of 
reading’ (1999, p.7) which insists on confronting structures that produce difference and 
the ‘writer’s’ complicity therein. The intent here, I believe, is to comprehend difference 
not as an intractable problem of ‘authenticity’ and ‘representation’, but rather as (having) 
material effect. This is in contradistinction to postcolonial criticism which, in displacing 
structure(s) for conditions such as hybridity, heterogeneity, multiplicity and ambiguity, 
proposes difference as ‘a metahistorical principle, making it nearly impossible to 
distinguish one kind of “difference” from another politically’ (Dirlik 1994, p.ix). Spivak’s 
commitment to the material effects of difference as they figure in relations of domination 
and subjugation is evidenced in her insistence on the critic’s responsibility to the 
subjugated other.  
The aim of the following section is to situate myself as writer/critic/spectator/subject in 
relation to the subaltern existences I encounter in this thesis. In order to do so, I find 
useful the concept of agential separability as articulated by Karan Barad (2007). Barad 
offers this concept as a critique of the ontological determinism of representations. That 
is, she argues that ontological difference, as assumed in the register of representation, is 
only an appearance effected by the iterative performance of material practices27. In order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  I am not certain that Ahmad or Dirlik would grant her this distinction. Even so, this is my reading of 
her postcolonial intervention, one that, I contend, is not done sufficient justice in the formers’ readings.  
27  This description recalls Judith Butler’s (2011) account of performativity. However, Barad argues that 
Butler leaves both matter as fixed and passive, a limitation effected by her primary interest in human 
social practices. Consequently, she notes: 
  Butler’s theory ultimately reinscribes matter as a passive product of discursive practices 
rather than as an active agent participating in the very process of materialization. This 
deficiency is symptomatic of an incomplete assessment of the causal factors of 
materialization and an incomplete reworking of “causality” in understanding the nature 
of discursive practices (and material phenomena) in their productivity. (2007, p.151) 
Instead, Barad describes matter as ‘phenomena in their ongoing materialization’ (2007, p.151), so the 
question of mattering, as posed by Butler, is rearcticulated as a question of ‘intra-active becoming’ 
whereby the mattering (as substance and significance) one body is the coproduction of another body 
that matters differentially as an effect of a separation – an agential cut – instituted within a given field of 
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to contemplate the productivity of Barad’s intervention, I offer Hortense Spillers’ (1987) 
account of the materialisation of the black female body as an effect of the practices of 
injury committed under slavery. In so doing, I demonstrate how the white/male body 
(that, originally, of the slave master) is bounded as mattering against that of the 
black/female body within the field of racial/sexual appearance. Explicating this account 
through Barad’s critique of representationalism, I read Spillers back into the postcolonial 
context, thereby interrogating its productivity in approaching the subaltern. Here, I read 
the subaltern – or specifically the body of the poor – as bounded out of mattering by the 
material practices that instituted the modern postcolonial subject as that which matters 
within the phenomenon of the human. Recognising thereby the agential separation 
between myself as writer/critic/spectactor/subject against the subaltern existences I 
encounter, I propose postcolonial critique as a method that is concerned with 
entanglement. That is, I suggest that a historicisation of the subaltern, as advocated by 
Spivak and Chakarabarty, necessitates a self-implicating practice that recognises the 
observer as a co-produced effect of the observed. In other words, the observer exists 
only in so far as they have been separated out from the observed by a particular 
apparatus of observation. In the final section of this chapter, I will affirm development as 
the apparatus that effects this separation – that institutes what Barad calls an agential cut 
– between myself (as postcolonial subject) and the subaltern. 
on encountering the subaltern 
In his explication of political society as the scene of subalternity, Nigam posits the figure 
of the pirate as epitomising an illegible hence illicit existence. This figure, he notes,  
has now become a pervasive metaphor for the illegal, the unruly and the 
unregulated. The pirate today is one who copies, multiplies and distributes or 
sells with scant respect for the original except as object of consumption. The 
pirate produces the ‘copy’ or the ‘fake’ and throws it alongside the ‘original’ into 
the market, duping the original branded producer. Often, though, s/he who is 
called the pirate, merely shares information and products with others. 
‘Intellectual property’, copyright and trade mark have thus become the new 
banners of capitalist aggression – as it stands threatened by such pirate or 
contraband capital – its own cheap copy. To the state, it poses another kind of 
threat by depriving it of what it believes are its legitimate revenues – all the 
transactions in this domain being completely ‘off the record’. (2008) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
appearance. Explicating the merits and demerits of Barad’s intervention further to this is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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Thus, the pirate’s very existence is a hidden transcript and, as such, she lives a double-
existence. On the one hand, the act of ‘piracy’ is the exercise of her agency in accruing 
the means of subsistence otherwise denied her. Yet, this circumstance precludes the 
possibility for organised resistance against the capitalist state that compels her mode of 
subsistence – i.e. ‘piracy’ – in the first place. Indeed, by installing her as pirate – that is, 
by attributing to her the identity of ‘pirate’ – the state authorises itself, as a function of 
necessitas, to eradicate her as unlawful. Consequently, this identity cannot serve as the 
basis for the formation of a legible politics and, in fact, renders precarious any alternate 
form of visibility/identity asserted by her. The figure of the pirate thus perfectly capture 
the circumstance of subalternity as defined by Spivak.  
In ‘Scattered speculations on the subaltern and the popular’, Spivak hones her 
description of subalternity as ‘a position without identity. … where social lines of 
mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a recognisable basis of action’ 
(2005, p.476). Indeed, the subaltern is she who, absent access to ‘institutional 
infrastructure’, lacks recognisable agency, where agency names ‘institutionally validated 
action, assuming collectivity’ (2005, p.475). This description is offered as a means to 
mark an irreducible difference between the subaltern/ity and the people/popular, a 
distinction that was unacknowledged in the former’s appropriation by Subaltern Studies. 
To posit equivalence between the two is merely to fill the ‘position without identity’ with 
a generalised/generalisable one. ‘People’, notes Spivak, ‘is a pluralised general category 
that has no necessary class-description’ (2005, p.479). This serves the interest of the 
recorders and managers of the subaltern – the intellectuals and self-fashioned leaders of 
resistive collectives – those who can self-synecdochise: ‘put aside the surplus of my 
subjectivity and metonymise myself, count myself as the part by which I am connected to 
the particular predicament so that I can claim collectivity, and engage in action validated 
by that very collective’ (2005, p.480). This option, however, notes Spivak is not available 
to all. This is what marks the place of the subaltern, indeed, the difference between the 
subaltern and the people. By describing the subaltern thus Spivak recognises the various 
differences that comprise ‘subalternity’ hegemonised as the popular, the generalised mass 
of the subjugated. The difference between the popular and the subaltern thus described 
is a perfect representation of distinct descriptions of peasant society as offered by 
Chatterjee and Nigam. Whereas for the former peasant society is constituted through an 
identity formed through differential fulfilment of rights by the state, the latter views 
peasant society as an appearance whose essence, because unknowable, is always already a 
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threat to the state. Indeed, it is only as such that associated existences can be reduced to 
a peasant identity and made subject to the disciplinary power of the state (2008). The 
massacre at Nandigram marks the failure of this subjection and the necessary eradication 
of subalternity as it confronts the state as sovereign. 
Against the instinct of postcolonial criticism to protect this subaltern in an aura of 
unessentialisability and hence untouchability, Spivak advocates an urgent, even if flawed, 
performance of critique that ‘historicize[s] the subaltern… [through the] contamination 
of historiography into the field of the historical possibility of what we can only call the 
present’ (2005, p.484). Chakrabarty similarly states that to historicise the subaltern is to 
ask ‘how this seemingly imperious, all-pervasive [master] code might be deployed or 
thought about so that we have at least a glimpse of its own finitude, a glimpse of what 
might constitute an outside to it’ (2000, p.93). Following these instigations, the purpose 
of this section is to contemplate a methodology for such a historicisation. I take as my 
point of departure the proposition that eradication is the necessary end of the subaltern. 
Here, eradication may proceed as a recuperation of the subaltern into a legible, and hence 
legitimate, subjectivity, or as outright annihilation (although, as I will argue in the next 
chapter, recuperation is merely annihilation differed). Regardless of the form it takes, I 
observe that under the postcolonial capitalist condition, eradication unfolds in the 
encounter between capital and the body. Or more precisely, in the encounter between 
capital and the matter of the body. Given that it is matter that registers the force of 
annihilation – and that subalternity is thus confirmed, in the final instance, through 
matter – I consider its significance in historicising the subaltern. To wit, this section 
reflects upon the significance of matter in undertaking a postcolonial critique. 
I begin below by engaging the work of Hortense Spillers (1987) on the concept of flesh. 
Spillers describes flesh as matter through which the body is primordially materialised as a 
socio-symbolic substance. Every subsequent violation of this body, she notes, is a 
revelation of the original writing of the whip on matter. As such, every violation exposes 
a ‘hieroglyphics of flesh’ (1987, p.67) that must be read as a historical trace congealed in 
matter. The productivity of such a reading is that it identifies the particular location of 
different bodies within a ‘grammar’ instituted by an inaugural violence. Spillers is 
interested primarily in the black female body and therefore traces its lineage back to the 
slave driver’s whip that inaugurates an ‘American grammar’. As such, Spillers is 
concerned with the matter of the racial subaltern – the one who Silva posits as the 
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affectable I (2007). To read the hieroglyphics of flesh in a postcolonial context, however, is 
more complex. This is because racial subalternity is always already implied of the 
postcolonial subject. However, as has been asserted by Chakrabarty and Spivak, among 
others discussed above, to approach subalternity within the postcolonial context is to 
engage illegibility and unlawfulness also in relation to capital. In other words, the poor 
who occupy the space of subalternity within the context of India appear as such because 
they signify excess in relation to both, the figure of the human as well as capital. I will 
explicate this is detail in the next chapter.  
Suffice it to notice at this juncture that Spillers’ account helps me read, and is helped by, 
Karen Barad’s description of agential separation. I explicate this concept in this section 
in order to describe how Spillers’ distinction between body and flesh is an explication of 
Barad’s concern with mattering. I use both these texts to read the circumstance of the 
subaltern in the postcolonial context and thereby explicate the terms of my own 
encounter with it throughout this thesis. Using Barad, I will describe this encounter as an 
entanglement, thereby proposing postcolonial critique as a method that must be attentive 
to entanglements. Let me begin with Spillers. 
In her text ‘Mama’s baby, Papa’s maybe’, Hortense Spillers (1987) notes that the African 
slave trade with/in the Americas is generally regarded as a case of ‘high crimes against 
the flesh’ (1987, p.67). This characterisation, in her view, is indicative of the fact that 
injury was done to the person of African women and men. Here, injury is seen to 
proceed through flesh in its ‘seared, divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to the ship’s hole, 
fallen, or “escaped” overboard’ (1987, p.67). The association between the wounding of 
the person with the violation of flesh is an effect of Spillers’ positing of flesh as a primary 
narrative. In other words, flesh is the primary medium through which the body is written 
as text – before body there is flesh – so that the violation of body is the disintegration of a 
text and thus the dissolution of person to flesh. Spillers explicates this circumstance by 
addressing the ‘theft of the body’ (1987, p.67) that inaugurated the New World order. 
She uses this phrase to describe the ‘severing of the captive body from motive will and 
desire… [wherein] the female body and the male body become a territory of cultural and 
political maneuver, not at all gender-related, gender-specific’ (1987, p.67). That is, the 
body during the Middle Passage is in ‘suspension’ – dissolved of all its indigenous 
signification and produced as undifferentiated mass it awaits a new inscription – through 
name, identity, signification – that will be gained only upon reaching land at the other 
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end (1987, p.72). As such, the relation between body and person is severed through the 
external imposition of meanings and uses, and it is as flesh – matter awaiting 
materialisation into body28 – that the cargo is shipped.  
The materialisation of the body – here, as black (and) female within a specifically 
American ‘grammar’, or symbolic order – is enacted, in the first instance, through acts of 
torture under slavery that consolidate her body as always captive, vulnerable to ‘protocols 
of “search and destroy”’ enacted by/for the state (1987, p.67). However, the markings of 
torture on the captive body – what Spillers refers to as a ‘hieroglyphics of flesh’ – are 
invisible once the body materialises within a cultural code organised through skin colour. 
Thus, Spillers defines flesh as ‘that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not 
escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography’ (1987, 
p.67). Yet, despite this invisibility of flesh, its hieroglyphs are transferred across 
generations so that the body, marked by colour and other culturally identifiable 
determinants, is in fact a text whose inside has been turned out. That is, the signification 
of the body is in fact the ossification of meaning made through flesh. It is as such that 
every subsequent act of violation of the body is the eruption, in fact, of flesh that 
exposes the inscription of the originary acts of wounding. Crucially, Spillers posits the 
distinction between body and flesh as the primary distinction between liberated and 
captive subject-positions. This, in my view, seems to indicate the ob/ab/jection implied 
in the flesh awaiting materialisation through instruments of torture and the vulnerability 
of the black female body thus materialised to have its flesh exposed, in contradistinction 
to the subjecthood signified by the integrity of the body of the white male (slave master). 
Indeed, it is the instrument of torture, wielded by/for the slave master upon flesh that 
confirms the distinction in subject positions. 
I read in Spillers’ account of injury under slavery as productive of an ‘American 
grammar’, a critique of representationalism. Karen Barad defines representationalism as 
‘the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they 
purport to represent; in particular, that which is represented is held to be independent of all 
practices of representing’ (2003, p.804; added emphasis). Accordingly, she critiques 
representationalist methods for taking for granted the ontological difference between 
black/female and white/male, asking only perhaps after the accuracy of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  I use the term materialise with specific reference to Butler’s usage where she describes the 
materialisation of bodies as an effect of the imposition of regulatory norms on the matter of the body 
and the signifying effects of the same (2011, p.xii). 
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representation. Spillers assertion of the injury of flesh as the practice of externally 
imposing meaning, as well as her affirmation of the black (female) body as a cultural text 
turned inside out, signal her recognition of ontological difference as produced through 
material practices. Put differently, Spillers is interested in how the black female body is 
made to represent. This is affirmed in her distinction between body and flesh – before 
body there is flesh – and that every violation of the black female body reveals the 
hieroglyphics of flesh etched under the slave master’s whip. Consequently, it seems to 
me that her imposition of the distinction between body and flesh as primary to the 
distinction between liberated and captive subject-positions, is an acknowledgement of 
what Barad refers to as agential separability (Barad 2007; Barad 2003).  
Agential separability is the condition of ‘exteriority within (material-discursive) phenomena’ 
(2003, p.825) so that appearance of difference is in fact a separation instituted by an 
agential cut. Reading Spillers accordingly, we might state that the difference of the 
black/female is an effect of an exteriority within the phenomenon the human effected by 
the instruments of torture. In this context, the productivity of an agential cut is that it 
institutes ‘a causal structure among components of a phenomenon’ (2007, p.140) with 
determines what comes to matter and what is excluded within a given phenomenon29. It 
is only as such – i.e. through the bounding of the white/male body as matter, or as an 
appearance, that matters – that he is fully intelligible as, or within the phenomenon of, 
human whereas the black/female as being exterior to, or in excess of, the bounds of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Barad explicates this proposition by engaging embodied technologies. Using the example of a wheel-
chair, she notes that, for the ‘user’, the wheel-chair is integral to, and never separate from, their 
embodied existence. Yet, practices that materialise the able-body enact a cut between disability and 
ability wherein disability (effect) marks the breaking-down of the able-body (cause), marked by the 
externalised presence of the wheel. This causality is the differential mattering (exclusion) of the ‘disabled 
body’ in relation of the ‘abled’. Yet, if the boundary of the body were not to be so defined – by the 
distinction, say, between organic and inorganic – but by a description of ability to move through the 
world, then the wheelchair would enact an alternate agential cut, not producing absolute difference but 
rather of a separation within the able-body as phenomenon: 
It is when the body doesn’t work – when the body “breaks down” – that such 
presuppositions [of the ‘normal’ body’] generally surface. It is often only when things 
stop working that the apparatus is first noticed. When such (in)opportunities arise the 
entangled nature of phenomena and the importance of the agential cut and their 
corollary constitutive exclusions emerges. It then becomes clear that “able-bodiedness” 
is not a natural state of being but a specific form of embodiment that is co-constituted 
through the boundary-making practices that distinguish “able-bodied” from “disabled.” 
Focusing on the nature of the materiality of able bodies as phenomena, not individual 
objects/subjects, makes it clear what it means to be able-bodied: that the very nature of 
being able-bodied is to live with/in and as part of the phenomenon that includes the cut 
and what it excludes, and therefore, that what is excluded is never really other, not in an 
absolute sense, and that in an important sense, then, being able-bodied means being in a 
prosthetic relationship with the “disabled.” (2007, p.158) 
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mattering (where mattering, for Barad (2007, p.3), represents both, substance and 
signification) is posited as unintelligible. As already noted, this separation – which 
appears, due to bounding as an ontological difference – is an effect of the agential cut 
instituted by instruments of torture wielded by/for the slave master. Barad defines 
agency as a ‘“doing” or “being” in its intra-activity. It is the enactment of iterative changes to particular 
practices…’ (2007, p.178). Agency, then, does not presume movement according to a 
motive will exercised by already constituted entities. Rather, it suggests the mutual 
becoming – the intra-action – of entities within phenomena. That is, agency is the 
unfolding of differential distributions of mattering within phenomena, where 
differentiation appears as the effect of an agential cut.  
The point here is that agential separability – separation as an effect of an agential cut – 
institutes matter that matters. To apply this notion to the postcolonial context, agential 
separability allows us to think the subaltern within the phenomenon of the human and yet 
as that which challenges its very architecture. In order to do so, however, we must follow 
Spillers’ provocation to read a hieroglyphics of flesh in order to approach how the figure 
of the subaltern is separated out and what apparatus or instrument institutes this agential 
cut. For instance, to read the hieroglyphics of flesh in Nandigram necessitates a reading 
of its historicity recountable through the theft of land. Here, theft of land refers to the 
colonial severing of indigenous relations to land, albeit structured through indigenous 
relations of production. Under colonial modes of production, those that worked the land 
were instituted not as wage-earners but rather as a means of production for capitalist 
expansionism in the metropole. Indeed the superexploitation of variable capital – 
through pauperisation bounded to a decapitalised agrarian system – was the cornerstone 
of the colonial project of wealth extraction (cf. Banaji 2010). This theft of land instituted 
the associated existence as peasant and ‘backward’. Of course, this was made possible 
through the deployment of ruthless extra-legal and extra-economic coercive measures, 
and more importantly, the brutal suppression of any sign of peasant revolt. Here, 
violence was posited as a tool of comprehensibility – that is, as the only language that the 
peasants understood. Thus, to adapt Spillers’ account to the postcolonial context, it may 
be suggested that the theft of land enacted injury against the flesh, it inaugurated a ‘post-
/colonial grammar’ wherein the bodies of the poor are always vulnerable to the exposure 
of flesh. Indeed, in the colonial context, the instruments that expropriated land enacted 
an agential cut that instituted the poor as differentially mattering, and hence, subaltern.  
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In the following section, I will assert development as the contemporary manifestation of 
colonial instruments that enacts an agential cut within the phenomenon of humanity. I 
will use the work of critics of development in order to demonstrate this as disciplining 
(Escobar 1995) or ‘civilising’ (Nederveen Pieterse 2001; Wilson 2013) apparatus that 
addresses itself to ‘the poor’ – especially peasants and women – as subaltern. Through an 
engagement with the history of development as a global project, it will be shown that the 
figure of the subaltern – or the appearance of ‘the poor’ – is of development’s own 
manufacture. In other words, development produces the very appearance it then 
addresses itself too. It is as such that we can recognise the intra-activity – the mutual 
becoming – of the subaltern and the postcolonial subject as an effect of an agential 
separation instituted by development. While this circumstance is the condition of 
possibility for the postcolonial subject to observe the subaltern, it also confirms the 
entanglement between the subjects and objects of development. Recalling Barad, 
entanglement describes the circumstance wherein an entity ‘lack[s] an independent, self-
contained existence’ (2007, p.ix) and thus does not exist apart from the other. This co-
existence, which appears as separation, is the effect of the agential cut. Consequently, I 
suggest that in order to stay faithful to the subaltern, the work of postcolonial critique 
demands an attention to entanglement and the apparatus that institutes this 
circumstance. It is in this spirit that the next chapter will interrogate the structure of 
development as it confronts the poor as subaltern. However, let me conclude this 
chapter by first explicating development as an apparatus that produces an agential cut. 
on development as the enactor of an agential cut 
I return one final time to the debate about the character of violence in Nandigram. Recall 
that Chomsky et al., in making a plea for left unity, discourage the outright dismissal of 
the CPI-M as an unredeemable party. They advocate instead holding the party 
accountable to its laudable history. Similarly, Chatterjee views the unfolding of 
Nandigram as an effect of misrecognition and mistrust between peasants, as those that 
constitute political society, and the state, as the bearer of the interests of civil society. As 
a preventative measure against the repetition of such violence, he notes that civil society 
must recognise that some of the work of rehabilitation – i.e. of reversing the effects of 
primitive accumulation – has to proceed within political society itself. Thus Chatterjee as 
well as Chomsky et al. appear to approach Nandigram through the lens of good 
governance. Yet, as Nigam et al.’s response to the latters’ statement emphasises, the 
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failing of the CPI-M government is not structural, but rather fundamental, in that their 
very principles abide by necessitas:  
While the CPM-led West Bengal government has announced that it will not go 
ahead with the chemical hub without the consent of the people of Nandigram, it 
has not announced any plans of withdrawing its commitment to the neo-liberal 
development model. It has not announced the shelving of plans to create Special 
Economic Zones. It has not withdrawn its invitation to Dow Chemicals 
(formerly known as Union Carbide, the corporation responsible for tens of 
thousands of deaths in Bhopal) to invest in West Bengal. In other words, there are 
many more Nandigrams waiting to happen. (2007; added emphasis) 
It is thus evident that while the first group views Nandigram as an aberration, for the 
second group, it is (or has become) a metonym for the annihilation of the Indian poor 
through development.  
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate development as an apparatus that institutes 
an agential cut, forcing thereby a reckoning with the subject and subaltern as entangled. 
To wit, I seek to demonstrate development as an apparatus of differential mattering. I do 
so by outlining how it differentiates out the poor as ‘backwards’ while simultaneously 
presenting itself to them as a means of recuperation. I begin my argument by outlining 
the historical and political context of the emergence of development discourse. 
Following the work of Arturo Escobar (1995) and Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2001), I 
describe the appearance of development as a secular discourse of redemption. Here, 
development, manifest as scientific rationality, is instituted as a panaceaic solution to the 
question of mass poverty, where poverty is the description not merely of a socio-
economic condition but, in fact, signifies differential humanness. The authors argue that 
development then creates the circumstance whereby ‘the poor’ may install themselves as 
self-determining, rational actors by subjecting themselves to capital, thereby expressing 
an intention towards humanness. It is as such that development institutes itself as a truth, 
authorised by its rational basis in scientific and economic knowledge, and motivating 
ethical existence. Yet, as the authors note, development is an object of discourse 
grounded in Enlightenment ideals. It is the materialisation of an ideology that upholds 
the idealisation of the human as a descriptor of ethical value while negating other forms 
of existence as devalue30. I substantiate this proposition by demonstrating the operation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Indeed, as Lindon Barrett (1998) notes, this is precisely the binarism that structures value as a 
phenomenon. Consequently, value operates not only as form (i.e. appearance) but also as force, 
represented in negation and intended towards the preservation of the associated appearance as value. I 
will describe this in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
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of development as necessitas. The section continues therefore with an engagement of 
Kalpana Wilson’s (2013) work on race and development. Using this, I review how 
development rewrites the civilising mission of the colonial project as a project of 
restoring human capabilities hindered by the conditions of poverty and human insecurity. 
Under the conditions of neoliberal, global capital, ‘peasants’ and ‘women’ appear as 
prime instantiations of subjugated existence, and hence the primary objects of 
development discourse. Outlining Escobar and Wilson’s explication of this circumstance, 
I conclude the section by demonstrating how the intervention of development within 
liberal humanist discourse serves to sustain, rather than recuperate, the poor as the 
condition for accumulation of economic value under global capital. Consequently, this 
section sets up the discussion in the following chapter wherein I explicate development 
as the manifestation of the postcolonial capitalist condition such that annihilation is its 
authorised end intended towards the preservation of the human and capital as elemental 
descriptors of value in modernity. I begin this conversation here by outlining the context 
of emergence for development as a global project.  
In Encountering development, Arturo Escobar describes development as  
a historically singular experience, the creation of a domain of thought and action… 
[defined through the production of] knowledge… elaborated into objects, 
concepts, theories, and the like; the system of power that regulates its practice; 
and the forms of subjectivity fostered by the discourse, those through which 
people come to recognise themselves as developed or underdeveloped. (1995, 
p.10; added emphasis)   
Emerging at the end of World War II, and contemporaneous with the onset of 
decolonisation across the globe, development was advanced as a strategy for the 
economic incorporation of the colonies/countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America into 
the global economy. This project was authorised as the recovery of ‘over half the 
population of the world’ from the throes of poverty and its attendant individual and 
social ills, and the elevation of their living to the standards enjoyed by the other half. This 
mission would be actualised through ‘modernisation’ – i.e. through the intervention of 
scientific and technological knowledge and mechanisms that had enabled the economic 
and, hence, social and cultural, advancement of countries in North America, and Western 
and Northern Europe. Thus, those regions and peoples of the world not yet advanced 
would be brought to the path of socio-economic progress. Regardless of debates on how 
this intervention would proceed, the overarching principle of development became 
posited as a certainty. Yet, as Nederveen Pieterse notes in his text on Development theory, 
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this certainty does not establish development as an inviolable truth but rather reveals it as 
a ‘point of view of the centre of power, it is the theorisation (or rather, ideologisation) of 
its own path of development’ (2001, p.18). In other words, development is a discourse of 
modernisation, epistemologically situated in Enlightenment thinking. As such, it marks a 
reworking of colonial discourse on economic and moral difference. 
As is now commonly acknowledged, the colonial project established itself as a civilising 
mission (Nederveen Pieterse 2001; Wilson 2013). This was substantiated by the 
postulation of the colonised as inhabiting the other side of the Christian/savage, 
rational/irrational, consciousness/sentience divide. Here, the project of civilisation 
entailed recuperating the colonised into modern existence through European mediation. 
Within this framework, the colonies appeared as objects of management. That is, 
colonial economics figured the colonies only as sources of cheap raw materials and 
labour, and the location for expanding markets. Given the presumed rational deficiencies 
of the colonised, scientific and technological knowledge were considered beyond their 
comprehension and useful only in so far as they were deployed through the mediation of 
the coloniser. The colonies were, thus, not sites meriting substantive capital investment.  
Of course, as historical evidence confirms, this racialism31 was a necessary strategy for 
maintaining the competitive market advantage of the metropole over the colonies. Yet, 
by positing the colonised as the moral other, colonial power manifest itself as a custodial 
authority to whose productive, rational capacities economic value should rightfully 
accrue. Racialism was thus the means for rendering economic subjugation. The global 
proliferation of anticolonial movements, premised on the conscious humanity of the 
colonised, challenged the legitimacy of this racial logic, revealing it as false. In response, 
the colonisers, and primarily the United States, discovered ‘poverty’. Indeed, poverty was 
instituted as, and still remains, a crucial concept around which development organised 
itself (Escobar 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 2001).   
In this context, Escobar notes, development came to be presented as a ‘fair deal’ for the 
whole world (1995, p.3). The ethico-economic contours of this deal were made explicit in 
various U.S. and UN doctrinal thought, such as the Truman Doctrine, whose enunciated 
aim was  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  As described in section 2, racialism denotes the transformation of regional, linguistic and cultural 
difference into racial difference. 
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to bring about the conditions necessary for replicating the world over the 
features that characterised the “advanced” societies of the time – high levels of 
industrialization and urbanization, technicalization of agriculture, rapid growth of 
material production and living standards, and the widespread adoption of 
modern education and cultural values. … Only in this way could the American 
dream of peace and abundance be extended to all the peoples of the planet. 
(1995, p.4) 
Thus, in Escobar’s view, development described a complete restructuring of the ‘other 
half’ of the world. While the social sciences discovered, described and measured the 
social, cultural and economic ‘poverty’ of the ‘underdeveloped Third World’, they 
worked in consort with science and technology to offer ‘solutions’ to these ‘problems’. 
Indeed, these disciplines took it upon themselves to produce the conditions necessary for 
the optimisation of life as a function of rationality. It is as such that Escobar proposes a 
Foucauldian reading of development as a disciplinary strategy. In particular, it was a 
strategy directed towards the ‘modernisation’ of ‘the poor’. The endeavour towards 
modernisation, notes Escobar, has its roots, in fact, within Europe, where the emerging 
capitalist states required the transformation of heretofore disposable poor into a class of 
labouring consumers. Consequently, ‘[the] “modernization” of poverty signified not only 
the rupture of vernacular relations but also the setting in place of new mechanisms of 
control. … It was, indeed, in relation to poverty that the modern ways of thinking about 
the meaning of life, the economy, and social management came into place’ (1995, p.22). 
Development follows a similar logic of modernising the poor. In this context, however, 
‘poor’ came to describe those colonially subjugated existences now encapsulated in 
concepts such as ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘Third World’, so that modernisation, in both its 
socio-cultural and economic forms, is a necessary strategy for harnessing the difference 
signified therein.  
Approaching development thus, Nederveen Pieterse affirms it as a secularised discourse 
of redemption: 
Developmentalism conforms to a Christian format and logic in viewing history as 
a salvific process. Thus it merges Christian and Enlightenment discourses so that 
the momentum of faith corresponds with the logic of reason – reason and 
rationalization operating toward the fulfillment of the expectations of faith. 
Providence recast as Progress. Predestination reformulated as determinism. The 
basic scenario of the scripture, Paradise-Fall-Redemption, comes replicated in 
evolutionary schemes. Primeval simplicity and innocence (the good savage or the 
pastoral past), followed by the fall from grace (corruption, decay, capitalism, 
urbanism – varying according to discourse), which is in turn to be followed by a 
redeeming change (modernity, technology or revolution). (2001, p.25) 
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The discursive shift evidenced by this evolutionary description marks development as a 
neocolonial liberal humanist discourse wherein the colonial other, who could mimic 
humanness only under the tutelage of the coloniser, becomes rescripted as a human-in-
waiting, eventually actualised through the intervention the ‘developed’ world. Here, 
material manifestations of ethico-economic subjugation are transformed from indicating 
a natural condition of existence into descriptions of backwardness that can be rectified 
through assistance. Yet, as already indicated, this redemptive logic assumes Europe – the 
geo-historically and epistemologically situated entity – as universal.  Indeed, each binary 
that authorises development – developed/underdeverloped, advanced/backwards – 
assumes a teleological conception of world history, with western Europe (and now the 
United States, as its evolved image) leading the charge and the rest of the world scattered 
on a continuum behind it. Thus positioned, it falls to the former, as an effect of moral 
responsibility, to help the latter catch up. Indeed, as outlined above, this is the 
relationship between the metropole/west and the colonial/postcolonial contexts, 
according to Chakarabarty, wherein the latter is viewed as needing retrieval from the 
waiting room of history.  
Yet, akin to the original circumstance of the European poor, this attempted rectification 
– the recuperation of those left behind by progress, onto the path towards their rightful 
teleological end – is, ultimately, a self-serving discourse. Development was a refiguration 
of colonial economics, undertaken, this time, not only on behalf of the United States as 
the pre-eminent economic power but also intended towards the revitalisation of post-
War European economies. Development, then, was less a benevolent strategy of 
modernisation, and more one of dependence – one wherein the politically and 
economically strong states – those that in world-systems analysis are referred to as the 
core – depended upon the weaker, indeed weakened, states – the periphery – in order to 
consolidate themselves as such. Rather than proceeding under the direct control of the 
core states, however, development materialised itself through strategies of management 
and control exercised by the periphery states, albeit modelled upon those propounded by 
the core. The role of the periphery states is to facilitate the entry of the world market 
into its own society, not vice versa (Nederveen Pieterse 2001, p.25) and is achieved as an 
effect of unequal political and economic relations. Indeed, this inequality is a necessary 
condition for the authorisation of development, rather than its object of mitigation.  
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In her text on Race, Racism and Development (2013), Kalpana Wilson views these unequal 
material and symbolic relations as an affirmation of the intimate connection between race 
and development since its inception. As outlined above, critiques of development posit it 
as the restaging of Enlightenment thinking. Wilson takes this argument further, 
explicating this replication as the preservation of the founding relationship between race 
and capital that materialises Enlightenment thought. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the institution of slavery wherein the projection of racial difference authorised the 
capitalisation of life itself. The incompatibility of the condition of enslavement with 
Enlightenment ideals of freedom and universal humanism notwithstanding, slavery has 
been a primary mode of capitalist production in modern history. This was achieved by 
the evacuation of the ‘others’ of Europe from the space of humanity, an eradication that 
allowed for the ‘full commodification and therefore non-integrity of the body’ (Wilson 
2013, 1.394). Insidiously, this thwarting of humanness – of the actualisation of human 
capacities – inflicted by enslavement came to naturalise, to morally justify, the very 
condition. Moreover, as Wilson notes, the description of race was further consolidated 
by revolts enacted by the enslaved against their dehumanisation, so that these acts were 
constructed as acts of barbarity necessitating strategies of subjugation and terror that 
confirmed their non-humanness.  
This form of suppression and removal from humanness as a strategy of moralised 
domination was not limited to slavery but was manifest in all forms of colonial practice. 
In the case of colonial India, for instance, Wilson considers how the 1857 uprising 
against the British East India Company was a crucial moment for the consolidation of 
racial difference in India. The ‘unprecedented scale and social diversity’ (Wilson 2013, 
1.425) of this event32, culminated in the institution of direct imperial control grounded in 
the formulation of racial difference. That is, the uprising provided the scene for the 
projection of the barbaric other as a legitimate object of colonial force. Official records 
constructed the actions of revolters as outrages that offended moral, civilised sensibilities 
providing the grounds for the intensification of colonial strategies of control. These 
methods, which pre-dated the uprising, unfolded through the institutionalisation of 
distinctions of caste and religion that justified colonial control as reform. This control 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  The uprising was precipitated by the introduction of new gun cartridges wrapped in paper greased with 
cow and pig fat. Since the cartridges had to be opened with the mouth, they offended the religious 
sentiment of both, Hindu and Muslim soldiers. While the revolt began with the army, it spread through 
and received support from other sectors of the public, cutting across religious, caste and regional 
divides.   
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did not limit itself to the cultural/symbolic terrain. Instead, intervention in the moral 
domain was actualised through a socio-material restructuring of the relations of the 
colonised to land and labour. That is, by ‘returning’ Indian society to it ‘authentic’ socio-
moral form as determined principally in caste, the colonial power was able to limit the 
forms of labour and ownership available to the populace. This transformation, realised 
through native intermediaries, effectively transferred control of economic resources – 
land, raw materials and labour – to the colonisers, serving the needs of the rapidly 
industrialising metropole. As Wilson documents, this resulted in the complete 
destruction of the indigenous textile industry as well as artisanal trades such as spinning, 
weaving, pottery and smithery.  
The masses thus dispossessed constituted a substantial segment of the 1857 rebellion. 
Precisely therefore the colonisers intensified their control, using moral discourse for 
economic ends. In practice, taxation became a predominant tool of control. The lasting 
legacy of this system is not only mass impoverishment in the post-/colony – triggered by 
the coerced shift for subsistence farming to cash-crop cultivation (2013, 1.653) – but also 
massively pervasive deskilling and deindustrialisation. This is precisely the scene – 
determined as both, cultural and economic backwardness – against which development 
can posit itself as redemptive practice. Akin to colonial power, development asserts itself 
by speaking to the place of socio-economic subjugation wrought by a traditional, 
‘backward’ order. While in the former context this place is occupied by the bio-socially 
described racial other, under development this location is determined by indicators of 
economic and social dispossession. Consequently, development discourse most often 
addresses itself to ‘peasants’ and ‘women’ as signifiers of these forms of dispossession, 
respectively.  
Escobar approaches development’s ‘discovery’ of peasants and women through the 
analytic of visibility. That is, these figures emerged as objects of development discourse 
through of an ‘objectifying regime of visuality’ (1995, p.155) that spectacularised these 
existences so as to subject them to disciplinary regimes of power. Thus, for instance, 
peasants were apprehended as ‘a somewhat bothersome and undifferentiated mass with 
an invisible face; they were part of the amorphous “surplus population,” which sooner or 
later would be absorbed by a blooming urban economy’ (1995, p.157). The 
characterisation of peasant activity as unproductive, since removed from urban and 
national markets, posited them as a population problem and resource drain that needed 
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to be solved through modernisation. Discourses of poverty, hunger and population 
‘explosion’ attached themselves to peasant existence as a primary signifier of the ‘crisis’ 
and the principal target for the solution. The solution entailed rationalising peasant 
existence, getting them to ‘behave like good and decent capitalist farmers’ (1995, p.158), 
through the supply of necessary knowledge and capital. The Green Revolution was the 
outcome of this fervour to make peasants more productive – i.e. to make their labour 
yield more commodities (mainly food) more profitably. This ‘revolution’ was authorised 
through an economic reductionist image of the peasant as stunted by the inability to 
maximise his labour. The erasure of the peasant as a historico-cultural being confirms her 
as a mere object of disciplinary power, to be brought/taught into the proper economic 
order. Consequently, as Escobar notes, the imposition of the Green Revolution was met 
with resistance across the globe, not merely for its ultimately economically destructive 
effects but also because it was ‘above all else a struggle over symbols and meanings, a 
cultural struggle’ (1995, p.167). When such revolts occur, however, they are viewed as 
confirmation of the irresoluteness of the peasant, unwilling to abide by (the) order as the 
condition of their own well-being. This sanctions the final eradication of those resisting 
as a necessary removal of an obstacle to ‘progress’. This circumstance of final eradication 
is evidenced in the events at Nandigram. Yet, it is the scene against which the destruction 
in Bhopal unfolds as well. Historically, as I will describe in Chapter 3, the emergence of 
‘Bhopal’ – the factory, its workers, residential colonies, and finally, its devastation – is a 
direct effect of the Green Revolution. Furthermore, even though disciplinary power 
manifests differently in Nandigram as in Bhopal, the existences that produce these spaces 
confront development as the effect of a shared ontological lineage. In both 
circumstances, their relation to capital is an effect, and confirmation, of their ethical 
degradation, actualised in their final reduction to matter.  
The metric of productivity is similarly applied to women as an indicator of backwardness 
v/s modernity. In this case, however, productivity is associated with agency, or a lack 
thereof. In particular, women are posited as being unproductive as an effect of the 
deprivation of rational possibility by the sexist/misogynist mandates of their traditional 
cultures. As Wilson’s study of colonial era and development era visual discourse 
ascertains, the production of the figure of the colonised/Third World woman relies upon 
the juxtaposition of lazy, undisciplined men with industrious, enterprising women 
actualised by the intervention of colonial and, later, commercial and non-profit 
multinational, intervention. While colonial power proceeded through the logic of rescue 
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– specifically in the oft-cited formulation of ‘white men saving brown women from 
brown men’ (Spivak 1988a) – this discourse extends under the development frame as the 
liberation of female agency. That is, the participation of women in global markets is 
viewed as an effect of a ‘rational individual exercising free will’ (Wilson 2013, 2.868) 
rather than of economic coercion. Indeed, the valorisation of agency in development 
discourse puts relations of oppression and exploitation under erasure so that women’s 
participation in the marketplace, even when undertaken as a strategy of survival, is hailed 
as a rational, free-willed intension towards progress. Yet, Wilson remarks, rather than 
signifying emancipation, the description of agency in development discourse merely 
marks the instrumentalisation of poor women under neoliberalism (2013, 2.902). I will 
demonstrate this proposition in Chapter 4 in my discussion of the surrogacy market in 
India. Here, I will demonstrate how rhetoric of agency restages procreative labour under 
the conditions of the employment and marriage contract. This is evidenced in the 
productive consumption of the bodies of poor women which facilitates a transfer of 
ethical value from her to intended parents. This transaction, solicited as an exchange 
grounded in a shared humanness marked especially by maternity, confirms in fact the 
differential humanness of poor women materialised as surrogate. To wit, the appearance 
of the poor as ethically degraded is the condition of possibility for the institution of the 
surrogacy market.  
It is evident from the preceding outline that development, as an apparatus of agential 
separation, is in effect an apparatus of differential distributions of mattering. Put 
differently, capital, under the sign of development, materialises bodies differentially. 
These differential appearances – which are constituted through the bounding of ‘matter 
that matters’ within the phenomenon of the human – are the basis of the differential 
distribution of value amongst them. This distribution of value operates in the ethical 
register but has implications in the economic register as well. For, as will be described in 
the following chapter, ethical degradation, represented by the poor as subaltern, is the 
condition of possibility for the reproduction of capital, even as this reproduction is the 
condition of possibility for the accrual of ethical value – i.e. the consolidation of 
humanness – for the postcolonial subject as capitalist/consumer. This circumstance 
reveals the entanglement of ethical value (the human) and capital (economic value) under 
postcolonial capitalism. Thus, using the work mainly of Marx, Spivak, Bataille and 
Barrett, the following chapter explicates this entanglement as the structure of the 
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postcolonial capitalist condition that authorises the annihilation of the poor as the 
necessary end for the preservation of value.  
Put starkly, the mutilated bodies encountered throughout this thesis are the condition of 
possibility for its writing. 	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chapter 2  
the entanglement o f  the human and capi tal :  
on the syntax of the postcolonial capitalist condition 
Gayatri Spivak’s text, A critique of postcolonial reason (1999), stages encounters with the 
native informant as she circulates within epistemological practices. Beginning with 
colonial discourse and continuing through to transnational cultural studies, Spivak 
examines the centrality of this figure in structuring postcolonial reason. In so doing, she 
proposes the native informant as the figure that is foreclosed from the space of the 
Subject – i.e. that which constitutes the Subject but only through its expulsion. Indeed, 
she posits the native informant as ‘a name for that mark of expulsion from the name of 
Man’ (1999, p.6). As such, the native informant is subaltern. In the context of the global 
present, Spivak designates the ‘poorest woman of the South’ as the appearance of this 
figure – an assertion that is substantiated by a critique of her emergence in the milieu of 
global finance33.  
In a particularly biting critique of this circumstance, Spivak notes how the poorest 
woman of the South materialises, putatively and perversely, as an effect of the Kantian 
categorical imperative such that global finance ‘can justify the imperialist project by 
producing the following formula: make the heathen into a human so that he can be as an 
end in himself; in the interest of admitting the raw man into the noumenon; yesterday’s 
imperialism, today’s “Development”’ (1999, pp.123–124). Of course, the engagement of 
this subaltern by capital is ultimately concerned with its own reproduction so that she is 
appropriated, in fact, as ‘the favored agent-as-instrument of transnational capital’s 
globalizing reach’ (1999, p.200). Even so, Spivak notes, subjecting oneself to finance 
capital presents itself as the only, or primary, line of social mobility to an otherwise 
invisible/dispensable existence. This, as noted in the previous chapter, is an effect of 
capital’s presentation as recuperative. Yet, recuperation, I have affirmed, is annihilation 
differed.  
In this thesis I seek to demonstrate how, under the postcolonial capitalist condition, the 
preservation of value proceeds through the annihilation of the poor. In order to make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  She makes a similar argument about scapegoating in reference to the British intervention into sati 
reform which she provocatively codes in the formulation ‘white men are saving brown women from 
brown men’ (1988a; 1999; 2005). Here, women were produced as objects of rescue as a means to 
consolidate the moral and political authority of the colonial powers. 
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this argument, this chapter moves with Spivak by focusing on the preservation of value 
such that it comprehends the ‘poorest woman of the South’, or the poor in general, as 
subaltern. Spivak’s own engagement with this subaltern proceeds through an engagement 
of transnational cultural studies. This is apparent in her deconstructionist approach 
towards the emergence of the ‘poorest woman of the South’ as subaltern and the 
material effects of this emergence. Here, she advocates a transnational literacy amongst 
feminists and cultural theorists so that they might hear the subaltern rather than 
represent her ‘interests’ against capital through an already available code. While this is an 
important project, it is not mine. Rather, as already stated, I approach the practice of 
postcolonial critique as a concern with entanglements. As such, I depart from Spivak 
because I am compelled by the matter of the subaltern – where matter, recalling Barad, 
describes phenomena in their ongoing materialisation (2007, p.151). It is only as such, I 
contend, that we can recognise the condition of entanglement wherein an entity ‘lack[s] 
an independent, self-contained existence’ (2007, p.ix) and thus does not exist apart from 
any other.  
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it seeks to demonstrate how the 
appearance of value structures development. Here, I will explicate capital and the human 
as phenomenological descriptors of economic and ethical value, respectively, in order to 
posit their entanglement as constitutive of the operation of development. Given the 
place of development as an instantiation of the postcolonial condition, the entanglement 
of these appearances constitutes its syntax. The explication of this syntax proceeds by 
engaging the transaction between devalued work/er and economic value as it unfolds 
under the purview of global capital. I will substantiate this exchange through what I will 
explicate as the manipulation of matter intended towards the securing of the human and 
capital. Here, I borrow Barad’s definition of matter as ‘phenomena in their ongoing 
materialization’ (2007, p.151). Consequently, matter is that which is perpetually being re-
/formed to establish an appearance. In this chapter, I am concerned in particular with 
the interactions between capital and embodied matter that negotiate appearance as 
human. That is, I will demonstrate how the recuperative gesture enacted by capital under 
the sign of development entails a manipulation of the embodied matter of the poor into 
productive bodies. This materialisation is merely annihilation differed; so that 
annihilation is the definitive gesture of dematerialisation by capital intended towards the 
preservation of a particular appearance as human. This, I propose, is an effect of the 
differential structure of capital and the human.  
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Thus, the second aim of this chapter is to outline the differential structure of capital and 
the human so as to establish annihilation as the ultimate actualisation of their ontology. I 
do so by demonstrating material conditions of existence – i.e. the conditions under 
which the body materialises itself as an appearance in relation to capital – as ontological 
signifier. Specifically, I will show that existence appears as human in so far as it expresses 
a material freedom, i.e. freedom from necessity. This is precisely the description that 
allows development to do its work. As noted in the previous chapter, development 
addresses itself to those existences that appear ‘backward’ as an effect of their un-
/underdeveloped material circumstance. In this chapter, then, I will show how capital 
appropriates the poor, as appearances of degradation, and materialises them as 
productive bodies under the promise of manifesting them, ultimately, as materially 
liberated and hence human. However, this putative recuperation is of course a ruse for 
the appearance of degradation as necessary for the reproduction of capital is achieved 
through the persistent subjection of the poor. This subjection confirms their ontological 
difference signified by their material degradation while simultaneously securing the 
ontology of the human signified by those existences to which the material value of 
capitalist reproduction accrues. This is the descriptive statement of the postcolonial 
capitalist condition. As noted earlier, the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how 
the entanglement of the human and capital, as signifiers of value, structures 
development, and hence constitutes the syntax of the postcolonial condition. The 
primary purpose in doing so is to reveal annihilation as the ultimate actualisation of this 
syntax. That is, I will explicate annihilation as the culmination of the relation of 
domination and subjugation as instituted by the human and capital, as descriptors of 
value, and hence a preservation of the same.  
I begin this analysis by engaging the appearance of capital under the postcolonial 
condition. The first section of this chapter is thus concerned with the structure of capital 
in actualising itself as a differential. I begin with Marx’s (1976) elaboration on the social 
significance of capital as a signifier of economic value. In particular, I outline his labour 
theory of value that identifies the devalorisation of labour power as the condition of 
possibility for the valorisation of capital. As observed in the previous chapter, Marx’s 
preservation of Man as historio-ethical subject of labour, prevents him from accounting 
for the institution of an ontological difference effected by his (Man’s) invention, and that 
appears as racial and sexual difference. I evidence this critique using Leopoldina 
Fortunati’s (1995) criticism of Marx for disregarding the sexual division of labour. In so 
	   78 
doing, Fortunati argues, Marx misses the intensification of subjugation – or more 
precisely, the absolute devalorisation of labour power – accomplished by capital by 
putting reproductive labour under erasure. This erasure is authorised by the patriarchalist 
institution of Man as Subject and thereby serves to preserve him as such. This form of 
devalorisation, of course, is constitutive of the postcolonial condition wherein Man 
appears in his onto-materialist instantiation.  
The section thus moves to demonstrate the devalorisation of labour as it proceeds along 
the international division of labour. Here, I use the work of Gayatri Spivak (1985) to 
demonstrate how the appearance of backwardness – determined by decapitalised 
conditions of existence – devalourises labour power within comprador countries thereby 
authorising the maximisation of its use value. Such a maximisation not only objectifies 
life but also limits the possibility of its future cultivation. That is, existence in the 
comprador theatre is made to persist as degraded. This appearance of degradation serves 
the uninterrupted valorisation of capital and hence of existences whose conditions of 
survival it represents. As such, the valorisation of these existences – what Spivaks refers 
to as the condition of the being super-adequate to oneself – is manifest through the 
enhancement of consumptive possibilities on the other side of this division of labour. 
Indeed, as Hannah Arendt (1998) notes, under the conditions of global capital, 
consumption has become the expression of Man par excellence. This, according to her, is 
an effect of the institution of labour – i.e. the productive consumption of capital – as the 
privileged form of human activity under modernity. This produces a circumstance 
wherein no object is safe from annihilation through consumption. This proposition has 
dire consequences for workers on the devalorised side of the division of labour. Indeed, 
the maximisation of their use value tends precisely towards their annihilation through the 
productive consumption of their labour power as capital. The process towards 
annihilation proceeds, of course, to assure the possibility of super-adequation on the 
other side of the division. In the next section of the chapter, I demonstrate super-
adequation as the appearance of the human as sovereign so that annihilation – effected 
by the productive consumption of labour power tending towards the absolute – secures 
the ontology of the human. 
I make this argument beginning with Georges Bataille’s (1993) description of the human 
as instituted through the negation of excess. Here, excess describes that which exceeds 
the ‘world of thought’ and utility. In other words, excess is all that appears as serving no 
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purpose. Consequently, for Bataille, the humanised world is instituted through subjection 
to the rule of productive activity. Existence that appears productive thus bears a positive 
value and is separated from excess as the space of negative value. The condition of 
material depravation, then, appeals to capital as a moment for intervention. In the latter 
circumstance, capital recuperates what appears as degraded matter, materialising it as a 
productive body.  
The section continues to develop this argument using Didier Deleule’s (2014) elaboration 
of the productive body as effected through the scientisation of the living body that tends 
towards its institution as a dead machine. This is achieved through ‘organology’ – the 
intervention of psychology that fragments out the living body in order to minimise the 
impact of its psycho-sensuality. Of course, this process is necessary for maximising the 
utility of the body through its subjection to capital. While the materialisation of the 
productive body is a universal imperative, this materialisation is not uniform. That is, 
body is differentially materialised per the division of labour extant in a given system. 
Indeed, it is precisely this differentiation that determines the appearance of a body’s 
condition of survival. Those bodies whose survival is against biological death are 
constituted as servile whereas those for whom survival is the experience of exuberance – 
described through liberation from necessity and partaking in material indulgence – 
appear as sovereign. 
The section thus concludes by returning to Bataille’s description of the human, now 
instituted as sovereign. Here, sovereignty is performed through the productive labour of 
consumption, specifically, of the objects of another’s labour. This is the appearance of an 
exuberant existence; one, however, that is contingent upon the reduction of another to 
the condition of servility. The servile, although now materialised as productive bodies 
through the negation of their excess, are yet barred from humanity as an effect of their 
inability to transcend necessity as the condition of survival. This is precisely the interface 
between the servile body and capital evidenced in the context of development. While the 
body’s materialisation as such represents the promise of economic growth – i.e. an 
enhancement of the conditions of survival – it is in fact an instantiation of its institution 
as degraded. The sovereign subject, materialised through capital, requires degradation in 
order to reproduce itself. Whereas the ongoing materialisation of sovereignty is an effect 
of its relation to servility, it actualises itself, in the final instance, as annihilation. This 
proposition follows from Achille Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitical description, wherein 
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sovereignty is the exercise of control over mortality. This description is useful to 
comprehend the security of sovereign as contingent upon the abjection of life to the 
point of death. In this context, death is the ultimate instantiation of sovereignty and, 
hence, of the human.  
This chapter thus presents the annihilation of bodies in their encounter with capital, as 
the actualisation of the entanglement between the human and capital. In so doing, it 
offers a theoretical framework for the remainder of this thesis. 
on the encounter of the subaltern and capital 
Lindon Barrett’s text, Blackness and value (1998), opens with an account of Billie Holiday’s 
experience working as a cleaner. Holiday’s work consisted in keeping the steps of 
neighbourhood houses clean. This work initially got her a nickel per job. Eventually, 
recognising the value of her labour, she buys her own supplies and begins to charge three 
times the regular pay for her services, i.e. 15 cents instead of a nickel. The value of 
Holiday’s work lay in preserving the steps as signifiers of value themselves.  
As Barrett notes, the steps separate the inside of the house from the outside, and as such 
are a representation of what lies within. The white steps – signifying cleanliness, a purity 
even – mark the interior of the house as a valued space, while as a boundary, they 
preserve the sanctity of the inside against the dirt and disorder on the outside. In order to 
confirm this value – i.e. for the inside to project its cleanliness and order – the steps 
mandated constant cleaning. Yet, even as they recognised the symbolic value of the steps, 
the women of the houses, according to Holiday, were uninclined to do their own 
cleaning: ‘All these bitches were lazy. I knew it and that’s where I had them. They didn’t 
care how filthy their damn houses were inside, as long as those white steps were clean’ 
(quoted in Barrett 1998, p.11). Holiday mobilises this symbolic value of the steps to sell 
her labour at an inflated rate. Yet, her success at thus appropriating economic value 
exceeds the value of the steps as signifier. As Barrett suggests, Holiday’s entrepreneurial 
success is as much an effect of her deference (albeit in facetious form) to the boundary 
with respect to her own devalued position. 
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Holiday bears a negat(ed)(ive) value 34  in relation to the steps as a boundary that 
constitutes and safeguards the inside – the space of the white mistress – as posit(ed)(ive) 
value. This, Barrett affirms, is an effect or her blackness, and, I would add, her 
femaleness. Recalling Silva’s (2007) explication of the transparency thesis presented in 
Chapter 1, we note that these descriptors institute Holiday as an affectable I – that 
existence which is marked as being a ‘thing of world’, not of understanding and 
judgement. This circumstance institutes the racial and sexual subaltern in ontological 
difference. Holiday’s racial subalternity, as Barrett confirms, ontologised35 her as fit for 
‘low, down, dirty’ work (1998, p.19). Indeed, her willingness to thus mingle with dirt 
consolidates her negat(ed)(ive) value while simultaneously re-inforcing the posit(ed)(ive) 
value of the inside/whiteness (also Silva 2013). Similarly, as I will underscore in this 
section, her femaleness naturalises her labour of cleaning. In other words, since such 
work, being reproductive, is relegated to the domestic space – i.e. is instituted as 
‘women’s work’ – Holiday’s labour is seen as appropriate, indeed natural, for her sexual 
form (Fortunati 1995). As such, since reproductive work is domestic and hence deemed 
non-productive, Holiday’s labour, and indeed Holiday herself, are viewed as valueluess. 
Holiday’s cunning, then, as Barrett notes, is to deploy her doubly devalued position to 
access positive value through the exorbitant rates she charges. That is, she transforms her 
devalued position into a means of seizing economic value for herself. But in so doing – 
that is, by performing deference to her white mistress given her own devalued location as 
black/female for the accrual of economic value – she affirms the value of the boundary 
and the whiteness enclosed within it. 
Barrett’s engagement with Holiday’s experience as a cleaner narrative is an attempt to 
outline the production of value. Production, here, circumscribes not only the material 
and symbolic instantiations of value, but more crucially, that of the phenomenon itself. 
In other words, Barrett is concerned with the phenomenology of value. The culmination 
of this endeavour is reflected in the subtitle of his text, seeing double. This phrase is 
intended to invoke both, the binarism of value as well as the condition of impaired 
perception. The former is an effect of its constitutive boundaries – of inclusion and 
exclusion, subjugation and domination – as evidenced in the case of the steps in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  This designation is an adaptation of Barrett’s positing of the bounding of value as posit(ed)(ive) (1998, 
p.15). 
35  I use this term to underscore how the ontological difference imputed to the racial/sexual subaltern 
naturalises her degradation. It is as such that Holiday is posited as fit for menial labour. Or more 
precisely, that menial labour is deemed as ontologically appropriate for Holiday. I will explicate this 
argument in detail over the course of this chapter.  
	   82 
Holiday’s narrative. Yet, this binarism is obscured as value ‘struggles to appear a 
hypostasized, singular, fixed, centered phenomenon’ (1998, p.12). The appearance of 
value as such indicates a blurred picture. Barrett’s undertaking, then, follows from the 
imperative to correct the latter circumstance by exposing the binary structure of value. 
Of course, enacting this corrective is not an original project. Barrett commences his 
study noting the importance of Marx’s contributions to the study of value. He 
acknowledges Marx’s examination of the fetishisation of the commodity under capitalism 
as exposing it [the commodity, hence value] not only as a representation of value but also 
as the instantiation of a differential. 
This structure of value as a differential institutes it as violence. This is an effect of its 
elaboration through boundaries – the production of a posit(ed)(ive) inside and a 
negat(ed)(ive) outside – as well as its imperative to preserve its posit(ed)(ive) form 
through the securing of boundaries. Consequently, Barrett notes, ‘[v]alue denotes 
domination and endurance in a space of multiplicity. Its presence and performance entail 
the altering, resituating, and refiguring of the Other, or many Others, in margins, in 
recesses  indeed, paradoxically, outside a self-presence (defined by a fetishized boundary) 
that nonetheless aspires to be everywhere’ (1998, p.19). Indeed, for Marx, the commodity 
as a differential represents the social relationship of domination and exploitation between 
capitalist and worker. Value, in this description, is an effect of labour. Yet, as is evident 
in Holiday’s circumstance, value, in its material register, is subsequent to – indeed an 
effect of – the inscription of symbolic value. To wit, Holiday deploys her negat(ed)(ive) 
(symbolic) value as a resource for the production of material value. It is precisely this 
symbolic value – or lack thereof – represented in the appearance of degradation that is 
mobilised by development to secure the reproduction of capital. 
This section is an elaboration of the mobilisation of symbolic value in the production of 
value under the conditions of global capital. Whereas Holiday accrues the economic 
value of this mobilisation herself, under the purview of global capital, the mobilisation of 
symbolic value enhances capital itself. In both cases, however, the production of 
economic value is an effect of relations of domination and subjugation. I begin this 
section, therefore, by outlining this social character of capital as explicated by Marx in his 
labour theory of value. However, rather than approaching degradation as an effect of 
capital, I seek to establish its appearance as a necessary condition for its reproduction. I 
elaborate this proposition by first demonstrating racial and sexual difference as the 
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originary appearance of degradation that is appropriated by capital but only through an 
erasure.  That is, I seek to explicate how Marx’s labour theory does not sufficiently 
account for existences produced as the other of Man. In so doing, I first engage 
Leopoldina Fortunati’s (1995) work to outline how capital exploits sexual differentiation 
in order to valorise itself. As her criticism of Marx’s labour theory demonstrates, the 
institution of sexual difference as an ontological difference, authorises the erasure of 
reproductive labour undertaken by women so that it appears unproductive. This erasure 
represents doubled exploitation by capital that ultimately serves to secure patriarchalism. 
This structure of exploitation persists under global capital where the devalorisation of 
labour proceeds along the lines of the material conditions of survival.  
Using Gayatri Spivak’s (1985) intervention into contemporary interpretations of Marx’s 
labour theory, I outline how the international division of labour signifies abjection as an 
effect of the appearance of degradation. That is, the international division of labour 
represents, in fact, the authorised eradication of the poor. This abjection tending towards 
annihilation facilitates an increasing accumulation of capital, thereby securing 
consumptive possibilities on the other side of the division. In other words, the 
devalorisation of labour as an effect of degradation enables an increase in the 
accumulation of capital on the other side of the division of labour for those whose 
conditions of survival are already defined by it. This accumulation appears as the 
intensification of consumption beyond necessity. I address this appearance through 
Hannah Arendt’s (1998) critique of ascension of labour as enabled by Marx. Here, she 
describes how, under advanced/global capitalism, the labour of constant consumption 
has come to signify humanness. In so far as abjection is the condition for perpetual 
consumption, it is also, then, the negation of the possibility of humanness on one side of 
the division of labour that confirms humanness as the provenance of the other. This 
section thus demonstrates how capital – structured through the binarism of valorisation 
and degradation – secures humanness through the violence of abjection.  
I turn first to Marx. 
Marx commences his elaboration of value in Volume 1 of Capital (1976) through an 
interrogation of the commodity as its basic representation and the primary expression of 
social relations under a capitalist mode of production. The commodity is a product of 
labour that bears use and exchange value. The use value of a commodity is unique to it 
and is limited by its characteristic property in satisfying man’s needs; exchange value 
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describes the relationship that determines the proportion whereby a given commodity 
can be exchanged for another (1976, p.126). Both these forms of value are discrete. 
Indeed, as Marx notes, exchange value is completely independent of use value for the 
former expresses itself as a quantity whereas the latter as a quality. In the exchange 
relation, then, use value is abstracted from the commodity so that what remains is its 
value. Consequently, he writes,  ‘exchange-value [is] the necessary mode of expression, or 
form of appearance, of value’ objectified in the commodity (1976, p.128). It is this 
property of the commodity that renders it a particular, and peculiar, artefact of the 
capitalist mode of production. Marx explicates this through his labour theory of value.  
Since the commodity is produced through the expenditure of labour power, its value is 
an effect of labour power congealed in the commodity (1976, p.128). Here, labour power 
describes the physical and intellectual (and we might add affective) capabilities that are 
spent in the production of use values (1976, p.270). As a means of production, labour 
power is an abstracted quantity since it only as such that it may participate in relations of 
exchange. That is, whereas concrete labour bestows a particular form, and hence utility, 
upon its product, the appearance of this product as a commodity – i.e. its appearance as 
value – relies purely upon its materialisation through ‘congealed quantities of homogenous 
labour’ (1976, p.136; added emphasis). The quantity of this undifferentiated labour is 
measured as an effect of the duration over which labour power is expended. In other 
words, the value of a commodity is a representation of labour time socially necessary for 
its production (1976, p.144). Marx describes socially necessary labour time as ‘the labour-
time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production normal for a 
given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent at that 
society’ (1976, p.129). Consequently, the magnitude of value of a commodity represents 
the proportion of socially necessary labour time required for the production of the 
associated commodity, and is in direct proportion to the same. This quality of value as 
being an effect of labour time has particularly insidious consequences for subjects of 
labour.  
Under the capitalist mode of production, labour power is the fundamental instrument of 
production, and hence a commodity itself – owned by the worker, sold to the capitalist. 
The actualisation of labour power as such is contingent upon its exchange, that is, on its 
instantiation as value. Marx posits that under a capitalist mode of production the only 
form of labour that bears value is productive labour wherein productive labour is that 
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which produces surplus value: ‘Capitalist production is not merely the production of 
commodities, it is, by its very essence, the production of surplus-value. … The only 
worker who is productive is one who produces surplus-value  for the capitalist, or in 
other words contributes towards the self-valorization of capital’ (1976, p.644). The value 
of productive labour, then, is expressed through its price – i.e. in its wage. As the 
expression of the value of labour power, wages represent the socially necessary labour 
time for labour to re/produce itself – not merely for the worker to replenish his 
immediate physiological needs, but also to sustain himself mentally, physically and 
emotionally. Thus, by paying wages, the capitalist pays for the reproduction of the 
worker. The production of surplus value, however, requires the expropriation of surplus 
labour – i.e. labour over and above what is required for the worker to reproduce herself. 
The maximisation of surplus value, then, depends upon the maximisation of the 
expropriation of surplus labour. This is achieved through the minimisation of the socially 
necessary labour of the worker, expressed through technological advancements and the 
subsequent devalorisation of labour and suppression of wages: 
The prolongation of the working day beyond the point at which the worker 
would have produced just an exact equivalent for the value of his labour-power, 
and the appropriation of that surplus-labour by capital – this is production of 
absolute surplus-value. …  The latter presupposes that the working day is already 
divided into two parts, necessary labour, and surplus-labour. In order to prolong 
the surplus labour, the necessary labour is shortened by methods for producing 
the equivalent of the wage of labour in a shorter time. The production of 
absolute surplus-value turns exclusively upon the length of the working day, 
whereas the production of relative surplus-value completely revolutionizes the 
technical processes of labour and the groupings into which society is divided. 
(1976, p.645)  
This process constitutes the relation of domination and exploitation that characterises 
the production of value under capital.  
Following from the critique of Marx in the previous chapter, we must note that his 
explication of the labour theory of value assumes a universal subject – objectified in the 
European male. Under the contemporary circumstance of global capital, however, as 
Spivak reminds us, the place of the worker is occupied most frequently by poor women 
in the South. Consequently, Marx’s labour theory must account for the play of racial and 
sexual subalternity in the production of value. Indeed, as feminist materialist critiques 
highlight, the relegation of certain forms of labour as unproductive represents the 
devalorisation of labour/er along sexual (and, as I will demonstrate, also racial) lines. 
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This naturalises the subjection of particular labouring bodies to capital up to the point of 
abjection. We have noted this already how Holiday’s blackness and femaleness authorises 
her degradation through/in labour. This circumstance, as I will describe below, pertains 
as well to the poor. 
In The arcane of reproduction, Leopoldina Fortunati (1995) critiques Marx’s labour theory of 
value for putting reproductive labour under erasure. As noted above, Marx recognises 
the devalorisation of labour as a condition of possibility for the extraction of surplus 
value. Yet, in this description, labour is limited to its productive form. That is, Marx is 
concerned with the suppression of wages and unconsidered increases in labour 
productivity (through the imposition of longer working hours and subjugation to 
technology as the form of domination and exploitation under capitalism. Fortunati 
criticises Marx for his inattentiveness to ‘valueless’ forms of labour that in fact undergird 
capitalist production. This critique is substantiated through the argument that the 
absolute devalorisation of reproductive labour constitutes the primary and necessary 
condition for the expropriation of value by capital. Reproductive labour, as Fortunati 
affirms, creates value precisely because it is productive of labour power as a commodity. 
Yet, its appearance as non-value is an effect of positing it as a ‘natural force of social 
labor’ (1995, p.12). That is, the relegation of reproductive labour to the private sphere 
makes it appear as though it were the natural (normal, instinctive) unfolding of human 
sociality, beyond the purview of capital and hence beyond representation as value (in the 
form of a wage).  
Given that the private sphere is feminised (domestic, apolitical), the labour performed in 
this space is naturalised as women’s work. Indeed, the concentration of reproductive 
labour amongst women, releases the male worker from any reproductive responsibilities, 
liberating him fully to serve capital. By earning a direct wage from capital, the male 
worker is able to support the unwaged process of reproductive labour. That the value of 
women’s/reproductive labour receives representation only indirectly in the male worker’s 
wage implies doubled exploitation – the exploitation of two workers with one wage , in 
so far as the wage represents the labour time socially necessary to reproduce the male 
worker, and therefore his social relations, without accruing any value for him/themselves. As 
such, wages keep the male worker subjected to capital, and the female worker subjected 
to the male and indirectly to capital. More crucially, by negating the value of 
women’s/reproductive labour, capital produces a resource for itself that intensifies its 
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ability to expropriate value36. This creation of a space of non-value intended towards the 
production of value manifests not only along the line of sexual difference but along that 
of racial difference as well. This is evidenced, for instance, in Spivak’s consideration of 
the subjects of labour that occupy the ‘other side’ of the international division of labour. 
In ‘Scattered speculations on the question of value’, Gayatri Spivak (1985) critiques 
interpretation of Marx’s labour theory of value that attempts to restore the primacy of 
use-value in relations of exchange as an anti-capitalist gesture. Such a restoration, she 
suggests, works well when considering ‘word-processors … as well as independent 
commodity production (hand-sewn leather sandals), our students’ complaint that they 
read literature for pleasure not interpretation, as well as most of our “creative” 
colleagues’ amused contempt for criticism beyond the review, and mainstream critics’ 
hostility to “theory”’ (1985, p.89). This tongue-in-cheek critique is intended to draw 
attention to the differential textuality of use in the ‘comprador countries’ and serious 
implications of a romanticised restoration of use value therein. 
In order to demonstrate the textuality of use, Spivak introduces the notion of ‘affectively 
necessary labour’ – i.e. labour that is undertaken because the worker seeks to benefit 
from the affects created thereby. In this case, surplus labour is not in excess of socially 
necessary labour and cannot be reduced merely to the substance of surplus value. To wit, 
the possibility of affectively necessary labour makes it so that the securing of value to use 
does not eliminate the possibility of the accumulation of wealth (as evidenced, for 
instance, in the word processor.) Moreover, the possibility of affectively necessary labour 
applies only where productivity has reached highly advanced levels – i.e. where the 
subject of labour power has been sublated into the subject of consumer-humanism. This 
sublation, as Spivak argues, is achievable only by restricting productivity on the other side 
of the international division of labour. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  This is precisely the point of critique/departure for Barrett’s intervention into Marx as well – the 
institution of negat(ed)(ive) space for the production of posit(ed)(ive) value. Consequently, he 
approaches the phenomenon of value through the interrogation of limits. Even as he explicates value 
primarily in its symbolic instantiation, his insistence on being attentive to boundaries emerges from his 
critique of Baudrillard’s thesis of symbolic value. Here, Baudrillard is said to offer the notion of 
symbolic value as a means to correct the unquestioned materiality (in both senses of the term) of use in 
Marx. In response, Baudrillard seeks to ‘get outside “the logic of value”’ by describing ‘a place of 
formlessness that would belie the possibility of value itself’ (1998, p.15). This he attempts by staking out 
a position in the space of non-use. Yet, as Barrett notes, this gesture merely reifies the phenomenon of 
value since ‘value always declares such a scission [between, say, use and non-use] in order to 
substantiate, privilege, and hypostasize a particular form of “positive value”’ (1998, p.15). That is, in 
trying to find a space outside of value – where value is recognised primarily in its positive form-
/alisation – Baudrillard, like Marx, misses the significance of the ‘outside’ as the condition of possibility 
of value as such. 
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Capitalist modes of production depend upon the capitalists’ ability to consume the use 
value imminent in the workers’ labour power. In order to increase surplus value, the 
capitalist must assume the use of the greatest proportion of this labour power available in 
the worker, an exploit accomplished by decreasing the latter’s necessary labour. The 
extraction of relative surplus depends on an increase in the productivity of labour and a 
concomitant decrease in the value of labour. This is accomplished by technological 
advancements, especially in industries that produce the basic commodities necessary for 
subsistence. This, in turn, reduces the value of the commodities themselves. But, the 
accumulation of wealth by the capitalist depends upon continuous iterations of the 
circuit of money capital – i.e. the transformation of the surplus products of labour 
(commodity capital) into money, a portion of which is returned to production in the 
form of capital (means of production) (cf fn. 5). The first transformation – i.e. the 
actualisation of commodity capital – is enabled only when other capitalists or workers 
issue their money (whether in the form of surplus value or wages) into the circuit of 
exchange. In order to sustain increases in relative surplus value, decrease in the value of 
basic commodities must be offset by the generation of newer commodities, removed 
from those required for basis subsistence. Moreover, the concomitant decrease in the 
value of average labour necessitates a reconfiguration of the division of labour that can 
sustain a class that can purchase this expanding array of commodities – a consumer class 
– alongside those, the consumption of whose labour power can be maximised in the 
production of surplus value.  
Describing the unfolding of this process under the contemporary arrangement of 
capitalism, Spivak writes: 
Since the production and realization of relative surplus-value, usually attendant 
upon technological progress and the socialized growth of consumerism, increase 
capital expenditure in an indefinite spiral, there is the contradictory drive within 
capitalism to produce more absolute and less relative surplus-value as part of its 
crisis management. In terms of this drive, it is in the “interest” of capital to 
preserve the comprador theater in a state of relatively primitive labor legislation 
and environmental regulation. Further, since the optimal relationship between 
fixed and variable capital has been disrupted by the accelerated rate of 
obsolescence of the former under the rapid progress within telecommunications 
research and the attendant competition, the comprador theater is also often 
obliged to accept scrapped and out-of-date machinery from the post-industrialist 
economies. To state the problem in the philosophical idiom of this essay: as the 
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subject as super-adequation in labor-power seems to negate 37  itself within 
telecommunication, a negation of the negation is continually produced by the 
shifting lines of the international division of labor. (1985, p.84) 
Spivak’s reference to the negation of the ‘subject as super-adequation in labour power’ 
articulates a subject who is super-adequate to himself – i.e. one who produces value for 
himself through the consumption of his own labour power (his mental, physical and 
emotional capacities) in the unfolding of the self rather than alienating himself from it in 
exchange. The effective withdrawal of (a portion of) his labour power from circulation in 
the market, however, is possible only through the negation of this negation for those in 
the comprador theatre, a circumstance achieved by ‘mak[ing] sure that multinational 
investment does not realize itself fully there through assimilation of the working class 
into consumerist-humanism’ (1985, p.84). That is, the negation of the negation implies 
the suppression of a segment of subjects from becoming super-adequate to themselves. 
The anchoring of value to use, then, has little relevance – or rather, is of invidious 
consequence – to those yet maintained in a proletarianised condition. The intensification 
of the extraction of absolute over relative surplus value marks the intensification of the 
condition of  alienation, and hence un-freedom. To wit, the augmentation of the use 
value of labour power imminent in particular individuals, or more precisely, bodies, is the 
reduction to thing-ness. This is precisely the condition of un-freedom – subjection to 
alienation by necessity – that drives Marx’s thought38. Under contemporary conditions of 
global capital, as Spivak notes, we observe that this reduction to a labouring existence 
exists not merely across the worker-capitalist divide, but more significantly, is 
differentially distributed across the (global-racial-sexual) division of labour. Her 
distinction between subjects that are super-adequate to labour power and super-adequate 
to themselves implies, I suggest, the subject’s differential possibilities in expressing 
humanness. In so far as man actualises himself through human activity (material and 
symbolic), humanness is materialised in the process of world-making. While Marx 
attributes this process to labour and production, Spivak’s critique indicates a shift away 
from this form towards self-valorising consumption under global capital. According to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  Negation, here, refers to a negative relation to circulation wherein, cut off from circulation, the object 
reverts to its natural form.  
38  ‘By reducing the worker’s need to the barest and most miserable level of physical subsistence, and by 
reducing his activity to the most abstract mechanical movement; [the political economist] says: Man has 
no other need either of activity or of enjoyment. For he declares that this life, too, is human life and 
existence. (Marx 1970, p.50) 
 …  
‘The worker may only have enough for him to want to live, and may only want to live in order to have 
that’ (1970, p.51).  
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Arendt, this shift, effected by the ascension of technology and automation, represents a 
decline in world-making and an intensification, in fact, of a destructive mode of existence 
as perpetual consumption. Even so, I contend that the possibility of such consumption 
represents merely a shift in the manifestation of humanness while preserving its essential 
logic and distribution.  
In The human condition, Hannah Arendt (1998) critiques Marx for his failure to distinguish 
between labour and work, a difference, she contends, that is imperative to 
comprehending the possibility for freedom39. She does so by providing an account of the 
interface between human capacities and the nature of society against the backdrop of the 
modern world. Her address is directed, in general, at the glorification of labour in 
modern society as the primary descriptor of man’s productive activity. This elevation, 
reified by the ‘seemingly blasphemous notion of Marx that labor (and not God) created 
man or that labor (and not reason) distinguished man from other animals’ (1998, p.86), 
leaves unconsidered the political implications of labour in its historicity, blurring thereby 
the distinction between products of labour and their relation to world-making.  
Referring to the basis of labour in antiquity, Arendt remarks upon the condition of the 
subject of labour – i.e. animals laborans – as one of enslavement and animality. The 
condition of labouring meant the individual was subject to the needs of their body, and 
that in attending to them he deprived himself from participation in human activities, the 
activities of animal rationale. The latter was one who engaged in contemplation and public 
intercourse in order to generate public spaces that could ‘transcend the life-span of 
mortal men’ (1998, p.55). The productive activity of animal rationale was the sustenance of 
the polis, the space marked by freedom from necessity and domination. This is political 
man. Labour – that is, the enslavement and subjection of others to labour – is the 
condition of possibility for political man, and hence of freedom. As Arendt notes: 
What all Greek philosophers, no matter how opposed to polis life, took for 
granted is that freedom is exclusively located in the political realism, that 
necessity is a primarily pre-political phenomenon, characteristic of the private 
household organization, and that force and violence are justified in this sphere 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 It bears mentioning that this distinction proposed by Arendt has been the object of some criticism  – 
one I tend to agree with. As the discussion above will reveal, the distinction between labour and work 
replicates in form much of the distinction between productive and reproductive labour. It is not my 
intent, therefore, to posit this distinction as novel. Rather, I outline it because Arendt’s explication of 
world-making in relation to work and labour facilitates a discussion on their relevance to humanness, 
and thus, what I will refer to as ethical value.  
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because they are the only means to master necessity – for instance, by ruling over 
slaves – and to become free. (1998, p.31) 
The condition of the animal laborans, on the other hand, was that of abjection, of ‘a fate 
worse than death, because it carried with it a metamorphosis of man into something akin 
to a tame animal’ (1998, p.84). While enslavement in antiquity did not rely on descriptors 
of ontological difference, as is the wont of the modern institution, it did institute a 
different phenomenology of the enslaved, so that emancipation from slavery entailed a 
change in the same.  
Furthermore, the condition of animal laborans is one of worldlessness. Labour, in its strict 
sense, produces nothing but life. It adds no new ‘objects’ to the world and is instead 
concerned only with reproducing itself. There is no end-point to the process of labouring 
– it is a repetitive and continuous cycle that ends only with the death of the labouring 
organism (1998, p.98). To be liberated from labour is to have the capacity to materialise 
the world. In a materialist context, this means to produce objects that ‘guarantee the 
permanence and durability without which the world would not be possible at all’ (1998, 
p.94). Arendt distinguishes this form of productivity from labour, designating it as work. 
The subject of work is homo faber, he who fabricates the objects that generate an enduring 
world. In this, homo faber is the ‘lord and master of the whole world…. his productivity 
[seen] in the image of a Creator-God’ (1998, p.139). This is in contradistinction to animal 
laborans who are servants to nature and the world.  
Moreover, while animal laborans produces objects primarily according to, and used (up) 
by, the exigencies of life, the products of homo faber are an effect of reification. To wit, the 
products of work emerge from an ‘image or model whose shape… not only precedes it, 
but does not disappear with the finished product, which it survives intact, present, as it 
were, to lend itself to an infinite continuation of fabrication’ (1998, p.141). The products 
of labour, on the other hand, are the effect of conditioned activity and, under the 
division of labour, may have no resemblance with the final product. They leave, in fact, 
no material trace in the world. Conversely, products of work materialise the world. 
Consequently, Arendt notes, it is not labour but work that is the true expression of man. 
Indeed, it is the animal laborans’ subjection to labour – his degradation to the status of a 
‘tame animal’ – that frees up man’s capacity to be homo faber, the lord and master of the 
world. Or, per Spivak’s formulation, the condition of being made super-adequate to 
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labour signifies the devalorisation of labouring subjects necessary for man to become 
super-adequate to himself.  
Contemporary society, according to Arendt, is not divided between animal laborans and 
homo faber. Rather, it is a society fully constituted by the former. Arendt’s critique of 
Marx’s elevation of labour in modern society – i.e. the institution of productive power as 
the ultimate expression of human activity – is that the repetitious and eternal character of 
labour makes it so that the products of labour must be constantly consumed and cannot 
bear an enduring quality: 
…the endlessness of production can be assured only if its products lose their use 
character and become more and more objects of consumption… 
In our need for more and more rapid replacement of the worldly things around 
us, we can no longer afford to use them, to respect and preserve their inherent 
durability; we must consume, devour, as it were, our houses, and furniture and 
cars as though they were the “good things” of nature which spoil uselessly if they 
are not drawn swiftly into never-ending cycle of man’s metabolism with nature. 
(1998, pp.125–126) 
As a result, the contemporary society of animal laborans is no longer subject to the 
bondage of necessity but rather to that of perpetual consumption, and especially so, of 
the superfluities of life. Consequently, whereas the emancipation of labour produces the 
possibility for unfolding oneself through the world that is accomplished through the 
circumstance wherein ‘eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption 
and annihilation through consumption’ (1998, p.133). This essentially destructive drive of 
the animal laborans fulfills itself through the expansion of automation. Yet, it is precisely 
this circumstance that reaffirms the distinction between animal rationale and animal laborans 
– the subject who masters technology in producing enduring politico-ethical objects and 
spaces (e.g. Spivak’s word processing subject, crafter of hand-made sandals, ‘creative’ 
colleague,) and the subjected automaton that produces the conditions of life in the 
comprador countries. Arendt’s bleak estimation of a world driven to annihilation 
through consumption may underestimate the immaterial/affective aspect of 
contemporary world-making40 yet it cogently anticipates the necessary degradation of 
particular objects of the world – the organic automaton – entailed in the process41.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  This argument is forwarded by Michael Hardt  in his discussion of immaterial labour as the most 
valorised form in the postmodernised economy (that defined through the predominance of service and 
information labour). He substantiates his argument by considering the turn in production from Fordist 
to Toyotist model. Whereas the former entailed the mass manufacture of standardised commodities and 
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By looking from the shadow of value represented in the comprador theatre, then, we 
observe that value is not merely an economic effect, but rather is an entanglement of the 
ethical (human) and the economic (capital). The tendency to maximise the use value of 
labour power towards the absolute is the process of creating a negat(ed)(ive) space within 
the comprador theatre. The ethical devaluation thereby implied constitutes a resource for 
capital to extract not only economic value but also to create ethical value in the form of 
subjects super-adequated to themselves. Value, as Barrett notes, ‘is the “the willful 
expenditure of the Other in an imposing production of the self’ (1998, p.28). To be 
certain, under capital this expenditure is of the energetic body; yet, one that is facilitated 
by, and proceeds through, ethical degradation. In other words, even as capital secures 
itself through abjection, the appearance of existence as degraded is its initial moment of 
authorisation to operate as such. 
The following section provides an elaboration of this argument by engaging Georges 
Bataille’s (1993) description of the human. Here, Bataille describes the appearance of 
degradation through the notion of excess. Excess describe forms of existence that appear 
degraded that exceed utility. The expression of humanness requires a negation of excess 
so as to institute productivity as its idealised form. Consequently, those existences that 
signify excess are the other of, and therefore barred from, humanity. Since the negation 
of excess necessitates a subjection to productivity, the recuperation of degraded ‘others’ 
into humanity proceeds through their subjection to capital. This represents the 
materialisation of the productive body. I describe the appearance of this body through 
Didier Deleule’s (2014) engagement with psychology as a practice of organology. The 
productive body is instituted through the fragmentation of the living form in order to 
produce individuated organs that can be made to interface efficaciously with capital. As 
such, the productive body is intended to function as dead machine. This production, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
minimally sought feedback from the consumer, the latter restructures manufacturing as a service, one 
that actively and constantly extracts feedback from the consumer that determines production. Thus, 
even as commodities are consumed at an increasing pace, this consumption is a product of, and remains 
productive of, communication and information. A similar argument pertains to affective labour that 
occasions the deployment of information and communication in the production and exchange of affect. 
The predominance of this form of production and consumption as the contemporary materialisation of 
value preserves sociality (even if in an instrumentalised form) rather than intensifying isolation and 
degrading action, as Arendt fears. 
41  Of course, the valorisation of immaterial labour reifies racial and sexual divisions of labour. In its first 
form, as information labour, the material labour that produces the instruments of information is put 
under erasure. The production of tangible commodities is devalued in a postmodernised economy, so 
that the associated labour is similarly degraded. Indeed, the technological divide produces subjects of 
information and affect by denying the same to the subjects of use value – a transactional form that 
persists in the organisation of affective labour. 
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however, is not identical and proceeds differentially in accordance with the division of 
labour. Here, those forms of existence whose conditions of survival are defined 
predominantly through biological necessity are the most ethically degraded. That is, they 
mirror most closely dead machines having had their psycho-social capacities almost 
completely severed from their being. Indeed, these instantiations of productive bodies 
represent the object of labours that produce the more enhanced conditions of survival of 
capitalists and their representatives. This represents what Bataille describes as the relation 
between servility and sovereignty.  
The latter part of the section outlines Bataille’s conception of sovereignty as effect 
through the consumption of the goods of another’s labour. As such, sovereignty 
represents the liberation from necessity and the expression of life through material 
indulgence. This form of existence is idealised as human under the conditions of global 
capital. The appearance of sovereignty, however, is contingent upon another’s subjection 
to labour. Intervening through Achille Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitical account, I argue 
that sovereignty manifests itself through the abjection of life to the point of death. In so 
far as sovereignty is the expression of humanness par excellence, then, the human can only 
be preserved through an abject subjection to capital. In this context, annihilation enacted 
by capital is, in fact, the actualisation of the human as sovereign. Consequently, the next 
section substantiates violation as the preservation, rather than the destruction, of the 
human.  
on the subaltern and the appearance of the human 
Recounting a particular incident from her time as a full-time cleaner employed to clean 
the inside of houses, Holiday remarks on the invocation of her blackness as the site for 
verbal rebuke:  
This great big greasy bitch [the woman for whom Holiday worked] didn’t do a 
thing all day until about fifteen minutes before her old man was due home for 
dinner. Then she would kick up a storm. I didn’t know my way around her fancy 
kind of joint. Instead of telling me what she wanted me to do, she'd get excited 
because her husband was waiting, start hollering at me and calling me “nigger.” I 
had never heard that word before. I didn’t know what it meant. But I could guess 
from the sound of her voice. (quoted in Barrett 1998, p.23) 
The deployment of this particularly violent racial epithet was intended to emphasise and 
consolidate her degraded position. As Barrett notes, the use of the word identifies 
Holiday with existence that is ‘visibly insignificant; she is visibly and categorically 
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relegated to the domain of those left in the dark’ (1998, p.24). Indeed, her individual 
debasement – an effect of her blackness – materialises her as part of the very dirt that 
she is meant to clean. As such, Holiday represents a negat(ed)(ive) value form in relation 
to the posit(ed)(ive) form represented by her white mistress. The appellation identifies 
her as an excess that must be excluded from humanness; the very utterance of this 
appellation stages this removal. I begin with this narrative because it reveals, I contend, 
the productivity of the subaltern in the preservation of value.  
In the last chapter, I used the work of Karen Barad to affirm the subaltern as an effect of 
an agential separation from the subject within the phenomenon of the human (2007; 
Barad 2003). Furthermore, drawing from Hortense Spillers’ account of the injury 
committed upon flesh by the whip (and other instruments of torture) of the slave master, 
I posited these as instituting the agential cut that produced a separation between the 
black/female from the white/male. This separation, or separability, is sustained by 
subsequent material practices of ‘search and destroy’ undertaken by/for the state that 
expose the flesh of the black female as subaltern in distinction to the body of the white 
male as subject. Holiday’s body as black (and) female, and specifically so within a U.S. 
American context, recalls its lineage from the slave master’s whip. The crack of this whip 
is repeated when the mistress of the house issues commands from on high while she, 
Holiday, stoops low directed by her orders; it is repeated too the first time she recognises 
herself as the object of the n-word; it is repeated in the steps as boundary whose 
whiteness marks her as of the outside and whose threshold she may cross only by 
labouring over it. In thus repeating acts of the injury, the white body bounds itself as 
value separating out the black body as an excess that can only be approached through 
violence (Silva 2013). Indeed, what Holiday’s circumstance substantiates is that the 
preservation of value as form – as objectified appearance, here whiteness – proceeds 
through the infliction of value as force – signified by the boundary, and boundary-
making practices (the commands issued by the mistress, the use of violent language) as 
forceful exclusion (Barrett 1998, p.68).  
This section is concerned with how these exclusions are authorised as the preservation of 
value figured in the human. Whereas Holiday’s appearance as excess is onto-
epistemologically instituted as an effect of her blackness, I suggest that under the 
postcolonial condition this appearance is an effect of the material conditions under 
which existence unfolds, specifically the appearance of existence as poor. I demonstrate 
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this using Bataille’s (1993) description of the human as that which is opposed to excess. 
Here, excess is that which lies beyond utility, so that negation of excess is accomplished 
through the institution of existences that appear productive to/of capital. As such, the 
human is objectified in the productive body. However, as is evidenced in Holiday’s 
narrative, her productivity does not resolve her appearance as excess – substantiated in 
her naturalisation of one who does ‘dirty’ work as an effect of her blackness. That is, 
even as Holiday’s blackness is manipulated to institute her as productive it maintains her 
as devalued given that it (her blackness) locates her outside of the space of the human. In 
order to extend this analysis to the case of the poor, I use the work of Didier Deleule 
(2014) to explicate how the conditions of survival associated with productive bodies 
effect a differential distribution of humanness. Here, the bodies of the poor – i.e. those 
bodies that interface with capital in order to secure biological survival – are servile in 
relation to those that, liberated from biological necessity, manifest survival as a socio-
economic exuberance and hence appear as human. I explicate this circumstance through 
Bataille’s description of the appearance of sovereignty wherein sovereignty, as affirmed 
through the consumption of the products of another’s labour, implies its contingence on 
subjection.  
Indeed, this is the structure of the relation between Holiday and her mistress. The 
domination implied therein does not proceed merely through Holiday’s subjection to 
labour but is confirmed by her blackness in relation to her mistresses’ whiteness. This 
relation thus reveals the differential structure of the human, the preservation of which 
necessitates the violence of maintaining particular existences not merely as servile but 
intended towards eradication. I underscore this circumstance through Achille Mbembe’s 
(2003) description of sovereignty as the exercise of control over death, so that 
annihilation, as an effect of capital, appears as its definitive gesture in the service of 
human. In Holiday’s case, this finality is apparent in the deployment of the epithet that 
categorically ‘kills’ her – here, the symbolic eradication signified by the n-word – in order 
to affirm the mistress as sovereign. However, as I will show in this section, and in the 
cases described later in this thesis, under the postcolonial condition this act of killing, as 
undertaken, produces a definitive death of the poor intended towards the preservation of 
economic and ethical value. 
I begin, now, with Bataille’s engagement with the human. 
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The human, for Bataille, is the phenomenological descriptor of an existence produced 
through the negation of nature. Here, servility is not so much a subjective position as it is 
an ontological condition effected by subjection to the tyranny of reason. Bataille’s 
concern with servility follows from his anxiety with the loss of the miraculous. He 
describes the miraculous as that which is ‘impossible but yet there it is’ (1993, p.206). The 
experience of the miracle lies in its essential unanticipated-ness, or more so, it 
unanticipatability, so that the actualisation of the unanticipatable arrests thought. Bataille 
refers to this as the moment of unknowing, when ‘anticipation dissolves into NOTHING’ 
(1993, p.207; original emphasis). This nothingness is radically opposed to the condition 
of knowing as the end of knowledge. That is, the privileging of rationality by modern 
man posits him in a constant confront with the possibility of knowing. This movement is 
putatively directed towards an ultimate liberation, or transcendence, of the human 
condition. Yet, as Bataille argues, this pursuit of knowledge as mean(ing)s makes man 
servile to thought; for in the continued, and inevitably frustrated, anticipation of a result 
– of knowing, or knowability – he loses appreciation of the miraculous, as such, and is 
thus deprived of his sovereign capacity. It is only in the moment of the miracle that we 
may be ‘thrust from our anticipation of the future into the presence of the moment, of 
the moment illuminated by a miraculous light, the light of sovereignty of life delivered 
from its servitude’ (1993, p.207). 
This mode of being is opposed to that of ‘archaic man’, the one who is ‘taken up with 
what is sovereign, marvellous, with what goes beyond the useful’ (1993, p.226). Even 
insofar as he must satisfy his needs, he does so through an animal nature rather than 
rational practice. The world of the archaic man, then, is not constituted through the 
progression of objects but of the experience of moments. In this, archaic man expresses 
a nonalienated existence. As Bataille notes, the sovereignty of archaic man lies in his 
interface with chance, with the arbitrary. The advent of the primitive man – marked by 
the in(ter)vention of tools intended to dominate chance – effected a ‘world of operation 
[…] subordinated to the anticipated result’ (1993, p.227). This subordination of life to 
utility reduced man to a thing, so that his existence, now objectified, became alienated 
form his inner (animal) experience. Thus, the inauguration of man as such, marked a 
denial of the possibility of sovereignty.  
Indeed, modern man is always already servile. He is subordinated, at least, to the 
disavowal of chance, and the attendant advancement of objects – production of/as 
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means. In the institution of this world of/as things, he establishes himself as a tool, one 
whose ‘meaning is given by the future, in what the tool will produce, in the future 
utilization of the product; like the tool, he who serves – who works – has the value of 
that which will be later, not of that which is’ (1993, p.218). Thus, Bataille notes, the 
condition of modern man is marked by the anguish of the ‘anticipation of oneself’ (1993, 
p.218). In his portentous attempt to apprehend himself in the future, man endeavours to 
rewrite his servility as sovereignty expressed through the abandonment of his natural 
condition. Bataille locates the inaugural moment of this phenomenon of sovereignty in 
the suspension of erotic activity. 
Bataille describes the erotic as a form of activity that serves no purpose  – i.e. activity 
that lies in excess of ‘this world of useful and isolated things, in which laborious activity 
is the rule’ (1993, p.24). He begins his consideration of the erotic by addressing the incest 
prohibition as a fundamental structure of human existence. Beyond the import of 
biology and the economy of exchange, Bataille reads the incest prohibition as a means of 
‘countering [the] animal disorderliness’ (1993, p.55) of free sexual activity. Amongst 
animals, sexual activity functions as per its natural given-ness – i.e. it is the effect of ‘only 
an irresistible, fleeting impulse, destitute of meaning’ (1993, p.48). The incest prohibition 
is the effect of recognising in sexual, or erotic, activity the possibility of value-production 
beyond mere reproduction.  
Writing, for example, of the exchange of women as authorised by the prohibition, 
Bataille notes: 
Thus, women are essentially pledged to communication42, which is to say, they must 
be an object of generosity on the part of those who have them at their immediate 
disposal. The latter must give them away, but in a world where every generous 
act contributes to the circuit of general generosity, I will receive, if I give my 
daughter another woman for my son (or my nephew). … What is denied in the 
incest prohibition is only the result of an affirmation. The brother giving his 
sister does not so much deny the value of sexual union with his close kinswoman 
as he affirms the greater value of marriage that would join his sister with another 
man, and himself with another woman. There is more intense communication in 
exchange based on generosity than there would be in immediate gratification. 
(1993, pp.42–43) 
The incest prohibition, then, is intended to move erotic activity away from the useless 
consumption of resources towards strictly established utility. That is, recognising the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  The ‘communication’ that Bataille refers to is the indication of socioeconomic status.  
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scientific (i.e. biological and economic) futility of unrestrained sexual activity, the incest 
prohibition accords it new value. All activity that exceeds the bounds of usefulness 
becomes relegated to the realm of the erotic.   
By introducing his argument through a critique of the incest prohibition, Bataille seeks to 
establish man as an effect of the ‘servility of thought’ (1993, p.14) – i.e. of the submission 
of his inner truth to useful ends. The humanised world is, thus, the reduced world of 
thought. This is the world defined by kinship, religion, occupation, etc. through which an 
individual circulates. All that lies beyond this world is the accursed domain. As evidenced 
in the incest prohibition, this is the domain of animality, produced through the negation 
of nature. Indeed, Bataille asserts the negation of the natural condition as elemental to 
the emergence of man as such. 
Of course, the incest prohibition is the not the primary moment of negation but rather 
an effect of it. The primordial negation pertained to ‘the being’s dependence on the natural 
given, on the body which it did not choose’ (1993, p.90). Bataille’s determination of this 
dependence is not so much metaphysical (i.e. the body as pure substance devoid of the 
possibility of rational comprehension) but rather existential. Reading existence as 
expenditure (of resources, energy), he notes man’s preoccupation with use as a particular 
effect of the human condition – i.e. the rational processes that impel him to establish 
utility as a resolution to its (expenditure/consumption’s) immediate problem (cf. Bataille 
1991). All expenditure that exceeds utility is considered base, accursed. Yet excess is the 
natural condition:  
On the surface of the globe, for living matter in general, energy is always in excess; 
the question is always posed in terms of extravagance. The choice is limited to 
how the wealth is to be squandered. … The general movement of exudation (of 
waste) of living matter impels him, and he cannot stop it; moreover, being at the 
summit, his sovereignty in the living world identifies him with this movement; it 
destines him, in a privileged way, to that glorious operation, to useless 
consumption. If he denies this, as he is constantly urged to do by the 
consciousness of a necessity, of an indigence inherent in separate beings (which 
are constantly short of resources, which are nothing but eternally needy 
individuals), his denial does not alter the global movement of energy in the least: 
The latter cannot accumulate limitlessly in the productive forces; eventually, like a 
river into the sea, it is bound to escape us and to be lost to us. (1991, p.23; 
original emphasis) 
Thus, humanity institutes itself as a posit(ed)(ive) form through the negation of excess as 
the natural given.  
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The body, as organic, sensuous matter – produced through cycles of birth and death, 
through various functions and excretions – is always already excess. The enactment of 
sovereignty requires, then, the abandonment of the body – its natural movements and 
intensities, its eroticism. The ensuing circumstance – characterised by the abandonment 
of the miraculous and the erotic – is the scene of sovereignty, constituted as the 
liberation from an ontology of the organic. Yet, this circumstance is in fact the negation 
of Freedom. The facticity of biological life as the substance of survival – as that which 
must be reproduced and preserved to guarantee the sustenance of man – renders the 
project of negation as a necessarily failed project. In so far as it can constitute an 
appearance, then, negation proceeds through the subjection of matter to the activity of 
productive expenditure. Bataille’s account of the human thus describes how embodied 
matter, which by its very nature recalls excess, is manipulated through labour in order to 
project a consolidated appearance as human. This affirms matter, as proposed by Barad, 
as crucial to the ongoing materialisation of the phenomenon of the human. Yet, given 
that the appearance of a particular form as human is effected by an agential cut, it must 
be observed that particular instruments – in this case, capital – produce separations in 
the scene of productive bodies effecting a differential distribution of humanness. Below I 
outline Didier Deleule’s (2014) account of the institution of the productive body in order 
to provide an explication of this circumstance. 
In ‘Body-Machine and Living Machine’, Deleule addresses the scientisation of the 
psycho-sensual ‘living machine’ to produce a ‘forgery’ (2014, l.1377) that he posits as the 
body-machine. ‘The image of the body-machine,’ he writes, emerges from: 
a definition of nature as an exuberant and omnipresent force [puissance], the sum 
of all possibles in which everyone may legitimately actualise themselves in 
determinate conditions that vary according to their virtue, and a redefinition of 
nature that excludes from its space a large set of possibles so as to allow only one 
to emerge at the expense of all others: nature as a uniform object suitable for 
mathematical treatment. … The boundless force [puissance] of irrational energies 
[forces] at work in the manifold of nature… is replaced by the idea of an eminent 
and unique dignity… subject to invariable and uniform laws, rationally stipulated 
and therefore rationally discernable, if only by ordinary understanding armed 
with methodological tools. (2014, l.1415–1424) 
This redefinition of nature, and hence the vital body, is not intended as a reduction to, or 
a simulation of, the mechanistic. Rather, it is the augmentation of power in actualising 
conquest – the mastery over nature – as the ontology of man. The machine is made to 
imitate life. The body-machine is thus an ‘epistemological myth’ (2000, l.1468) stipulated 
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as the culmination of perfected, not degraded, life – where perfected life manifests as 
productive power. As such, the body-machine ‘with its blemishes of subjectivity scoured 
away... appears in its historical destiny as productive being’ (2014, l.1490–1491).  
The inauguration of the living machine as body-machine is principally a project of 
discipline. That is, by subjecting it to its mechanistic potentiality, the body is 
disassociated from its psycho-sensual wiles. Or more precisely, sensation and perception 
are subjected to scientific examination, so that the body – its organs and surfaces, as the 
material sites of experience – can be transformed into ‘efficacious motion’  43. The 
creation of the body-machine thus entails a transformation of the living machine as if it 
were ‘dead’. To reiterate, the appearance of the body-machine as ‘dead’, is not in itself 
the evocation of a degraded circumstance. Rather, by diminishing the hindrance of sense 
perception and psychical affect, the dead machine is viewed as the absolute seizure of the 
body’s latent power [puissance]44 in opposition to nature. Of course, Deleule acknowledges 
this conception of the body-machine as a ruse, for even if it is ‘the telos of intelligibility 
for man-machine, it also undergoes a real depravation, for it becomes that which lacks 
reason, i.e. language, calculation, the projection of ends’ (2014, l.1526–1527). This 
depravation, which is ultimately a degradation, is the condition of possibility for the 
institution of the body-machine as the body of capital. This body form is what Deleule 
and François Guéry45 refer to as the productive body. The productive body, however, is 
not an ideological effect of capitalism. Rather, it names the already ‘organologised’ body 
as appropriated by capital. 
The productive body emerges from a scission of the social body into an individualised 
form, a cut that is replicated in the separation of the body from the totality of its powers 
(in particular of power [puissance] from knowledge [pouvoir]). Deleule attributes the agency 
of this cut (to use Barad’s terminology) to the discipline of psychology – or what he 
refers to as ‘'y’ – which is concerned with ‘knowledge-formation about separable parts or 
senses of the body… in order to gain an arithmetic knowledge of the body’ (Barnard & 
Shapiro 2014, l.578). Psychology, as the practice of organology, approaches the biological 
body as such in order to examine and control each organ of sense and perception so as 
to ‘minimize [the ensuing] embarrassing “subjectivity”’ (Deleule 2014, l.1573). The end 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  Deleule thus rewrites Bataille’s disavowal of nothingness/the erotic as rationalisation that acknowledges 
the facticity of the senses, yet seeks to colonise them as a means to minimise, or eradicate, their effects.  
44  Refers to physical power as opposed to pouvoir, or symbolic power/authority. 
45  Deleule’s text appears as Part II of the co-authored volume titled The productive body. 
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of organology, according to Deleule, is the ‘epiphenomenalisation of consciousness’ 
whereby the immediate causality of the body – its matter and functions – on the mind is 
denied. This creates a circumstance wherein 
a scale of beings in which the hypothesis of vital phenomena with no need of 
consciousness nevertheless can never entail the possibility of consciousness and 
its acts apart from the presence of the body. The bodily machine functions without 
receiving its orders from consciousness; yet, always present at the highest level of the hierarchy of 
beings, consciousness accompanies it without acting. Thus the machine moves by itself 
and the soul is reduced to a lesser function as the “logical subject of internal 
experience”’. (2014, l.1619–1622)   
Thus, the body-machine is brought into interface with the world-machine merely as an 
organ, devoid of any (need for) consciousness. This applies to the mind as well, which 
rather than being approached as the seat of reason and will, is merely an instrument 
applied to actualise a given end. An organ, thus appropriated as an instrument intended 
towards manifesting a de-personalised/specialised end, becomes a ‘metonymic 
representation’ of the productive body (2014, l.1537). This appropriation proceeds by 
means of, and for, capital, so that the productive machine appears as the body of 
capital46. Indeed, the productive body only appears as such – an amalgamation of organs, 
divested of life as sense, affect, and knowledge – in communion with capital. In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  This argument resonates with that of Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-oedipus (2000). Here, they posit the 
organised body as an effect of desiring-production – i.e. production effected by a desire to commune 
with an externalised world. The process of desiring-production grafts the body in the image of the 
product, the body thus organised produces products in its image, and so on:  
Producing is always something “grafted onto” the product; and for that reason desiring-
production is production of production, just as every machine is a machine connected 
to another machine. (2000, p.6) 
… 
Desiring-machines make us an organism; but at the very heart of this production, within 
the very production of this production, the body suffers from being organized in this 
way, from not having some other sort of organization, or no organization at all. (2000, 
p.8) 
A body that is not yet thus organised – i.e. the body without organs (BwO) – is an unproductive body, 
and as such opposes the desiring-machine since it views the latter as ‘an over-all persecution apparatus’ 
(2000, p.10). (Deleule and Guéry’s productive body thus appears an imitation of the desiring-machine.) 
 
As such, capital is the BwO of the capitalist. The desiring-machine, then, serves as the recording or 
inscribing device that makes capital productive: 
Machines attach them-selves to the body without organs as so many points of 
disjunction, between which an entire network of new syntheses is now woven, marking 
the surface off into co-ordinates, like a grid.  
…(2000, p.12) 
The process as process of production extends into the method as method of 
inscription. Or rather, if what we term libido is the connective “labor” of desiring-
production, it should be said that a part of this energy is transformed into the energy of 
disjunctive inscription… (2000, p.13) 
It is as such that the organised body, i.e. the desiring-machine, institutes itself as the organised 
(productive) body of capital.  
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form, the productive body is ‘no longer a living being who runs a machine, but [is subject 
to a] machine that makes [it] a machine out of the living being’ (2014, l.1858–1859). The 
productive body is thus an accessory that either serves or oversees dead machines, but it 
is the dead machine that governs the activity of the living machine. As such, the 
productive body is servile. This servility, of course, does not appear uniformly within the 
system of the fully developed productive body. The form in which a living machine is 
reduced to a productive body – or, the extent to which it must submit itself to servility – 
is contingent upon the position of its subject in the division of labour.  
The differentiation between individuated productive bodies is founded on the 
apportionment of capacities – such that some bodies are completely divested of any 
competence other than brute power whereas others are granted mental/intellectual 
proficiencies required for surveillance and control (2014, l.1842–1844). The productive 
body is thus an accessory that either serves or oversees dead machines, and must be 
preserved in this capacity. Under all possible circumstances, the maintenance of the 
productive body necessitates the survival of the biological body. Even where the 
productive body is itself produced as a ‘dead machine’, in so far as it is divested of its 
capacities for life, it can only be maintained as such by returning life, albeit in its 
mechanised form, back to it – i.e. through the survival of the biological body. In more 
advanced circumstances, the productive body is instituted through the mind as organ for 
the purpose of surveillance and control. Here, the maintenance of the productive body 
entails the development of new abilities, and thereby encourages a form of social survival 
that exceeds physiological necessity47. The differential manifestation of productive bodies 
– which is an effect of the division of labour within a system of the fully developed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  This encouragement of sociality is not limited to productive bodies instituted through sense or intellect, 
but also has pertinence to those instituted as biological machines in the main. Indeed, as Deleule notes, 
the survival of the biological body requires the maintenance of the living machine, even if minimally, as 
living. Consequently, he observes that the imperative of modern psychology has shifted towards securing 
the ‘productive consumption’ of the living machine:  
The living machine, reduced to the status of an accessory, constitutes a “moment” of 
the productive process, but this “moment” is obviously dispossessed of the very 
meaning of its productive act because the accessory… in its essence, is not superfluity but 
ignorance. One of the functions of the psychological intervention… is to restore to the 
subject an alien awareness of his condition by inculcation in him a certain type of self-
awareness centered on folkloric notions of “belonging”, of “feelings of group identity,” 
or even a brand of “empathy-spontaneity-creativity” that lend a ludicrous aura to the 
concept of “personality,” itself always accompanied by its trusty sidekick, “well-being” 
[intégration].  
… 
The goals of psychology… are thereby integrated into the general goals of the productive body which… 
encounters at every step and in all its diverse forms the resistance of life… and must, in consequence, 
and in the strongest sense, take account of it. (2014, l.1882–1890, 1919–1923; added emphasis) 
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productive body – thus represents differential systemic investments in the survival of 
individual productive bodies. As such, they signifying the distribution of possibilities for 
survival within the system of fully developed productive bodies.  
Deleule’s account of the productive body thus demonstrates its differential appearance in 
relation to conditions of survival. Akin to Bataille, he affirms the centrality of 
productivity – i.e. of the instrumentalisation of the body through labour – as the 
manifestation of the modern subject under the imperatives or rationality and utility. Yet, 
what his intervention additionally offers is an insight into how these productive bodies 
are differentially manifest in relation to the circumstance of life beyond labour. Deleule 
posits enhancements in the possibility of biological survival as the creation of 
‘abundance’, whereas advancements in social survival appear in the form of ‘promotions’ 
(2014, l.1784–1786). Yet, given that the sustenance of the system requires an expansive 
mass of productive machines to subordinate themselves to dead machines – indeed living 
machines must be made to compete with dead machine in the labour market – their will 
to survival must be channelled so that it is primarily biologically motivated. That is, a 
large proportion of the fully developed productive machine must be reduced to its 
biological component. This, in fact, is the circumstance of the poor, so that any 
‘abundance’ – whether pertaining to biological or social survival – accrues to those 
granted sociality, i.e. those that express what Bataille designates as exuberant life. The 
subjection of the poor entails not only their subordination to dead machines but also to 
fully living machines – indeed, eventually, to those subjects that exhibit the condition of 
sovereignty. Deleule’s account thus signals the relation of domination between the 
sovereign (bourgeois/subject) and servile (poor/subaltern) as fundamental to the 
entangled structure of the human and capital. I substantiate this proposition by returning 
to the work of Bataille. 
As noted earlier, the human, in Bataille’s articulation, describes the subject committed to 
productive expenditure. However, in a system fully constituted of productive bodies, the 
human appears as existence liberated from productivity. Or more precisely, the human 
describes a form of survival defined through ‘unproductive expenditure’ – i.e. the 
disposal of energy beyond necessity. Bataille designates this form of existence as 
sovereign. The sovereign is he who ‘truly enjoys the products of this world – beyond his 
needs. … [T]he sovereign (or sovereign life) begins when, with the necessities ensured, 
the possibility of life opens up without limit’ (1993, p.198). Within the context of 
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modernity – wherein the miraculous and erotic are replaced by the imperative of 
economic and social utility – unproductive expenditure entails the enjoyment of 
another’s labour. Sovereignty is thus appropriated through surplus consumption without 
the investment of labour. This is not to suggest that the sovereign man is not a 
productive machine, but rather that his productivity within the fully developed 
productive machine is located within his cultivation as a living machine through 
expenditure beyond utility. This surplus expenditure is contingent upon the 
expropriation of another’s labour – or more precisely, upon the servility of other living 
machines to their biological survival. In this context, the servile are those who ‘without 
means labor and reduce their consumption to the necessities, to the products without 
which they could neither subsist nor labor’ (1993, p.198) – those that are motived 
primarily by biological survival. In contradistinction, the sovereign’s survival as such lies 
in the anticipation of themselves through a world of things – that is, through the 
consumption (or more precisely, negation) of another’s possibility for social survival.  
The relationship between the sovereign and the servile is, thus, fundamentally that of 
subject to object.  
Survival, according to Deleule, describes the circumstance of ‘becoming a servant of 
death, i.e., accepting that the very conditions of life are controlled, so to speak, by an 
outside organism following a plan whose complexities may provide an illusion of 
autonomy but ultimately reveal themselves as elements of an alien body’ (2014, l.1767–
1769). This description of survival recognises the tension between will and force that 
structures the situation of subjection. Where survival is concerned with a victory against 
biological death, the survivor is only in ‘a trial run for death and thus the opposite of life’ 
(2014, l.1776). That is, the productive body reduced to a biological machine is destined 
for death, so that its productive form is merely a postponement of its fate. The survivor 
thus typifies the adaptive submission of biological substance to productive movement 
against the forces of death. As such, this submission is directed by the force of the 
sovereign as the arbiter of the possibility of biological survival. Consequently, the servile 
appears as an object intended towards the sovereign qua subject.   
Bataille reflects on the relation between subject and object as a relation between 
interiority and exteriority:  
We live in a world of subjects whose exterior, objective aspect is always inseparable 
from the interior. But within ourselves what is given of ourselves, objectively, as 
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the body, appears subordinate to us. My body is obedient to my will, which 
within myself I identify with the presence, perceptible form the outside, of the 
being that I am. Thus, generally, the object, or the objectively given being, 
appears to me to be subordinate to subjects, whose property it is.  
… 
Mechanically, I put on the same plane those things that generally appear to me in 
the dependence where they have no pre-eminence over one another and those 
things that I eat, that serve me, that are, with respect to the subject that I am, 
servile objects. (1993, pp.238–239) 
Thus, while sovereignty, in its primordial articulation, is not an ‘objective product’ but an 
inner experience – of the unanticipatable, the miraculous – its modern expression is 
constituted through an anticipation of the self actualised in relations of subjugation. 
While the experience of the moment remains pertinent – Bataille posits the sovereign as 
he who acts as if death were not – this experience is now contingent upon his reification 
as such (rather than his dissolution), engendered through an externalised objectification. 
Here, material luxury becomes posited as the putative means to experiencing the fullness 
of existence; it projects the image of exceeding death. Sovereign existence is luxurious48, 
translated as indulgence in material excess. Thus, even though he himself is an 
instrument – subject to future ends – the sovereign manifests himself as such by 
externalising his own objecthood into a world of things. To wit, the ability of the 
sovereign to experience life beyond the struggle of necessity, beyond utility, is made 
possible through the objectification of another. This reduction of another to objective 
existence – to a productive body servile to its own will to biological survival – is enabled 
through their subjection to necessity49. This ‘becoming-thing’ of the servile is achieved 
and maintained through sovereign force. Or, more particularly, servility constitutes the 
location whereby the sovereign manifests himself qua human. As such, servile existence 
is both the object and the effect of capital’s negotiation of humanness, thereby revealing 
the security of the human as an effect of sovereign violence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  In Bataille’s writings, luxury is the objective form of excess, of absolute expenditure. The basis of luxury 
is the transgression of the principle of utility. Death, as that which negates, in the absolute, the utilitarian 
unfolding that is (intended to be) life, is its most luxurious form. Similarly, but on a lesser scale, material 
luxury is a violation of useful production and consumption. 
49  Bataille, in fact, recognizes servile man as closer to the experience of sovereignty than the ostentatious 
displays of the wealthy. For the beggar or the labourer, who engage in acts of escape, are better placed 
to encounter the miraculous. Take for instance the laborer who drinks to escape necessity. Here, the 
experience of intoxication gives him ‘for a brief moment, the miraculous sensation of having the world at his 
disposal’ (1993, p.199; original emphasis). This, according to Bataille – the abandonment of the future in 
favour of the present – is the essence of sovereignty. For the wealthy man, on the other hand, 
sovereignty is a relational display, intended towards an instrumental, and ultimately ephemeral, end.  
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Writing of the relations of subjugation implied by sovereignty, Achilles Mbembe notes 
that ‘[t]o exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the 
deployment and manifestation of power’ (2003, p.12). While Mbembe, like Bataille, 
remains interested in necropolitics – i.e. in the political work of death – his description of 
sovereignty marks a departure from Bataille’s subjective articulation towards one 
explicitly concerned with the use of force – or, more precisely, with the manifestation of 
sovereignty as force. Thus, in his piece on necropolitics, he frames his writing of 
sovereignty as concerned with ‘those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not 
the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the 
material destruction of human bodies and populations’ (2003, p.14; original emphasis). 
Juxtaposing ‘necropower’ with Foucault’s conception of biopower, Mbembe seeks to 
comprehend politics as the perpetual motion of death. That is, rather than positing death, or 
killing, as the limit resolution of conflict, he engages death as the practice of ‘war without 
end’ (2003, p.23). Here, the figure of the enemy, who must be ‘made to die’ so as to 
restore the sovereign/ity, dissolves into the figure of the sub-human – the savage – who 
must be categorically eradicated in the war of/for humanity. Death, then, is not a means 
of preservation or restoration of the nomos, but rather an incessant means of ‘realizing the 
already known telos of history’ (2003, p.20).  
Mbembe thus re-writes Foucault’s formulation of sovereignty – the power to ‘let live or 
make die’ as a means of exercising discipline and control – as the practice of distributing 
value, i.e. ‘the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and 
who is not’ (2003, p.27). Writing beyond moments of biopolitical terror – such as those 
exemplified by slavery and the Holocaust – Mbembe sites the colony as a necropolitical 
zone par excellence. Here, the instrumental and administrative rationality of the biopolitical 
regime intersects with the sacred ground of history and identity to institute the colony as 
a space unfolded through death50. Under the conditions of global capital, however, the 
sovereign violence of colonial expropriation and occupation is manifest not merely 
through militaristic deployments but also, and more often, through juridico-economic 
measures. Referencing conditions in besieged states in Africa, he writes of the role of 
‘enclave economies’ in the distribution of death in the post-colony:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  Expounding on the case of Palestine, for instance, Mbembe notes how accounts of history, authorised 
by narratives of divine right, engender a state of siege, wherein distinctions between internal and 
external enemy are dissolved to subject entire populations to sovereign force.    
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[Th]e controlled inflow and the fixing of movements of money around zones in 
which specific resources are extracted has made possible the formation of enclave 
economies and has shifted the old calculus between people and things. The 
concentration of activities connected with the extraction of valuable resources 
around these enclaves has, in return, turned the enclaves into privileged spaces of 
war and death. War itself is fed by increased sales of the products extracted. 
(2003, p.33) 
… 
The extraction and looting of natural resources by war machines goes hand in 
hand with brutal attempts to immobilize and spatially fix whole categories of 
people or, paradoxically, to unleash them, to force them to scatter over broad 
areas no longer contained by the boundaries of a territorial state. As a political 
category, populations are then disaggregated into rebels, child soldiers, victims or 
refugees, or civilians incapacitated by mutilation or simply massacred on the 
model of ancient sacrifices, while the “survivors,” after a horrific exodus, are 
confined in camps and zones of exception. (2003, p.34) 
Indeed, these political categories constitute those survivors who are merely on a ‘trial run 
for death’. In Foucault’s writing, homo economicus is ‘the human being who spends out, 
wears out, and wastes his life in avoiding the imminence of death’ (1994, p.257). Yet, as 
Mbembe’s necropolitical re-writing of sovereignty demonstrates, the servile/survivors do 
not merely labour against death, but rather are abjectified to the point of death in the 
display of sovereign desire. Under a necropolitical regime of global capital, the 
sovereign’s imperative of excess consumption is accomplished not so much through the 
alienation of life as its abject instrumentalisation. To wit, the violence of the sovereign 
consists in the disposal of (the life of) the servile. It is precisely through this differential 
of sovereignty and servility, as it structures the entanglement of the human and capital, 
that development unfolds. 
Moreover, the form of disposal – the bruises, wounds and severings – constitutes the 
generalised substance of servility. Referring, for instance, to the remains of the Rwandan 
genocide, Mbembe describes the fragments of flesh and bone of the un/dead as 
inscribed ‘in the register of undifferentiated generality: simple relics of an unburied pain, 
empty, meaningless corporealities, strange deposits plunged into cruel stupor’ (2003, 
p.35). We observe this generalisation, too, in the fragmented body of the child and the 
spectacle of violence in Nandigram. Yet, even in this stripping away of subjectivity, its 
matter insists on signification – the violations, a mark of (its) unconsidered existence.  
Mbembe’s account of sovereignty thus emphasises the material violence of 
abjectification. In so doing, it extends Bataille’s description of servility as effected 
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through labour. Yet, what remains significant in the latter’s analysis is his elaboration of 
this condition as a particular appearance of humanness. Bataille’s account of sovereignty 
and servility, while materially circumscribed through relations of production and 
consumption, addresses, in fact, human differentiation. Excess, for Bataille, is the 
primordial principle of humanness, one that is negated in the subjection of existence to 
reason. Consequently, excess as a form of unproductive, erotic existence becomes a 
descriptor of diminished or debased human-ness, signified through embodied, 
topographical and social disorder. On the other hand, the projection of order – at least as 
an aesthetic – is achieved through indulgence in excess as a marker of transcendence. 
This transcendence, manifest through luxurious consumption, is accomplished through 
the subjection of the servile as thing. Moreover, the material consequences of servility – 
the absence of material excess and the prevalence of disorder – institute servile existence 
as excess itself. Indeed, it is precisely this excess – in its material instantiation (the body), 
and not merely its expenditure (labour) – that is consumed by the sovereign in/as the 
disposal of life. Mbembe’s account of necropolitics, where death substantiates 
sovereignty, further reveals the unambiguous brutality of excess in these synchronistic 
articulations. As such, death – as the final negation of excess – is the actualisation of the 
human effected by capital. 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate how subjection and obliteration under 
development operate through the entanglement of the human and capital. I have 
proposed this entanglement as the structure of development and hence the syntax of the 
postcolonial condition. This argument was forwarded by revealing the differential 
structure of the human and capital so that their preservation unfolds as violence. As 
such, the annihilation of existences that appear as degraded or devalued is the necessary 
teleological end for the ontological security of the posit(ed)(ive) form. This is possible 
because value conceals itself as a differential and operates by naturalising itself (Barrett 
1998), so that subjection and annihilation, as the practices of securing value, must 
proceed as if ontoepistemologically authorised. As made evident in this chapter, the body 
offers itself precisely as the source of this authority. 
This is a crucial intervention made possible through a critical global account of value. By 
being attentive to the entanglement of the human and capital in the production of value, 
we can comprehend the body not mere as a potentiality – the store of labour power – 
but, more crucially, as signifying matter. The primacy of the economic in materialist 
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descriptions of value posits the body as abstract(ed) energetic matter that is socially 
undifferentiated in the first instance – so that social differentiation, as manifest in 
relations of domination and exploitation, is viewed as an effect of capital. Instead, by 
considering value under capital as a relation between its economic and its ethical register 
– the mutuality of capital and the human – we are compelled to approach the body as 
ontoepistemologically materialised – that is, as matter that is made to represent – so that 
it may serve to consolidate the humanist pretension of development. Capital is thus 
concerned with the body not merely as substantive matter but also as signifying matter – 
not merely with what the body can materialise but how it comes to be materialised itself. 
This is an effect of the phenomenology of value that requires a space of non-value to 
institute itself as such. The body, as signifying matter, serves precisely this function of 
revealing a space of non-value that can attend to the ideological needs of capital.  
As already indicated, under modernity, the body is materialised (and biologically 
naturalised) as racially and sexually differentiated substance, and hence a signifier of 
ontological difference. This materialisation situates the racial and sexual other as a 
degraded being, extant in the shadow of the human. This radical alterity always already 
situates the body thus inscribed as a space of negat(ed)(ive) ethical value. The body is 
thus constituted as the natural basis for juridico-economic relations of domination and 
subjection. Under the conditions of global capital, however, these direct inscriptions 
upon matter, while necessary, are no longer sufficient to describe ethical differentiation 
and devaluation. Instead, as Wynter notes, there is a shift in the description of the human 
from a primarily biogenetic one, to one that folds the biogenetic into an economic 
description of ontological difference. Of course, this description is an appearance – one 
that maintains the body as its material instantiation. However, rather than relying on the 
inscription of matter, it prioritises the conditions under which the body materialises itself 
as such – that is, the conditions under which the body is reproduced as labour and life. 
These material conditions that attend the production of the body as such are now 
posited as signifiers of ontological difference, and thus become the naturalised basis for 
the relations of domination and suppression.  
The next chapter elaborates upon this signification of the body as it authorised 
exploitation, and finally eradication, in Bhopal. 	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chapter 3 
the matter( ing)  o f  bodies :  
on the Bhopal gas leak and the tragedy of excess 
‘“I used to be human once. So I am told.”’ Thus begins the story of the eponymous 
narrator of Indra Sinha’s novel Animal’s People (2008). An abandoned/orphaned infant 
survivor of ‘that night’, we meet him through his narrative, recorded on tape for a 
foreign journalist. Growing up on the edges of the Kampani’s toxic wastelands – 
swimming in the ‘lakes’ formed when rainwaters filled its sludge pit – his body, gradually 
and painfully, becomes severely contorted. He becomes ‘Animal’ – moving on all fours, 
‘throwing my weight onto my hands, hauling feet forward in a kind of hop’, with his ‘arse 
up in the air and legs too weak to squat’ (2008, pp.15–16); foraging for food in the alleys 
behind houses and restaurants, sharing his findings with ‘a yellow dog, of no fixed abode 
and no traceable parents, just like me’ (2008, p.18). 
Animal, of course, was not always so named; the name emerged in play, the effect, no 
doubt, of an inescapable observation: 
One day we [children of the orphanage] were lying on the grass in hot sun, drying 
off. A girl about my own age, she pushed me and left the prints of her muddy 
fingertips on my body. The mud dried pale on my skin. She said, ‘Like a leopard!’ 
So then they all dipped their fingers in the clay and covered me with leopard 
marks. ‘Animal, jungle [wild] Animal!’ The name, like the mud, stuck. The nuns tried 
to stop it but some things have logic that can’t be denied. (Sinha 2008: 16; emphasis 
added) 
This logic, that confirms his name, is the failure of the negation of animality objectified 
in his body. Indeed, throughout his narrative, Animal attests to a consciousness of his 
‘animal condition’: ‘‘‘Animal is a horrible person, full of filth.” Think I don’t know it 
already?’ (2008, p.79).  
This explication in Animal’s narrative of his symbolic and material defilement extends as 
well, albeit differentially, to other characters that populate his life, i.e. to ‘Animal’s 
people’. If his appellation is intended to represent the degradation of his existence, then 
the designation ‘Animal’s people’, marks not only a relational aspect but, more 
significantly, the tacit trajectory of all those whose existences and fates he signifies: ‘All 
things pass, but the poor remain. We are the people of the Apokalis. Tomorrow there 
will be more of us’ (2008, p.366). 
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Indra Sinha’s Animal’s People is situated in the fictional city of Khaufpur. The story is set 
around the incidents of ‘that night’ and make constant note of the ‘Kampani’ and its 
‘Amrikan’ lawyers. Even though the story never references Bhopal by its particular name, 
it is evident that this is a fictionalised re-telling of the devastation of the gas leak. There is 
no dearth of first-hand accounts of survivors of the event51. Yet, I begin with this 
fictionalised account because of its pointed symbolism. That is, the epithets therein – 
‘Animal’, ‘Animal’s people’, ‘people of the Apokalis’ – make stark the circumstance of 
violation represented by the leak.  
As previously noted, per Bataille, the appearance of excess signifies animality. Animality 
is the zone of the miraculous and the erotic – where life expresses itself in full 
exuberance, unfolding in opposition to the principles of rationality and utility. Thus, it is 
that which is barred from humanity, separated out as the space of non-value. Animality 
describes the circumstance of ethical degradation, that which must be eradicated for the 
preservation of the human. The previous chapter described the role of capital in fulfilling 
this end. There, I described how the appearance of animality – i.e. existence that appears 
as excess – appeals to capital as an opportunity for intervention. This is the basis of 
development wherein capital advances a recuperative gesture, materialising a productive 
body. This body, of course, exists for capital – indeed, it is intended towards the 
reproduction of capital – so that its maintenance as such requires the continued 
suppression of its (the body’s) conditions of survival. To wit, capital maintains the bodies 
of labourers as ethically degraded so that the production of economic value – as an effect 
of the materialisation of productive bodies – proceeds through the upholding of the 
labourer as ethically devalued. The recuperative gesture of development, then, remains 
contained within the relations of domination and subjugation or what, following Bataille, 
we may identify as sovereignty and servility. Animal’s proximity to the kampani that 
night – an effect of poor conditions of living – substantiates this subjugation. His form – 
a consequence of ‘that night’ – is the material record of its trajectory. His consciousness 
– of his situation and that of his people – is recognition of the inevitability of their 
termination, an effect of their differential humanness.  
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated annihilation as the imperative of development as 
an effect of the entanglement of the human and capital as descriptors of value under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  Cf. Suroopa Mukherjee (2010) Surviving Bhopal: Dancing bodies, written texts and oral testimonies of women in the 
wake of an industrial disaster. T.R. Chouhan (1994) Bhopal, the inside story.  
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postcoloniality. There I also affirmed the significance of the body in signifying and 
preserving value. In particular, I demonstrated how the body of the poor appears as 
excess and hence as ethically devalued. Furthermore, this appearance as negat(ed)(ive) 
value appeals to capital in securing itself. That is, bodies of the poor are appropriated by 
capital as signifying excess that must be eradicated by materialising them as productive. 
The accumulation of value by capital – or more precisely, for capitalists – is contingent 
upon the expropriation of the ethical value of workers. In other words, the reproduction 
of capital proceeds through the continued degradation of the workers objectified in their 
materially deprived conditions of existence, up to the point of annihilation.  
I continue this discussion with the Bhopal gas leak because it reveals the attempts of 
development to advance itself – and therefore the human and capital – as the truth of 
liberation and progress. Indeed, the chemical plant was commissioned by the state as a 
project of the Green Revolution. However, as Animal’s narrative, as well as the broken 
body of the child in Rai’s image, reveal, the project culminated as the annihilation of 
poor rather than their emancipation from poverty. This is the truth of development writ 
large on the bodies of the dead, like the child, and the un-dead, like Animal and his 
people, alike. The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to read this embodied truth. I 
have already demonstrated development as the manifestation of the postcolonial 
capitalist condition wherein the annihilation of the poor is the necessary end intended 
towards the preservation of the human and capital as value. Instead, the purpose of this 
chapter is to highlight the imperative of the body – or more precisely, of matter – in 
actualising this project. In other words, I will read the case of Bhopal to propose how an 
attentiveness to matter reveals it as indispensable to realising annihilation as the 
necessary end of development.  
Corporeal matter, on the one hand, is the ontic dimension of the body – that which in 
registering exchanges, for instance, of pleasure or pain, heat or cold, rough or smooth, is 
the substance through which life, and its worlds, are experienced as such (Scarry 1985). 
But matter is also a becoming. It is ‘the effect of a dynamic of power, such that the 
matter of bodies will be indissociable from the regulatory norms that govern their 
materialization and the signification of those material effects’ (Butler 2011, p.xii). That is, 
corporeal matter is constantly being re-formed in order that it may project a desired 
meaning under a given governing structure. In this chapter, I will address both these 
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aspects of matter as critical to the work of development under the postcolonial capitalist 
condition.  
The chapter begins by situating the Bhopal gas tragedy in its developmentalist frame. The 
first half of the section below provides an account of the historico-political context for 
the establishing of the factory, specifically the Green Revolution. The scholarly and 
testimonial accounts I consider there describe how the factory was made to represent the 
possibility of human progress through technological intervention and economic growth. 
As such, the plant stood as a promise of recuperation for the socially and materially 
deprived population of the state. This promise authorised the hasty, and therefore poor, 
infrastructural planning that found(ed) the factory as a toxic ticking time-bomb in the 
heart of life. I use the first-hand account of T.R. Chouhan (1994), an employee at the 
UCC plant, to further underscore how the treatment of the workers at the plant fell far 
short of the promise of progress as well. For the transfer of industrial capital was not 
accompanied by an equivalent transfer of knowledge and skills to the employees. 
Moreover, their resistance to poor and unsafe working conditions was met with 
arguments of cultural deficiency and thus was summarily suppressed. These 
circumstances constitute the scene of the disaster. Indeed, that the extent of the 
destruction caused by the leak could have been curbed, constitutes the tragedy of the 
event. 
The second half of the section proceeds to outline the aftermath of the leak from a 
juridical perspective. Here, I describe how survivors of the leak continued to be posited 
as incompetent subjects whose ability to know and speak a (formally legible) truth was 
suspect. The dismissal of the possibility of self-representation – of understanding one’s 
own injury – and of thereby achieving a self-determined justice, was attributed to their 
conditions of existence. In particular, the presumption of cultural deficiency of the 
litigants – made by both, the government of India, that undertook legal negotiations with 
UCC under the principle of parens patriae, as well as the UCC lawyers – was validated by 
the appearance of material and ‘cultural’ backwardness. The UCC lawyers, especially, 
seized upon the ‘abject poverty’ of the survivors as a representation of their ‘vastly 
different values, standards and expectations’ (Amnesty International 2004, p.51) which 
produced their existence as incomprehensible to the American (or, more generally, the 
modern) subject. This characterisation echoes, I suggest, the appearance of degradation 
as animality. Indeed, the purpose of the first section is to outline the material and 
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discursive strategies through which the existences associated with the Bhopal gas disaster 
are made to appear as differentially human and, hence, ethically devalued. 
The second section offers a theoretical explication of how differential humanness is 
objectified in the body. In particular, it describes how the bodies of the poor – i.e. bodies 
that appear materially deprived – come to be marked for annihilation. Here, I use the 
work of Mary Douglas (2002) on dirt as the instantiation of disorder to describe how the 
circumstance of material depravation comes to be ascribed a negative value. The 
appearance of poor bodies under such condition confirms their own devaluation. This 
devaluation, however, is not just an effect of a corruption but also, in fact, of taboo. That 
is, poor bodies do not merely appear as dirty but are themselves dirt and hence are 
pollutants. This polluting capacity of the poor poses them as a threat to ‘civilised man’. 
Bataille (1993) describes civilised man as one who isolates himself from dirt or filth. This, 
recalling the discussion in the last chapter, is because filth symbolises vulgar, unspeakable 
origins that must be disavowed in the actualisation of existence as human. In this 
context, impoverished existences – marked by a proximity to dirt, or filth – are deemed 
an affront to humanity. This is an effect of the failure to isolate one’s embodied matter 
from the natural given – a failure, as Bataille notes, to suspend (one’s) animality. The 
section concludes by introducing Denise da Silva’s description of the logic of obliteration 
(2007) to demonstrate how the appearance of animality compels termination. 
Consequently, this section underscores how the bodies of the poor provoke their own 
annihilation, authorising this as the ethical end of development. The violations of the 
bodies of the poor, then, are not traces of development carving its truth onto matter but 
rather are the eruptions of a truth already imprinted upon bodies realised, finally, by 
development. 
Even so, the act of violation itself enables development to affirm the truth of differential 
humanness that sanctions its (development’s) unfolding. The third section of the chapter 
addresses the imperative of matter to development in speaking its authority. This section 
draws inspiration from Elaine Scarry’s (1985) designation of the injured body as the body 
in pain. The experience of pain, she writes, is the dissolution of the body to pure 
intensity. This is the capacity of the body realised as/through matter. Thus, in so far as 
annihilation proceeds through the injury of the body, this is experienced through the 
matter. According to Scarry, the experience of pain – or of one’s self as matter – is 
productive of differentiated selfhoods between the one in pain and the one lacking it. 
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She thus affirms the efficacy of the matter of the body in confirming the differential 
valuation of one’s humanness. This confirmation, of course, is not the truth as such but 
rather of its power presenting itself as truth. In other words, I suggest that through the 
process of injury, development seeks to produce the experience of differential 
humanness in order to preserve itself as truth. I will go on to argue that the effectiveness 
of this strategy is not merely in the experience of pain but in its spectacle. I will 
substantiate this argument using the work of Peter Linebaugh (2006) and David McNally 
(2011) on hanging and dissection, respectively, to demonstrate how the proletarian body 
has historically been made to perform as a record of the truth of capital by marking it – 
through experience and as spectacle – as criminal.  
The second and third sections of this chapter are thus concerned with what Karen Barad 
refers to the mattering of bodies where mattering is ‘simultaneously a matter of 
substance and significance’ (2007, p.3). That is, they are concerned with how the body 
matters to (as ethical valuation) and matters for (as substance that authorises) 
development. The final section returns to the case of Bhopal in order to interrogate its 
historicity. Here, rather than reading Bhopal as a transition narrative, it reads it as a 
repetition. I revisit Hortense Spillers’ (1987) account of flesh, as matter without 
signification, in order to demonstrate present injury as the reiteration of the original 
violence that produces the body of the poor as social text. Following her provocation to 
read injury through a hieroglyphics of flesh, I trace the lineage of the injury inflicted in 
Bhopal back to the colonial moment wherein the proletarian body emerged as that 
marked by excess and hence lacking ethical value. By thus intervening, I demonstrate 
how value, more specifically negat(ed)(ive) value comes to be congealed in matter, so that 
the preservation of posit(ed)(ive) value – signified by the human and capital – 
necessitates a confrontation with degraded matter. I will thus conclude this chapter by 
arguing that under the postcolonial capitalist condition the securing of bodily integrity is 
the promise of humanness. This assertion sets up the final chapter of this thesis wherein 
I demonstrate surrogacy as a moment of annihilation because it causes the depletion of 
the surrogate body through its productive consumption in the process of procreation. 
This depletion, which is in fact an injury to the body, is confirmation of the surrogate 
mother as differentially human. 
But let me now begin with Bhopal. 
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‘That night ’ : the tragedy of Bhopal 
On December 2nd 1984, at around 11.30 PM, and continuing into the morning after, 
approximately 42 tonnes of isocyanate (MIC) silently leaked out from the Union Carbide 
chemical plant over the sleeping city of Bhopal. It is estimated that around half a million 
people were exposed to this deadly gas that night – a gas that Union Carbide officials 
insisted caused only superficial damage (Amnesty International 2004, p.12). Apart from 
the tens of thousands of lives lost since that night, over a 100,000 people continue to 
endure chronic illnesses in the present, the cures for which are limited or unavailable. 
The leak is most commonly attributed to the lax safety measures employed at the Bhopal 
plant, a charge substantiated by a comparative study of a similar plant in West Virginia 
(2004, p.46). My purpose in this section is not to outline the various technological 
failures that caused the leak. While the leak itself may be the consequence of 
technological failure, the crisis – i.e. the magnitude of the immediate damage and the still 
unfolding aftermath – is an effect of the socio-political context within which the Union 
Carbide factory stands. In particular, it is emblematic of the negotiations between the 
state and capital under the aegis of development. Of course, this circumstance is merely 
the appearance of struggle over the expression of humanness. In other words, the socio-
political context manifests the ontophenomenological structure that grounds the human 
and hence is the scene of the violence entailed in its preservation. The second section of 
this chapter will address the structure of this violence that preserves the human as the 
figuration of value. The intent of this section, however, is to outline the historical and 
political situation in Bhopal that objectifies this structure. 
The first half of the section describes Union Carbide’s developmentalist stake in India, 
specifically in Madhya Pradesh, the central Indian state whose capital is Bhopal. I 
describe how the corporation positioned itself as offering the progressive tools of science 
and technology to alleviate the social and economic backwardness of the state’s 
population. This promise, of course, was compromised by the maintenance of labour in a 
subjugated state. I use the first-hand account of T.R. Chouhan (1994), an employee at the 
chemical plant, to outline how this suppression played out not merely in the form of 
wages but also in terms of transfer of knowledge and the skilling of labour, as well as in 
the subdual of health and safety concerns in the operations of the plant. Crucially, the 
consequences of this suppression continued into the aftermath of the leak.  
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The second part of the section outlines how the devalorisation of labour at the factory 
resulted in a lack of information and authority in dealing with the immediate fall-out 
from the leak. Workers and residents fought death through informal circuits of 
communication, much of which deprived of any direct knowledge, was based in rumour. 
The extensive destruction of life caused by the leak was a direct result of this deprivation. 
The capacity of these bodies to carry and reveal knowledge was further erased by 
disallowing their testimony as medical and legal record. While in the first instance, UCC 
mobilised the backwardness of workers to render them as primarily body-machines, this 
appearance was consolidated by the state which posited them as medical and legal wards 
– those about whom data could be produced but who could not produce their own. This 
relationship between state and ward was attributed to the survivors’ incapacity for self-
knowledge, which ultimately is an effect of their unknowability. That is, the value of the 
survivors – as both, sources of evidence as well as in evaluating monetary redress – was 
contingent upon projection of their bodies as bearers of a technical, not subjective, truth. 
This limit was instituted by their appearance as ‘unreliable’ – whose subjective truths 
were fabricated and/or incomprehensible, representing, in both cases, their ethical 
difference.  
Indeed, in a gesture that realises the fundamental truth of development, the UCC lawyers 
explicitly linked the juridical unknowability of survivors to their material degradation. 
Thus, even in survival, the workers and inhabitants of Bhopal were disappeared, 
confirming eradication as the ultimate end of development. I will describe this play 
between material degradation and disappearance in the second section of the chapter.  
Union Carbide: ‘a hand in things to come’ 
1984 marked the golden jubilee of Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL). A subsidiary of 
the U.S. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), it was successor to the National Carbon 
Company which entered India in 1905 as a manufacturer of Eveready battery cells. 
UCC’s acquisition of the National Carbon Company resulted in the re-establishing of the 
company in India as UCIL and the subsequent diversification of its products from 
batteries to chemicals, plastics, and, eventually, pesticides. In 1968, UCIL set up its 
Pesticides and Formulations plant in Bhopal, establishing itself firmly within post-
independence India’s developmentalist dream. 
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A commemorative brochure published for the jubilee celebrations – titled ‘A time for 
nostalgia’ – begins by asserting Union Carbide’s position in India as ‘having shared the 
country’s dreams and aspirations and contributed to the nation’s growth’ (printed Fortun 
2001, p.87) since the start of its operations in the country. The remainder of the 
brochure weaves the narrative of UCIL’s expansion into that of India’s own historical 
trajectory, towards independence and national progress. This entwining of Union 
Carbide’s growth with that of India’s was affirmed through Carbide’s self-presentation, in 
ads and other publicity materials, as bringing science and technology, and hence progress, 
to the Indian nation. This was especially pertinent to the provision of electric power, 
agrichemicals for the cultivation of India’s agrarian economy. Thus, Union Carbide 
positioned itself as the conduit for science as a crucial building block for the country. 
One particular advertisement, proclaiming ‘Science helps build a new India’, notes: 
Oxen working the fields… the eternal river Ganges… jewelled elephants on 
parade. Today these symbols of ancient India exist side by side with a new sight – 
modern industry. India has developed bold new plans to build its economy and 
bring the promise of a bright future to its more than 400,000,000 people. But 
India needs the technological knowledge of the western world. For example, 
working with Indian engineers and technicians, Union Carbide recently made 
available its vast scientific resources to help build a major plastics plant near 
Bombay. Throughout the free world, Union Carbide has been actively engaged in 
building plants for the manufacture of chemicals, plastics, carbons, gases, and 
metals. The people of Union Carbide welcome the opportunity to use their 
knowledge and skills in partnership with the citizens of so many great countries. 
(printed in Fortun 2001, p.97)  
The image accompanying this text sets a farmer ploughing a field with oxen – a symbol 
of ‘ancient India’ – against the backdrop of ‘a new sight – modern industry’. Hovering 
above farmer and factory – and fully encompassing the extent of both – is a hand, 
tipping the contents of a test-tube onto the scene. The hand represents Union Carbide, a 
visual representation of its mid-century ad campaign, ‘A hand in things to come’.  
Indeed, the development of the chemical factory in Bhopal was facilitated by this aura of 
Union Carbide as offering a hand in the progress of India, here with specific reference to 
the Green Revolution – a global developmental strategy targeted at agricultural 
production that was intended ‘to increase food production, and to combat hunger and 
poverty through the introduction of chemical fertilizers to mechanize agricultural 
production’ (Mukherjee 2010, p.20). In accordance with this vision of a bourgeoning 
national economy, the Indian government approached Union Carbide for their assistance 
in developing a market for pesticides and other agrichemicals. In 1975, the Ministry of 
	   120 
Industry and Civil Supplies granted UCIL permission for the development of a pesticide 
formulation unit in Bhopal. The choice of Bhopal as the site of this facility was no doubt 
deliberate. As a fledgling city and the capital of the relatively ‘undeveloped’ state of 
Madhya Pradesh, it required opportunities to expand employment as well as to create a 
confidence-building precedent that could attract greater foreign investment. This 
endeavour was propelled by the city’s excellent road and rail links to major Indian ports 
(cf. Mukherjee 2010; Fortun 2001).  
The initial lease made by the state government to UCIL entailed a 5-acre plot of land at a 
pittance of $40 per acre per year. The area thus scoped was in the most populous part of 
Bhopal – the old city – and barely 3 kilometers from the railway station (Mukherjee 2010, 
p.20). In its initial stages of operation, the plant produced a pesticide, brand-named 
Sevin, whose active ingredient, MIC, had to be imported because of restrictions imposed 
by India’s licensing rules. However, within a few years, UCC had convinced the Indian 
government of its ability to build a large-scale MIC production and storage plant that 
would not only supply the needs of its own pesticide manufacture, but could also be sold 
to other producers of MIC-based pesticides. The seduction of this proposal lay in the 
claim that MIC-based pesticides were ‘environmentally sound’ and hence constituted a 
growth-market in a world taken up by the tenets of the Green Revolution (Fortun 2001, 
p.133). Consequently, by 1979, UCIL had added an MIC producing facility to its plant 
that was licensed to produce over 5 thousand tonnes of MIC and, over-time, expanded 
to seventy acres. This extensive project undertaken by Union Carbide served as ‘a clarion 
call by the Indian government to a corporate giant for participating in the task of nation 
building’ (Mukherjee 2010, p.20). 
This industrial expansion, however, was not met with a corresponding effort by the state 
government to strengthen the infrastructure of the growing city. In his study of the crisis, 
Paul Shrivastava describes Bhopal as ‘a textbook example of a rapidly developing city 
that sought – and obtained – sophisticated Western-style industrialization without 
making a commensurate investment in industrial infrastructure or rural development’ 
(Shrivastava 1987, p.57). Indeed, the state’s push towards industrial growth through the 
concomitant devalorisation of traditional methods of agriculture, resulted in an 
economically untenable rural to urban migration: 
The city’s population grew three times the overall rate for the state and the 
nation in the 1970s. This heavy in-migration, coupled with high land and 
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construction costs, caused a severe housing shortage in the city. For shelter, 
migrants built makeshift housing, which in turn became slums and shantytowns. 
By 1984, more than 130,000 people, about 20 percent of the city’s population, 
lived in these slums. Two of these slum colonies were located across the street 
from the Union Carbide plant. (1987, p.3) 
Indeed, the location of the Union Carbide factory violated the city’s own zoning codes. 
But Union Carbide sought to appease these concerns by funding a public park. In return, 
Municipal Commissioners who sought to move the factory were replaced by those who 
were more amenable to state and corporate aspirations (Ali 1987, p.175). The promise of 
economic growth thus seemed to warrant the cheap execution of business deeds with 
little heed to safety considerations.  
Despite the presumed environmental ‘soundness’ of its agricompounds, MIC itself is a 
highly unstable compound with an immense explosive potential. Edward Munoz, a 
project manager for the Bhopal plant and subsequently a managing director of UCIL, 
himself objected to its location, describing it as ‘analogous to planting a bomb near 
where people live and children play’ (Fortun 2001, p.117). Munoz attributes this 
recklessness on the part of Union Carbide to the overrepresentation of lawyers and 
MBAs, rather than engineers, in the ranks of its decision-makers, and to the ‘mafia’-like 
attitude of the Engineering Division in West Virginia (the division that exported parts 
and know-how to Bhopal) made up of ‘a very inbred group of buddies, who are very 
jealous of their prerogatives and do things the way they want’ (quoted in Fortun 2001, 
p.116). These observations refer not merely to the location of the plant but also to its 
projected capacity – a quantity (5,250 tonnes) proposed not on the basis of experienced 
calculation but principally as a means of enticing the Indian government into granting 
them production permits and to shut out prospective competitors from the market. This 
political calculus had dire, and ultimately morbid, material consequences. 
In his account of the conditions that precipitated the leak, T.R. Chouhan, a plant 
operator, outlines the dismal conditions of the plant from the outset: 
During our training we were told in detail about this plant with the help of a 
model [based on a similar plant in West Virginia]. I was rather awed by the 
sophistication of technology and attention to safety matters, which this plant was 
supposed to have. Things turned out to be different when the plant started 
operating.  
In all systems of the plant… modifications were made in design in response to 
operation problems. … All these [operational issues] required substantial changes 
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in order to build up and maintain production volumes. Safety appeared to be the last 
consideration. I thus learned the urgency of looking beyond corporate appearances, especially 
regarding safety. (Chouhan et al. 1994, p.25; added emphasis) 
Chouhan goes on to outline a number of accidents, health issues and fatalities that 
occurred at the plant, one that resulted in a widely-accepted logic amongst workers that 
“anything can happen in this factory” (1994, p.27). This was yet 1978, prior to the 
setting-up of the MIC production and storage units. Indeed, the condition of the Bhopal 
plant was a perpetuation of the already dismal record of UCIL in other locations, one 
that was ignored by the national and state governments in favour of their 
developmentalist dreams. This situation persisted even in the case of major accidents at 
the Bhopal site, such as factory fires that threatened the city’s populous, which were dealt 
with, as Chouhan notes, by ‘throwing parties at posh hotels of the city to thank 
government officials, city corporation officers and journalists for their cooperation in 
managing the fire’ (1994, p.28).  
This circumstance was exacerbated with the introduction of the MIC plant. The MIC-
based pesticides produced by UCIL were proposed as being a cost effective and 
environmentally safe solution for the extermination and prevention of pests. The 
unconsidered reality of pesticide use, however, was an increasing disillusionment with 
‘the cost of chemical inputs [and] increased crop vulnerability to new pests. Nor did 
Carbide anticipate famine years in which farmers were simply unable to produce the cash 
necessary for purchase of chemical inputs. And no one expected the spread of small 
pesticide producers who relied on cheaper components’ (Fortun 2001, p.133). 
Consequently, even at its peak, the plant was only producing less than 50% capacity. In 
1984, it was operating at 25%. By the time Chouhan arrived at the MIC plant in 1982, 
there was already persistent evidence of mismanagement and malfunction: 
… I was transferred to the MIC plant along with two other co-workers. It was 
rather surprising because to be an operator in the MIC plant, one had to be either 
a graduate in science or hold a diploma in mechanical or chemical engineering. 
Among us workers, it was known that the MIC plant was the most dangerous, 
and yet MIC plant operator jobs were coveted ones yielding higher grades and 
better salaries. … 
… At the end of five weeks, the plant supervisor asked me to take charge as full-
fledged plant operator. I refused to do this, insisting on the promised six-months’ 
training as I felt quite ill-prepared to handle a plant known for its complexities 
and dangers. … 
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… While working in the Sevin plant, I had on many occasions been told about 
the advanced technology and efficient crew of operators in the MIC plant. But, 
after joining, I witnessed a steady decline in the quality of personnel with more 
and more untrained staff hired in each category. They worked as regular 
operators but without proper qualifications and training. (1994, pp.31–32) 
Additionally, leaks occurred at the plant with ‘frightening regularity. … [and] were usually 
record as cases of material loss rather than injuries to workers’ (1994, p.37) 
Chouhan attributes the possibility of such extensive mismanagement not merely to 
operation rationalisation but also to the UCIL’s practice of worker intimidation and 
union suppression. Union leaders were made redundant in response to their agitation for 
higher safety standards and better treatment of workers, especially those that suffered 
injury. Workers who were diagnosed as having work-related health issues were moved 
out to less toxic environments, without notification or explanation to other employees. 
This, Chouhan notes, resulted in workers being unable to protect themselves and also 
hindered any impact they could have on securing the health and well-being of the 
communities outside the factory (1994, p.24). Noting the apparent indifference of the 
community itself to incidents such as fires and worker deaths by gas poisoning, he points 
to UCIL’s expansive strategy of control.  
As a consequence of India’s drive towards a Green Revolution, and UCC’s own role in 
facilitating it, a substantial portion of the communities outside the factory walls were 
made up of first and second generation immigrants displaced from their rural 
communities by the imposition of mechanised agriculture (Mukherjee 2010, p.2). These 
people, who were lured to urban areas for the economic betterment promised by the 
state’s development visions, settled in colonies outside the factory without “papers”. This 
precarious situation coerced a silence that they hoped would protect them from 
evacuation by the city (Chouhan et al. 1994, p.35). Eventually, in order to improve its 
own image, UCIL handed out land deeds to some in these communities despite the fact 
that they had failed to establish the necessary safety zones (Guillette 2008). But the 
residents themselves had little idea that ‘the plant was producing one of the most 
dangerous compounds ever conceived by the chemical industry’ (2008, p.174).  
the unfolding of a tragedy 
Describing the initial hours of the gas leak, one survivor, Champa Devi Shukla, recalls:  
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It felt like somebody had filled our bodies up with red chillies, our eyes 
tears coming out, noses were watering, we had froth in our mouths. The 
coughing was so bad that people were writhing in pain. Some people just 
got up and ran in whatever they were wearing or even if they were 
wearing nothing at all. Somebody was running this way and somebody 
was running that way, some people were just running in their 
underclothes. People were only concerned as to how they would save 
their lives so they just ran. (International campaign for justice in Bhopal 
2009) 
As is the wont of mass disasters, rumour and chaos were the primary causes of death in 
the immediate wake of the gas leak. Local and state health and safety authorities were 
utterly misinformed and underprepared in dealing with such a calamity. UCIL had done a 
poor job of conveying pertinent information to health and safety regulators, as well as in 
informing and skilling their own employees, let alone those outside the factory walls. 
Writing of Union Carbide’s control of information, Syed Ashfaq Ali notes: ‘So absolutely 
rigid is Union Carbide’s monopoly on information on this gas, that its employees, at the 
time of appointment, are bound by a “secret agreement proscribing them from divulging 
any secret or confidential technical information”. They are not even permitted to take the 
Company’s specialized literature and safety manuals outside its premises’ (1987, p.174). 
Under these circumstances, health officials were uninformed about the exact 
composition of the MIC gas as well as the extent of its toxicity, and were thus vastly 
unaware of how to deal with the poisoning. Informal circuits of information produced 
mass fear and panic with more people dying in the stampede than due to the deleterious 
effects of the gas itself. Tragically, many lives might have been preserved through the 
simple use of a wet cloth to cover the eyes and nose. 
The pain and suffering that constitute the tragedy of the Bhopal gas leak are not a 
collection of individual experiences of ‘that night’ but rather are the materialisation of the 
experience of suffering as ‘actively created and distributed by the social order itself’ (Das 
1995, p.138). For survivors, pain is the instantiation of the truth of development – the 
inevitable cost of the propagation of (their) humanness. Whether it be the physical pain 
described by survivors like Champa Devi Shukla or the spectacular representation of 
pain on the child’s body in Bartholomew’s image – each iteration is ultimately a ‘mark of 
pain as the price of belonging to a society’ (1995, p.137). Recognising the ontological 
basis of this cost, survivors view justice as premised on a continuing liability for ‘the 
enduring asymmetry of the relationships through which [they may] negotiate for 
resources, authority and survival’ (Fortun 2000, p.8). 
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Yet, 30 years on, the chemical plant in Bhopal still stands as a toxic rem(a)inder of the 
events of 1984. Even as its after-effects continue to wreak havoc on the lives of 
survivors, Union Carbide (now Dow Chemicals) has been excused from formal liability 
for the leak. As Mukherjee and Fortun note, UCC began to distance itself from UCIL, 
and hence the circumstances of the leak, immediately after news of the incident broke. 
Warren Andersen, the CEO of Union Carbide, posited the corporation’s responsibility in 
moral, not legal terms. That is, UCC accepted ‘moral responsibility, but no liability’ for 
the leak (Fortun 2001, p.98). This description was premised on the notion that UCC was 
merely the equivalent of a ‘shareholder’ since ‘it did not have any propriety or ownership 
interests in the assets of UCIL. At any given time, UCC was only a “contractual 
provider” of certain technology and knowledge’ (Mukherjee 2010, p.35). By thus 
positioning itself, UCC was able to transfer liability onto UCIL management and the 
Indian government. UCC did not thus just recuse itself from paying compensation, but 
did so on purportedly humanitarian grounds. This sentiment is reiterated by Anderson in 
a statement made commemorating the anniversary of the leak, a year after final 
settlement of compensation: 
We saw Bhopal for what it was – a terrible tragedy involving real people who had 
either lost family members or had suffered injuries, in some cases serious injuries. 
They needed medical relief, prompt aid in any form possible, and an early 
settlement which would help restore their lives and bring long-term relief. They 
didn’t need what they ultimately got – armies of lawyers and politicians who 
spent years claiming to represent them and deciding what was in their best 
interests. We saw Bhopal in moral – not in legal – terms. Although we had good legal 
defences – the plant wasn’t ours and it later was established that the tragedy had been caused by 
employee sabotage – we didn’t want to spend years arguing those issues in court while the victims 
waited. We therefore said immediately that Union Carbide Corporation would 
take any moral responsibility for the disaster. (printed in Fortun 2001, p.99; 
emphasis added) 
In keeping with its stated ‘moral’ obligation, in the five years leading up to the final 
settlement, UCC contributed approximately $130 million to various emergency, health 
and vocational funds. Yet, during this period, it simultaneously argued against the 
litigation of any claims against it, and especially so within the U.S. judicial system. This 
move was substantiated by assertions of an unresolvable ‘cultural’ difference between 
India and the U.S. 
For instance, arguing for the dismissal of claims filed by survivors of the leak in U.S. 
courts, the defence for UCC sought to highlight 
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the practical impossibility for American courts and juries, imbued with 
US cultural values, living standards and expectations, to determine living 
standards for people living in the slums or ‘hutments’ surrounding UCIL, 
Bhopal, India, [thus] confirm[ing] that the Indian forum is 
overwhelmingly the most appropriate. Such abject poverty and the vastly 
different values, standards and expectations which accompany it are commonplace in 
India and the third world. They are incomprehensible to Americans living in the 
United States. (Amnesty International 2004, p.51; emphasis added)   
Indeed, it is precisely this form of contempt that validated UCC’s sabotage theory. As 
Chouhan notes, the basis of the theory was the image of ‘“a typical worker – stupid, 
vindictive, prone to lying’ (Chouhan et al. 1994). So resolved was their disdain towards 
workers that UCC officials dismissed them as reliable witnesses to the leak, claiming a 
“reflexive tendency among plant workers everywhere to attempt to divorce themselves 
from the events surrounding any incident and to distort or omit facts to serve their 
purpose” (Kalelkar, quoted in Chouhan et al. 1994, p.65). This conjuring of the spectre 
of a disgruntled worker was no doubt intended to turn attention away from any 
culpability borne by UCC in the unfolding of the event. However, the attendant 
imputation of deficient, indeed perverse, moral-cultural ‘values’ had serious implications 
for any possibility of justice for the workers and residents of Bhopal.  
When the U.S. court, presided over by Judge Keenan, dismissed the over 100 cases filed 
against UCC under its jurisdiction (Gupta 1991, p.2), it tacitly accepted the proposition 
that UCC was a separate entity from UCIL. But more significantly, by divesting UCC of 
culpability, it sought to transfer liability to the Indian state as the proper guarantor of the 
well-being of the Indian people. Indeed the court advanced its decision as the restoration 
of the sovereignty of the Indian state in determining its own course of justice. This logic 
extended to the Indian government’s own handling of the case. In 1989, the Indian 
Supreme Court adjudicated the case between UCC and the Indian government, which 
had appointed itself as sole representative of survivors of the leak under the principle of 
parens patriae. This positioning was intended to provide cover for the majority of 
survivors who lacked the resources necessary for their own legal representation. In 
effect, it prevented any survivors from opting-out of the government’s guardianship and 
undertaking their own legal actions against UCC. While this disabling of juridical 
autonomy proceeded under the guise of expediency and fairness, it confirmed, in fact, 
descriptions of survivors as ‘incompetent’. 
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Akin to their positioning as unreliable witness, survivors of the leak were viewed as 
lacking the capacity for self-knowledge and understanding required to assess their own 
injury. They had little input in explicating the complex toll of the disaster on their lives. 
Instead, the government conducted a cursory review of damage to health, property and 
livelihood in order to generate criteria for the adjudication of the appropriateness and 
scope of injury. Yet, these calculations, as Mukherjee and Fortun have argued, were 
based on incomplete information and a flawed understanding of the effects of the leak, 
and did not account for damages yet unfolding. Consequently, the compensation 
delivered to survivors – the final settlement amounted to $470 million, far lower than the 
Indian government’s initial ask of $3 billion (Gupta 1991) – barely addressed their 
immediate concerns 52 . Given that the settlement was reached under parens patriae, 
survivors have been blocked from filing new claims to cover inadequate compensation 
and future injury. For the survivors of Bhopal, then, the law has become a site of 
subjugation rather than the space of justice. Recognising this situation, the Supreme 
Court itself acknowledged the ‘denial of natural justice’ implied in their decision: 
By the court’s own admission, the Bhopal Act [whereby the government 
appointed itself guardian] provided victims access to the law, but not to rights. It 
denied gas victims the right to represent themselves. And, in effect, it also denied 
them the chance to “opt out” of representations made by others in their name. In 
defense of this move, the attorney general argued that while rights are 
indispensably valuable possessions, they might be theoretically upheld, while the 
ends of justice are sacrificed. The appropriate response is a curtailment of rights, 
such that the largest good of the largest number is served. Justice, then, was a 
utilitarian quantification. (Fortun 2001, pp.39–40) 
This utilitarian calculation was not limited to the well-being of survivors but was also 
intended towards sustaining India’s image as a safe site for foreign investment. Indeed, 
by acceding to a settlement, the state undertook to negotiate the rights of its people with 
those of the corporation. Consequently, for multinationals such as UCC, the law became 
a site for the demonstration of their moral agency and, ultimately, for the authorisation 
of their mode of engagement in the developing world.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  Compensation per person amounted to no more than $1000. Besides falling short of paying for a 
lifetime of chronic illness, it provided no cover whatsoever for unrecognised medical cases. For 
instance, the most long-term and disastrous effect of the leak has been on the reproductive capacities of 
women. Thus, the decades after the leak have seen a generation of children carrying the marks of the 
gas into their own bodies and lifetimes. This situation remains unaddressed, and unredressable, under 
the terms of the 1989 settlement.  
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The Bhopal gas leak has appropriately been approached as the consequence of 
institutional failures. As evidenced in Chouhan’s account, not only was there an 
incomplete transfer of knowledge and skills, but also a general condescension and 
wariness towards the capacities of workers. This situation of mistrust structured relations 
between UCC and government officials, as well, so that the people of Bhopal became 
secondary to securing the interests of the latter two parties. Similarly, the aftermath of 
the leak witnessed the failings of medical and legal architectures. Here, the inability of 
survivors to translate injury into scientific/medical language removed their own 
experiences and understanding from carrying juridical import, thereby subjugating their 
self-knowledge to institutional claims to scientific and legal expertise. The shroud of 
misinformation and secrecy that organised relations between UCC and government 
made it so that the latter was woefully underprepared to undertake any effective action, 
medical or legal, to safeguard the wellbeing of survivors. Yet, rather than acknowledge 
this incapacity, the state chose to manufacture proficiency. The outcomes of perfunctory 
scientific testing and medical reviews undertaken in the aftermath of the leak were 
consolidated through various ‘stylistic devices… to speak with an authoritative voice on 
matters that did not admit of any certainty’ (Das 1995, p.155). This record made it so 
that survivors were viewed as unreliable sources who produced exaggerated accounts of 
injury – a circumstance that ultimately justified a paltry settlement. Consequently, as 
Sheila Jasanoff notes, the tragedy at Bhopal was ‘as much about the capacity of powerful 
institutions to selectively highlight and screen out knowledge as it was about maimed 
lives and justice denied or delayed’ (2007, p.344). These institutional failures, however, 
are not a mere aberration, but rather are central to the functioning of capital.  
Thus, as Tara Jones (1988) has noted, the gas leak at Bhopal is an act of corporate killing. 
This killing proceeds as a ‘balance sheet of death’ (1988, p.12) whereby UCC and the 
state government could ‘write off the thousands of corpses [of Bhopal] as the cost of 
increased food production which has enabled India’s ‘teeming millions’ to survive’ (1988, 
p.276). Indeed, the appearance of the backwardness of the region enabled the 
mobilisation of toxic capital under the guise of aiding human development. As already 
indicated, development posits itself as an economic strategy intended towards the 
propagation of humanness. UCC’s role in India was to contribute to its economic 
advancement through scientific and technological intervention as a means for human 
progress. UCC, in consort with government officials, thus positioned themselves as 
redeemers of the underclasses. As noted before, the intervention of science and 
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technology facilitates the possibility of materialising productive bodies for whom, in 
Deleule’s description, survival could pertain not merely to biological but also social 
survival. However, in so far as capital requires subjection in order to reproduce itself, the 
scope of its materialisation as such is limited. Thus, instead of addressing themselves to 
the capacities of workers, UCC and the government relied on the appearance of human 
backwardness in order to make them subject to structures of knowledge and 
information. By controlling information and curtailing the possibility of autonomous 
action, institutions became bearers of the ‘truth’ of development as a recuperative force. 
Yet it is an alternate truth – that of annihilation – that is writ large on the bodies of the 
objects of development.  
The next section describes how the bodies of the poor come to be marked for 
annihilation. Here, I will posit annihilation as an effect of animality – of the appearance 
of existence as excess – that must be destroyed in service of the figure of the human. I 
begin by using Mary Douglas’ (2002) conceptualisation of dirt as a bearer of negative 
value to describe how existences marked by material depravation – i.e. by dirt and 
disorder – are similarly devalued as such. Indeed, this devaluation produces such 
existences as tabooed, those that must be separated out and isolated from society. This 
proposition is reflected in Georges Bataille’s (1993) description of civilised man as he 
who is horrified by filth. This horror is activated by the fear of animality – the anxiety 
associated with recalling one’s own filthy origins – so that the appearance of animality 
anywhere merits its eradication. Indeed, it is precisely this drive towards eradication that 
is fulfilled by development – initially, through the materialisation of the productive body, 
as described in the previous chapter, yet, in the final instance, as annihilation. I deploy 
Denise Ferreira da Silva’s (2007) description of the logic of obliteration in order to 
demonstrate development as its objectification. Consequently, the following section 
underscores how development appears merely as the fulfilment of the fate of the poor 
whose bodies always already mark them for eradication. It thus describes the 
circumstance of those who Animal describes as ‘the people of the Apokalis’.    
on the matter of excess and the annihilation of Animal(ity) 
Animal lives in the Nutcracker, the ‘biggest and most desperate’ of the city’s slums. Its 
main street, Paradise Alley, is an interesting hub of active life. That is until Animal 
(re)encounters it through the eyes of a sympathetic American doctor. On hearing her 
describe the place as ‘flung up by an earthquake’ (105),  
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something weird and painful happens in my head. … [S]uddenly I’m seeing it as 
she does – a wreckage of baked earth mounds and piles of planks on which hang 
gunny sacks, plastic dried palm leaves. Like drunks with arms round each other’s 
necks, the houses of the Nutcracker lurch along this lane which, now that I look, 
isn’t really even a road, just a long gap left by chance between the dwellings. 
Everywhere’s covered in shit and plastic. Truly I see how poor and disgusting our 
lives are. (2008, p.106) 
This moment marks the reification of the ethical distance – or, differential humanness – 
between Animal and the American doctor. As such, it is the fictionalised version of the 
arguments made by the UCC lawyers as regards the incomprehensibility of ‘the vastly 
different values, standards and expectations’ associated with the abject poverty of Bhopal 
– that which is so ‘commonplace’ in India. Earlier in this thesis, I have already posited 
incomprehensibility as an effect of ontological difference. This chapter addresses the role 
of matter in consolidating this difference. This section, in particular, describes how 
material degradation – i.e. the appearance of dirt and disorder – comes to represent 
ethical excess that must be eradicated. Whereas in the previous chapter I described 
subjection to labour – i.e. the materialisation of the productive body – as a form of 
partial eradication, this chapter is concerned with absolute eradication – the decisive 
return of body to matter as achieved through murder. This forced return reveals the 
differential humanness inscribed in the bodies of the poor. In this section, I posit the 
materially deprived conditions under which the impoverished appear as the scene of this 
inscription.  
I begin the section with Mary Douglas’ (2002) description of dirt as a discarded residue 
in order to establish it as a space of negat(ed)(ive) value. The institution of dirt as 
devalued constitutes it as a pollutant so that interaction with dirt occasions the condition 
of degradation. The mingling, then, of discarded matter with vital matter demands the 
eradication of the former. This, as Bataille (1993) notes, is the necessary function of 
civilised man, the imperative condition for the appearance of humanity. The proximity to 
dirt – or what Bataille terms, filth – represents a failure to negate the debased origin of 
Man, producing such existences as filth themselves. It is precisely as such that Animal 
recognises his condition and that of his people. Indeed, the appearance of material 
degradation transfers its negat(ed)(ive) value on those existence proximate to it, so that 
existence in filth is the appearance of existence as excess. These existences, that appear as 
a threat to humanity, must therefore face obliteration as the eradication of excess. The 
final portion of this section thus engages Denise da Silva’s (2007) notion of the logic of 
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obliteration to describe death as the absolute solution to excess and, as such, the 
preservation of humanity. The designation of Animal and his people as ‘of the Apokalis’ 
is a recognition, in fact, of this logic.  
In her seminal work on Purity and danger, Douglas posits dirt as the epistemic effect of 
systemic ordering. It is, as her oft-stated aphorism notes, ‘matter out of place’ (2002: 44). 
If the purpose of ordering is to define rules that ‘force one another [men] into good 
citizenship’ (2002, p.4), then the institution and upholding of these rules produces 
precincts of privileged value. Any person, then, that transgresses these rules, whether 
intentionally or by accident, is seen as a polluting presence and thereby accorded negative 
value, or de-valued. Indeed, polluting persons are deemed not only (in the) wrong but 
also dangerous. Here, Douglas makes an interesting observation about dirt and identity. 
Once dirt is established as such – i.e. as matter offending against order (2002, p.2) – it is 
regarded as abhorrent and vigorously cast away. At this point, dirt is dangerous because it 
still clings onto identity: ‘they can be seen to be unwanted bits of whatever it was they 
came from... . This is the stage at which they are dangerous; their half-identity still clings 
to them and the clarity of the scene in which they obtrude is impaired by their presence’ 
(2002, p.197). Thus, dirt, as a remnant of otherwise positive identity and value, occupies 
a marginal space. ‘The power inhering in the structure of ideas’, Douglas notes, is the 
‘power by which the structure is expected to protect itself’ (2002, p.140). The presence of 
dirt, precisely because it recalls its lineage (it’s ‘half-identity’), reveals the otherwise 
occluded structuration of power inherent in the formation of zones of purity. Indeed, it 
threatens to expose the fictions that ground the very ideas of purity and pollution.  
Furthermore, as Douglas’ anthropological study of taboo reveals, the body’s 
construction, as a boundary or continuity, is contingent upon the epistemology that 
produces order within a given system. Within the context of modernity, where reason is 
founded in scientific rationality, the body is produced as the negative limit of humanity. 
This description echoes Bataille’s description of the body which, due to its organic, 
sensuous character, marks the boundary at which humanity unfolds into animality. In 
fact, in Bataille’s reading, Man views the body not merely as contagion but rather as 
always already filth. He is thus consumed with the constant necessity to discard bodily 
filth, to remove it from the humanized world created in his image. The person that 
carries with them the contagion of dirt, then, – i.e. the one considered to be a polluting 
presence – threatens the privilege, or value, accorded to, the human. This threat opens 
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up this entity, as the bearer of negat(ed)(ive) value, to the violence unleashed by the 
ontophenomenological structure to the human to preserve itself as value. 
According to Bataille, ‘civilized man’ signals his humanity through the art of refinement, 
i.e. by learning to keep filth at bay. In so doing, he attempts to reaffirm the boundary 
between humanity (his) and animality (an/others). Indeed, man thus measures his 
distance (qua man) from the primitive through the fullness of his aversion to filth. He 
does so by upholding his body as a boundary between the humanised world and the 
natural given – i.e. through the negation of the body as pure, living matter. The material 
condition of the body – its proximity, symbolic or material, to filth – is man’s primary 
expression of his aversion to filth. The greater his horror of filth, the greater his distance 
from it, and the greater his claim to human-ness. Indeed, given the value accorded the 
humanised world, man’s anxiousness with regards dirt is directly proportional to his own 
value. The greater his horror of filth, the more vehement is his upholding of boundaries 
– the discarding of filth and contaminating presences – and the greater the entrenchment 
of attendant value(s). 
Man’s aversion to all that signifies his primordial animal condition is an expression of the 
principle of negation. Negation, however, can never be (and, perhaps was never intended 
to be) realised in the absolute. It marks rather a suspension – an abandonment – that 
restrains animality within strict bounds. It creates order within the totality that puts 
animality in its place, effecting thereby the reduced condition of humanity. Filth, then, is 
the abandoned excess of a humanised world, so that proximity to filth marks a failure of 
humanity. The proximity of life and dirt – as evidenced in the merging of the child’s 
body with earth in Bartholomew’s image, in the ‘shit and plastic’ that constitutes the 
scene of Animal’s existence, in the abjection conjured in the discourse of the UCC 
lawyers – captures this failure. As noted in the previous chapter, the failure of humanity, 
represented as excess, is posited as an ontological lack. This lack, objectified through 
outer determination – i.e. proximity to dirt as unformed nature – identifies the being as 
always already facing the horizon of death. Silva describes the horizon of death as the 
ontological limit of the others of Europe, as instituted by the transparency thesis (Silva 
2007: 29). That is, it anticipates the inevitable termination of those forms of existence 
that exceed comprehension. This limit, Silva notes, is actualised through engulfment or 
annihilation.  
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Engulfment is the strategy of ‘“partial negation”, the productive violent act of naming, 
the symbolic appropriation that produces them [the others of Europe], inaugurating a 
relationship [between the I and the others] precisely because, in the regimen of 
representation interiority governs, it institutes unsublatable and irreducible subjects’ 
(2007, p.29). Thus, engulfment is a mode of imputing differential self-consciousness 
through a reliance on the exterior signification of reason in the body and land. Indeed, 
this sublimation of appearance (exteriority) into consciousness, and hence self-
determination (interiority), marks the existential violence of representation. This violence 
reaches fulfilment in the moment of annihilation wherein the relationship between the I 
and the others is decisively (and brutally) severed. This is what Silva refers to as the logic 
of obliteration. That is, while engulfment may occur primarily on the level of the 
symbolic – as evidenced in the embodied condition of Animal and his people – 
obliteration entails a final destruction, or murder. Bartholomew’s image of the burial of 
the child bears witness to this final obliteration. More significantly, however, the visual 
assemblage that represents its death inescapably recalls the child’s subjection to, and the 
inevitable failure of, the strategy of engulfment.   
It is necessary here to mark the relation between Bataille’s evaluation of death and the 
logic of obliteration as just discussed. Death, for Bataille, is the final putrefaction of life. 
In recalling the natural condition that bore life, it marks the final failure of the original 
prohibition: ‘I will rejoin abject nature and the purulence of anonymous, infinite life, 
which stretches forth like the night, which is death. One day this living world will 
pullulate in my dead mouth’ (Bataille 1993: 81). Yet, precisely because it is opposed to 
utility53, it is the most luxurious form of life. To wit, since death cannot be subject to the 
laws of necessity, it is expenditure without (an) end. It expresses, therefore, the 
exuberance of life. For Bataille, death, in expressing the fullest ‘experience of the 
possible’ (1993: 1) is the most authentic yet radical form of human-ness.  
The horror evoked by death, as the final and irreversible return back to nature, signals 
the utter disavowal of this radical human-ness. Bataille describes this horror as an effect 
of desire, wherein man’s institution as such through the original prohibition always 
already sites him in confrontation with the desire to transgress. Using Silva’s language of 
engulfment, then, we may suggest that any reference to life in its organic form – i.e. to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53  Mbembe notes that Bataille opposes death to utility because death ‘destroys what was to be, obliterates 
what was supposed to continue being, and reduces to nothing the individual who takes it’ (Mbembe 
2003: 15) 
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the condition of excess – evokes a fear of engulfment (of the I, by the other). It is this 
fear, or horror, that founds the logic of annihilation. Indeed, annihilation (abjection 
tending towards death) is the final solution to excess. Of course, under the conditions of 
global capital, annihilation is not always an effect of direct force. Rather, it is an effect of 
relegation, or devaluation, in relation to capital. As already noted, the production of 
economic value by capital proceeds through the depletion of ethical value. This depletion 
is enacted, and manifest, in the circumstance of material depravation. In the case of 
Bhopal, as is the case with development in general, (proximity to) filth, while in itself the 
outcome of economic degradation, becomes the material signification of the debased 
self.  I have argued here that in so far as the appearance of depravation signifies animality 
it must be eradicated from the space of humanity. Whereas in the context of 
development, capital presents itself as recuperative, its primacy over matter – i.e. its 
institution as a positive form against the negative value of un(con)formed matter – 
guarantees this eradication. In other words, the annihilation of the poor is the telos of 
development as confirmed by the signification of their own bodies as excess.  
The following section reveals the indispensability of matter development. The section 
draws from Elaine Scarry’s (1985) explication of the significance of the body in affirming 
the truth of power. The materialisation of power, according to Elaine Scarry (1985) is an 
effect of the experience of pain which produces differentiated selfhoods. This 
differentiation, or differential, is the very truth that power seeks to confirm. In the 
context of development, then, injury is the confirmation of a differential humanness. 
This differentiation, however, is not an effect of development. Rather, development is 
the contemporary apparatus that maintains this differentiation in order to preserve the 
phenomena of the human and capital as incontrovertible. I substantiate this proposition 
through the historical accounts of capital punishment as offered by Peter Linebaugh 
(2006) and David McNally (2011) that demonstrate how such punishment sought to 
mark the proletarian body as criminal, thereby confirming capital as truth. Through these 
engagements, the section below aims to reveal how matter matters to development. 
on the body and development as an instrument of mattering 
On a visit to a clinic to seek treatment for his embodied condition, Animal has an 
encounter with an aborted foetus. He discovers this ‘ugly little monster’ (Sinha 2008, 
p.57) jeering at him through a jar set in a doctor’s surgery. Animal and the foetus 
recognise themselves in each other – each existence reflected in the arrested matter of 
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the other. The latter seeks its liberation from the jar – from its suspension as unborn, 
from the place ‘where it is all dark, you open your mouth but there is no air just the black 
stink of it filling your mouth and eyes and nose’ (2008, p.58) – just as Animal seeks his 
from his embodied containment within the realm of animality. Yet, Animal, the foetus 
assures, has a superior fate: ‘“Your back is twisted,” says he with great bitterness, “but at 
least you are alive. Me, I’m still fucking waiting to be born”’ (2008, p.58). Yet, Animal is 
merely an alternate appearance of the same circumstance for, as the doctor notes, ‘half of 
those who were expecting that night aborted and as for the rest, well let’s just say some 
things were seen in this town that were never seen before’ (2008, p.58). This sentiment 
references the vast proportion of injury done by the gas leak to women’s reproductive 
capacities. Children born of gas-affected parents carry severe physical distortions – 
markings that hamper not only their economic capabilities but also harm their social 
existence.  
This section will outline how the act of injury – as experienced in and spectacularised 
through matter – is the practice of differential mattering, where mattering implies 
significance (worth) and materialisation. The former aspect of mattering will be revealed 
through Elaine Scarry’s (1985) argument that the pain of violation effects differential 
selfhoods. In particular, the experience of pain produces a reduced experience of the self 
in relation, especially, to the one causing the experience. This diminishing of the self is 
power’s means of enforcing itself as truth, so that matter – as the inheritor of this 
experience – is crucial to power’s ability to actualise itself. I follow Scarry’s argument 
with Peter Linebaugh’s (2006)	   engagement with hanging, and David McNally’s (2011) 
account of dissection, as capital/ist punishment. Here, each author demonstrates how 
the injury entailed in hanging and dissection was crucial to the production and 
maintenance of the proletarian body as a threat to capital and, hence, to social good. 
Indeed, these forms of punishment were reserved for the proletariat for they also 
affirmed capital as value and the capitalist class – as represented through the work of the 
hangman/anatomist – as the protector of this value. This discussion thus reveals how 
bodies come to be differentially materialised through injury. The purpose of this section, 
then, is to underscore the indispensability of matter to consolidating development as 
truth.  
In The body in pain, Elaine Scarry (1985) describes pain as the experience of the body at its 
limit. Here, the body is posited as an intensity at whose limit the self undergoes 
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dissolution, so that pain entails the destruction of ‘a person’s self and world, a 
destruction experienced spatially either as the contraction of the universe down to the 
immediate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling up to fill the entire universe’ 
(1985, p.35). Pain is thus experienced as the reduction, or enlargement, of the body to 
pure matter. Yet, in as much as pain realises itself in and through matter, the body must 
be retained as a material form in order to render this pain recognisable. That is, without 
the appearance of traces carved in its wake, pain remains a remote event, occurring in the 
interior of the body, ‘belonging to an invisible geography that, however portentous, has 
no reality because it has not yet manifest itself on the visible surface of the earth’ (1985, 
p.3). Yet, injury, when made manifest on the body, records the truth of power. Thus, the 
dual functionality of the body  – of actualising experience and facilitating recognition – 
produces it as an ideal substance through which power can wield itself as ‘incontestable 
reality’ (1985, p.27).  
This duality, according to Scarry, is precisely the structure of torture and war, wherein 
power authorises itself through the spectacle of injury. Indeed, injury is the elemental 
purpose of these acts. Yet, she notes, ‘[i]n each, the incontestable reality of the body – 
the body in pain, the body maimed, the body dead and hard to dispose of – is separated 
from its source and conferred an ideology or issue or instance of political authority 
impatient of, or deserted by, benign sources of substantiation’ (1985, p.62). That is, 
power severs the body from its subjectivity, mobilising its psycho-affective capacity in 
order to substantiate it as nothing but the appropriate, and necessary, object of juridico-
political force. In the case of torture, for instance, the act of interrogation as that which 
is seeking a ‘truth,’ substantiates the interrogator’s primary goal of inflicting agony upon 
their subject. Similarly, in the case war, while the actual aim is to injure the body of the 
enemy, and as many as possible, this practice is given credence by ‘verbal issues 
(freedom, national sovereignty, the right to disputed ground, the extra-territorial 
authority of a particular ideology)… that are understood by warring populations as the 
motive and justification and will again be recognized after the war as the thing 
substantiated or (if one is on the losing side) not substantiated by war’s activity’ (1985, 
p.63). Thus, the experience and scars of pain borne by the body evidence power’s 
schedule to establish itself as such. The imminence of injury, intended to serve as a 
caution to those that share an embodiment with the injured, enables power to establish 
itself as historical truth. This truth is consolidated by the differentiated selfhoods 
produced through the act of injury.  
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Scarry’s text explicates how power’s authorisation through injury is accomplished by 
creating a differential in its experience – i.e. a relative absence from pain versus the limit 
experience. This separation signifies differentials in being in and of the world, and its 
recognition as such: ‘The absence of pain is a presence of world; the presence of pain is 
the absence of world. … Over and over, in each stage and step, the torturer’s mime of 
expanding world-ground depends on a demonstration of the prisoner’s absence of world’ 
(1985: 37, 38). The injured body, then, is the material signification of a reduced being, 
trespassing worlds conceived and populated by power. This is precisely the binary 
structure that Linebaugh and McNally attribute to public hangings and dissections 
wherein the performance seeks to reify the bourgeois civil order with the ‘hung, drawn 
and quartered’ proletarian body at its core, as substantiating matter, and the 
executioner/anatomist – in form and in action – as the bearers of the truth of capital.  
In his meticulously detailed account of The London hanged (2006), Peter Linebaugh 
commences with a contemplation of the term ‘capital’. Capital, he notes, designates both, 
private property as well as the confiscation of its (putatively) most sacred form – i.e. life 
– as in death due to capital punishment. These two meanings of capital, according to 
Linebaugh, although apparently unrelated, in fact contain the very structure of their 
relation. For capital, ‘as the organized death of living labour (capital punishment)[is 
exactly related to] the oppression of the living by dead labour (the punishment of 
capital)’ (2006, p.xvii). Indeed Linebaugh’s text charts the relationship between the 
expansion of capitalist production and new appearances/descriptions of criminal activity 
in 18th century England (i.e. during the era of the Industrial Revolution). The premise of 
Linebaugh’s argument is that capitalism and criminality moved dialectically, so that ‘the 
forms of exploitation pertaining to capitalist relations caused or modified the forms of 
criminal activity, and, second, that the converse was true, namely, that the forms of crime 
caused major changes in capitalism’ (2006, p.xxiii). Whereas the study of capitalism – or 
specifically, of its workers – may be approached through commodities as ‘the ‘social 
hieroglyphs’ of its existence’ (2006, p.153), the study of criminality necessitates an 
attention to embodiment as an ‘ethical hieroglyph’ so as to reveal how the manipulations 
of embodied matter come of signify ethical de/valuation. Hence Linebaugh reads capital, 
in both senses, through the stories of the hanged.  
Indeed, the hanged are of the proletariat, those whose only identity was that of worker. 
Etymologically, proletarian means ‘those whose value [is] nothing more than the 
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production of new workers’ (2006, p.138). They are those of the ‘animal œconomy’ for 
whom subsistence is the only form of survival (2006, p.257). Under the gaze of capital, 
then, the proletariat was always already suspect, for survival often required its (capital’s) 
misappropriation. Of course, misappropriation – whether as theft or sabotage – also 
functioned as proletarian resistance to capital’s encroachment upon their conditions of 
life. In either case, being ‘caught’ was the substantiation of this perceived criminality, so 
that punishment required the stamping out of its very source – of the proletarian spirit. 
Capital punishment, then, served not only as the removal of a singular criminal but also 
to showcase power’s annihilatory potential to a suspect population54. Hanging also 
entailed supplementary forms of material manipulation, so that the focus of punishment 
was living matter. Indeed, living matter was the object of punishment par excellence 
because it instantiated punishment, in fact, as reification. In other words, hanging – or 
capital punishment – was, first, the restaging of an inscription and, only then, an act of 
punishment. 
Under an emergent capitalist order, the enclosure of embodied life was the originary 
moment of inscription. As David McNally notes in his text Monsters of the market (2011), 
the unenclosed, popular body as conceived of as ‘open, untidy and fluid’ – a ‘monstrous, 
unfinished and transgressive,… intrusive, invasive thing ‘not separated from the world by 
clearly defined boundaries’’ (2011, p.43; quote from M. Bakhtin (1984) Rabelais and his 
world). This description recalls Bataille’s notion of excess – the ontophenomenological 
condition barred from humanity. This suspension is enacted through the materialisation 
of the labouring, or productive, body, so that capital is the fundamental tool of 
inscription that produces the worker. This inscription, of course, occurs through matter. 
For the labouring body is materialised through a series of reassamblages. In particular, 
the labouring body emerges through severance from land, the restructuring of social ties, 
and the mortification of living labour (2011, p.143), i.e. the mutilation of the body as a 
singularity and the reattachment of its individuated organs to capital. This originary 
inscription is reiterated in the mortification of matter as entailed in capital punishment. 
Further to the corporeal intervention that wrought death, the bodies of the condemned 
were often subject to dissection – either sold for medical study or often appropriated to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  Even where capital punishment was not executed, Linebaugh notes, those found guilty of capital crimes 
but excused from its mortal punishment where shipped to the colonies as to fulfill the requirement for 
forced labour (cf. 2006, pp.16–17). This re-routing of capital punishment from absolute to social death 
makes patent the relation between human, as living being, and property, as dead object, that structures 
capital.   
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create the spectacle of a public anatomy. The history of dissection, McNally notes, 
predates the emergence of capitalism. In the medieval era, this act was reserved for the 
political elite. Here, dissection served as a symbolic perpetuation of power wherein body 
parts were buried at several sites in order to receive multiple instances of recognition and 
prayer (2011, p.24).  
The institution of scientific thought as the privileged form of knowledge production, 
however, transformed dissection from elitist performance into empiricist study. This 
latter form of dissection detracted from its original religio-political intent so that bodies 
subjected to study were those that had already been deprived of any moral or religious 
integrity – i.e. those deemed a social excess. Under a capitalist order, this space was 
occupied by the proletariat. Their bodies, already fragmented by capital, and their beings, 
already negated as excess, could be appropriated without moral contradiction. In fact, the 
act of public dissection, when it followed capital punishment, became a means of 
(re)enacting social control. The spectacle of public anatomy, writes McNally, entailed 
‘literally inscribing the rule of law – of property rights and ‘free trade’ – on the body of 
an executed member of the lower ranks of society. Such events partook in an aesthetics 
of domination, a pleasurable (and, for those from the lower classes, masochistic) 
identification with the victors and their laws’ (2011, p.27)55. Dissection, then, whether 
public or otherwise, was not merely a ritualistic consequence of imputed criminality but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  McNally engages public anatomy as it occurred in continental Europe. In the case of England, he notes 
that intervention of surgeons who sought corpses for study after hangings or of the dead from poor-
houses. Protecting the bodies of the dead from such appropriations, often through sale, was an 
important form of proletarian resistance to capitalist control by the state. Here, McNally notes, the 
concern was not so much with preserving the integrity of the body but rather of preserving it from 
further capitalist encroachments. Making reference of Linebaugh’s study, McNally writes: 
Hanging, as Linebaugh reminds us, was a notoriously uncertain means of ending a 
human life. The noose was meant to cause death by asphyxiation; but tied loosely or 
inexactly, it often induced loss of consciousness, rather than loss of life. … In fighting 
for the bodies of the hanged, therefore, the crowd may in part simply have been trying 
to save lives... Further-more, the willingness of the crowd to damage Jack Sheppard’s 
body so long as they kept it from the surgeons, suggests that it was control over the 
plebeian body that was at stake, more than its physical integrity. (2011, p.22) 
… 
To be sure, the working poor fought this reduction of their labour to just another 
marketable good among many; but, over the long haul, capital proved largely victorious. 
At the gallows, however, the plebeian crowd could gather in their thousands to publicly 
reclaim proletarian bodies from market-forces. In wresting the corpse from the 
surgeons, the crowd struck a blow – both symbolic and real – against commodification 
and for the integrity of the proletarian body, male and female, if only in death. In 
burying it intact, they claimed a moral victory over the dismembering powers of capital. 
(2011, p.23) 
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rather functioned as the reification of capital’s originary inscription of the proletarian 
body.  
Given, as McNally notes, that the capitalist order posited poverty itself as an offence – 
‘to be desperately poor was to be insubordinate, to refuse to adapt to the market-
economy’ (2011, p.52) – the proletariat was marked as always already criminal. Thus, 
dissection – the literal dismemberment and disorganisation of the body – was the fresh 
trace made in matter to remind the proletariat of its existence as excess and, hence, 
disposable. This reminder, although imprinted into un-alive matter, can only function as 
such if it affects matter that is yet living. The repetition of capital punishment in the act 
of dissection is, in fact, the repetition of the primordial injury inflicted by capital upon 
the proletarian body. It is through this spectacle of injury, in and through matter, that 
power affirms its capacity for the production of pain, thereby asserting its rule. This 
pertains, of course, even in the absence of an individual agent – like a torturer or an 
anatomist – for the appearance of injury, as a visible trace of the experience of pain, 
equally restages the differentiation that confirms a given modality of power as truth. It is 
as such that matter is crucial to consolidating development as an apparatus of differential 
mattering.  
This imperative of differentiation, which renders incommensurable various experiences 
of self-hood, produces a definite separation between subjects and objects of truth – e.g. 
between anatomist and criminal; between torturer and tortured. It is this separation that 
provokes Saidiya Hartman, as noted in chapter 1, to denounce the ethical potential of a 
relation of empathy – the assumption of a shared humanity – between the spectator and 
object of injury. This impossibility pertains as well to the objects of the gas leak as 
captured in Raghu Rai’s image, in Indra Sinha’s writing and in the UCC lawyers’ speech. 
Referring, for instance, to the image of the buried child, Rai designates it as ‘an icon of 
grief and greed in the face of industrial disaster’ (South Bay Mobilization 2003). This 
description seeks to impute a sharable experience between the object of the image and its 
observer – specifically between the father burying his child, whose hand is noticed 
lingering over her makeshift grave, and those bearing witness to the event/spectacle. 
However, the injury borne by the child – the fragmentation of its body that makes it 
appear, once more and finally, as matter – belies this possibility. To wit, the instance of 
material violation reveals the differential positioning of the father/child and observer 
with respect to the truth of development. Yet, it is the fact of violation that facilitates a 
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mutual recognition between Animal and the foetus; that maintains a shared fate between 
Animal and his people as ‘the people of the Apokalis’; that situates the father’s grief as an 
invisible injury whose pain is shareable only with those who are the objects of the truth 
of development.  
The next section will suggest that this shareability of pain is an effect of an originary 
trace buried in flesh; in so far as injury is a visible trace of pain, it is also the revelation of 
this trace as history inscribed in flesh. Below, I draw upon Hortense Spillers’ (1987) 
provocation to read violation through a ‘hieroglyphics of flesh’, wherein ‘flesh’ is the 
undifferentiated matter in which meaning is congealed to form the body as social text. 
Consequently, every violation of the body is the eruption of the primordial writing on 
flesh, recalling its ethical lineage. Approaching the violence in Bhopal thus, I suggest that 
the injury caused by developmentalist projects is heir to colonial violence as originary. 
Here, I outline aspects of the historical accounts provided by Hamza Alavi (1975) and 
Jairus Banaji (1975; 2010) that speak to the theft of land instigated by colonial power. 
This theft, I will suggest, formed the proletarian body as the object of its truth – i.e. that 
of civilisation. The ontologisation of this appearance as ethical degradation institutes 
what, adapting Spillers, I will call ‘a post-/colonial grammar’, that now authorises similar 
appearances – i.e. bodies that are marked by material depravation – as objects of 
development. To read the hieroglyphics of flesh in Bhopal then is to read beyond the 
enforcement of development as truth. Rather, it is to read violation – up to the point of 
death – as the confirmation of a differential humanness of the poor, inaugurated by 
coloniality and exposed in repeated eruptions of flesh. I conclude this chapter by noting 
how these eruptions, as projections of negat(ed)(ive) value, simultaneously assure the 
bodily integrity of those recognised as human.  
on flesh and the rehearsing of a ‘ post-/colonial grammar’ in Bhopal 
One night, on his way back home to the Nutcracker, Animal finds himself lured onto the 
grounds of the ‘KILLER COMPANY’ (Sinha 2008, p.272). He is seduced by the voices 
of the dead making themselves known on the hair and skin of his body: 
The dead are shrieking at me that the good earth has been defiled with blood. In 
thick clots the blood lies, won’t be washed away by rain. … Give us justice, 
screams the blood. It promises years of disaster, years of illness, if I do not take 
revenge. It warns me that ulcers will eat my flesh with white and weeping sores. 
… This is the song of the blood. The dead are rising up in the factory grounds, 
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they are coming, looking as they did on that night, with eyes dripping blood they 
are coming, they’re coming for me. (2008, pp.274–275) 
Flesh, to borrow from Hortense Spillers (1987) is the substance through which the 
history of the body is congealed. It is the space of ghosts that haunts the body in its 
signifying form. Animal feels the dead on his skin because they are his own flesh. He 
carries their deaths in his own distorted body. Avenging their death is his only chance to 
prevent the dead – his own flesh – from, finally, annihilating him.  
I introduced Spillers’ notion of flesh in chapter 1 of this thesis, identifying it as matter 
through which the body emerges as an inscribed form. In this section, I elaborate on her 
account in order to historicise the injuries of Bhopal. Thereafter, I provide a brief 
overview of colonial inscription of proletarian bodies to demonstrate how devaluation is 
congealed in the body of the poor. The preservation of the human and capital – against 
whose valued form the proletarian body was materialised – necessitates the repetition of 
the negated value of the body of the poor. This is the work of violation – the 
reappearance of an originary violence. I will argue in conclusion that this violation, which 
affirms the poor as differentially human, promises bodily integrity as the sign of 
humanness.  
Flesh, as defined by Spillers, is ‘that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not 
escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography’ (1987, 
p.67). Put differently, flesh is the substance that bears originary markings whose trace is 
dissimulated in the social inscription, or social construction, of the body. The body, then 
– as raced, sexed form – is the material appearance of the socio-history of flesh. 
Highlighting this aspect of the body as appearance, Spillers defines ‘ethnicity’ as an 
ethico-material descriptor that 
freezes in meaning, takes on constancy, assumes the look and the affects of the 
Eternal. … As a signifier that has no movement in the field of signification, the 
use of “ethnicity” for the living becomes purely appreciative, although one would 
be unwise not to concede its dangerous and fatal effects. 
“Ethnicity” perceived as mythical time enables a writer to perform a variety of 
conceptual moves all at once. Under its hegemony, the human body becomes a 
defenceless target for rape and veneration, and the body, in its material and 
abstract phase, a resource for metaphor. (1987, p.66) 
Thus, the body, objectified through ‘ethnicity’, represents an ontology both, congealed 
through and authorising of, repetitions of a primordial violence. In the U.S. context, for 
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instance, Spillers locates the present ‘dangerous and fatal effects’ of ethnicity in the 
embodied scene of conquest and slavery – in the scene of ‘actual mutilation, 
dismemberment and exile’ (1987, p.67). This scene marks an indelible writing on flesh, 
one that cannot be erased by the emergence of the body, as a discursive or iconographic 
construct. Spillers describes this originary writing – the inaugural violation of flesh – as 
‘theft of the body’. Besides the actual act of kidnapping that facilitated the accumulation 
of slaves, ‘theft of the body’, refers to the severing of the captive body from will and 
desire; and consequently, the becoming of that body into a ‘source of irresistible, 
destructive sensuality’ (1987, p.67) that exists solely for the captor. ‘Theft of the body’, 
then, is the violent reduction of personhood, however signified in the body, to unformed 
matter – to flesh. That this originary violence entails the reduction to flesh, implies that 
the body, prior to this moment, is not non-existent. Rather, it exists as an effect of 
indigenous systems of signification. ‘Theft of the body’, then, denotes the destruction of 
indigenous networks – material as well as symbolic – to institute person as thing – flesh.  
Referring to the space allotments aboard slaves ships, for instance, Spillers notes that the 
use of sexed descriptions – ‘man’, ‘woman’ – highlights, in fact, the gender 
undissociation of this ‘cargo’. Gendering, she notes, takes place within the context of 
domesticity, wherein the patronym situates associated persons in their particular and 
proper order for human and social purposes. The cargo on the ship, on the other hand, 
in being severed from their African family and proper names, is an ungendered mass. 
The designation of women as such signals her ‘apparently smaller physical mass [which] 
occupies “less room” in a directly translatable money economy. But she is, nevertheless, 
quantifiable by the same rules of accounting as her male counterpart’ (1987, p.72). This 
severance was further writ through the ‘displacement of the genitalia, the female’s and 
male’s desire that engenders future’ (1987, p.73). Indeed, the primacy of property 
relations that intervened at will in any affective or biological ties initiating from the 
enslaved, in foreclosing the possibility of kinship denied gendering. In the context of the 
female slave, even where violence explicitly targeted her sexed form – through rape and 
forced reproduction – the enactment of this violence as the avowal of property relations 
denied her woman-ness.  
Given that the body is always in representation – i.e. it is the surface through which 
cultural meaning is made and congealed – Spillers argues that the violence of slavery was 
committed upon flesh – the biological substance that precedes signification. Flesh, in 
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other words, is that blank surface upon which the slave-driver’s/master’s tools write ‘an 
American grammar’ (1987, p.67). The historicity of the ripped apartness of flesh is 
sedimented in the black, and particularly, the black female body, so that every act of 
violence committed upon it reveals the trace of the institution of the socio-political order 
of the New World. Indeed, in successive acts of injury, the originary inscription of flesh 
receives iteration on the body. Injury, as the ‘reconfiguration of human tissue’, reveals 
what Hortense Spillers calls a ‘hieroglyphics of flesh’ (1987, p.67) – etchings on a surface 
that are the ripped apartness of body as cultural text, exposing the primordial narrative of 
flesh. To approach the injured body, then, is to read the hieroglyph that unleashes itself 
in the iterative act of injury. Just as the pain of injury produces differentiated selves, the 
unleashing of flesh therein is the revelation of an always already differentiated humanity. 
The hieroglyphics of flesh, then, is the history of differential humanity.  
To approach value under the postcolonial condition, I propose, is to read the 
hieroglyphics of flesh. In chapter 2 of this thesis, I demonstrated how under this 
circumstance value is constituted through the entanglement of the human and capital. 
Indeed, the reproduction of capital is authorised as the preservation of the figure of the 
human. As argued in this chapter, such preservation proceeds through injury as the 
imprint of a truth. In the case of Bhopal, this truth is not only that purported by 
development but, more critically, the hieroglyph exposed in the eruption of flesh – the 
telling of an original violence56. As noted in chapter 1, with reference to Nandigram, the 
violence of development is associable with the colonial theft of land. Here, theft does 
not refer to the unauthorised transfer and use of property but instead to juridical change 
in the very description of land, from an imperial holding57 to bourgeois commodity (cf. 
Alavi 1975; Banaji 2010, pp.34–40). As Jairus Banaji notes, the zamindars of Moghul India 
– the ‘local rajahs and regional aristocracies’ who were tributary subjects of the Moghul 
Empire – became instituted as landowners by the British. In so doing, the zamindars 
became revenue collectors for the British through the imposition of land tax and money 
interest. In as much as the zamindars owed the imperial crown tax from the rent of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  I will describe this original violence primarily in the economic context of colonial India. This, however, 
is not a complete explanation for economic violence was authorized by, and hence replicated, the social 
violence of the extant structures of caste. It is beyond my capacity at this juncture to provide more than 
a cursory analysis of the role of caste, and especially the relevance of the body therein. My analysis will 
therefore be limited to descriptions of history of production. 
57  Hamza Ali describes land in pre-colonial India as ‘a possession held by virtue of the force at the command 
of the local lord, rather than property held under bourgeois law. … [T]he Moghul Emperors made 
attempts – though not always very effectively – to ‘appoint’ the local lords, who in turn often benefited 
from the legitimacy thus conferred on their possession...’ (1975, p.1255). 
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land, they collected the same from small farmers for the use of their land. The latter 
circumstance resulted in the proletarianisation of small peasants through their 
transformation not only into wage-labourers but also into debtors. ‘The expansion of the 
hold of the market over the peasantry’, notes Banaji: 
was the premise of British revenue policy… The market summarised the 
‘civilising’ mission of British imperialism. By the 1850s, peasant commodity 
production had become the solid foundation that sustained the fiscal pressures of 
the transplanted capitalist state of British imperialism. (1975, p.1889) 
The subjection of small peasants to the global market required the investment of money 
capital – to buy seeds and other necessity inputs, plus for the payment of rent. The 
extraction of surplus value through rent owed the zamindars, on the one hand, and 
interest, owed to money-lender, on the other, maintained small commodity producers in 
a perpetual state of indebtedness.  
Of course, this suppression of small peasants was reified in the violation of their bodies. 
Conditions of drought, scarcity and famine – which increased the indebtedness of small 
peasants and workers – no doubt inhabited their bodies not only through decrepitude 
but also through the direct violence aimed at monetary extraction. This violence was the 
truth of caste58 and capital consolidated in matter. For the work of economic extraction 
in service of the British crown was primarily performed by two other native collectives – 
the big peasantry and the bankers/money-lenders – who stood on the positive side of 
this truth. This economic differentiation, which marked as well the beginnings of a 
differentiation between modern/ising and pre-modern natives, formed the basis of 
differentiation in the developmentalist project of independent India59. Crucially, as Alavi 
notes, the contemporary urban proletariat descends from the vast mass of rural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58  Predictably, the dispersion of economic conditions proceeded along lines of caste with the small 
peasants and workers formed from the lower castes, often untouchable, whereas the zamindars and 
monetary capitalists were of higher castes (cf. Banaji 2010, chap.10). 
59  Describing the continuity between the economy of colonial and independent India, Banaji notes:  
Already within the framework of the small-scale merchant-moneylending capitalism of 
colonial India, rooted in peasant commodity production, a basis had emerged for the 
evolution of a more entrenched and ramified petit-bourgeois capitalism. …[T]hose 
layers of the small peasantry which in the colonial period had already acquired the 
characteristics of substantial petit-bourgeois households evolved more rapidly into small 
capitalists; on the other hand, groups that had formerly dominated the peasantry on the 
basis of its own productive organisation, progressively redeployed their capital in 
production itself. But bound with both processes has been a deeper entrenchment of 
money-commodity economy, which reproduces and partially consolidates the more 
backward forms of capitalist domination on the market of the more impoverished layers 
of the rural petit-bourgeoisie, which subsist on consumption loans and loans for 
circulating capital. (1975, p.1892) 
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proletariat produced under colonialism. The imperative of technologically advanced 
large-scale agriculture heralded by the Green Revolution benefitted the rural elite while 
rendering small-scale farmers and share-croppers obsolete. Under these conditions, 
farmers with small holdings (less than 2 hectares) suffered heavy losses given their 
minimal market surplus and the relatively high cost of inputs. During this period of 
intensified agricultural practices, small-holdings constituted about 75% of total 
agricultural holdings which accounted, however, for a small percentage of the actual land 
held. Consequently, the proportion of the rural population disadvantaged by the Green 
Revolution was substantial, leading to their mass pauperisation and displacement (cf. 
Alavi 1975, pp.1239–1243). It is precisely from this mass of the rural dispossessed that 
industrial enterprises, like the UCC factory in Bhopal, drew their labour.  
The violation of the buried child, of Animal and the foetus; the deferred, yet inevitable, 
fate of the child’s father and of Animal’s people – all are eruptions of the trace of 
colonial violence as originary. This violence – which proceeded through the injury of 
bodies materialised in indigenous forms – established capital as (its) truth through the 
pain of manipulating matter. Indeed, colonial violence – whose end was civilisation, the 
preservation of the figure of the human – reified its truth through matter. That is, not 
only did it disintegrate the indigenous body but also reassembled the ensuing matter to 
form the destitute body under capitalism – un(con)formed, erotic, because as yet un-
/underproductive, matter; that which appears as, because it exists in proximity to, 
(symbolic and material) filth. It is as such that the truth established by colonial power 
reinforces itself through/as development. More specifically, development is the 
reiteration of an agential cut enacted by colonial power. This cut manifests a ‘post-
/colonial grammar’ conformed by development that materialises ‘the people of the 
Apokalis’ as objects of the logic of annihilation.  
To wit, colonialism marks the inauguration of the ideological imperative of capital in 
sustaining the concept of humanity. This inauguration proceeds through matter – in the 
dematerialisation and rematerialisation of bodies that are differentially located in relation 
to the figure of the human. As such, flesh is doubly the stuff of value. It is the bearer of 
economic value as that which is made to participate in circuits of capitalism, wherein the 
accumulation of wealth proceeds through the accumulation of flesh. And it is also the 
material through which (a) truth is carved out, objectified in an embodied ethical order. 
The preservation of this truth is premised upon the promise of bodily integrity, of the 
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non-exposure of flesh, as the givenness of one’s humanness. The violation of the body – 
the eruption of flesh – then, is precisely the reiteration of negat(ed)(ive) ethical value that 
instituted, and now preserves the appearance of, an ethical order as truth. In chapter 2 of 
this thesis, I demonstrated how under the postcolonial condition value is constituted 
through the entanglement of the human and capital. Indeed, the reproduction of capital 
is authorised as the preservation of the figure of the human. My discussion in this 
chapter highlights the indispensibility of matter in objectifying this order.  
Under the postcolonial capitalist condition, matter substantiates the entanglement of 
human and capital to materialise the body as an appearance of value. As such, it enables 
the formation of the body as both, a signifier and the inheritor of the truth of each 
phenomenon – human and capital. In the thesis thus far, I have posited development as 
the instrument – the apparatus – that, in verifying and mobilising different 
materialisations as differential ontologies, ratifies both phenomena. This chapter, in 
particular, has underscored the role of injury in actualising this process. It is as such that 
development facilitates the mattering of bodies, so that an attention to development as 
an instrument of mattering exposes the vitality of matter in preserving the human and 
capital as appearances of value.  
In the next chapter, I engage the viability of the surrogacy market in India in order to 
demonstrate how the poor are interpellated in transactions in the register of flesh. The 
surrogacy market presents itself as a site for the self-determined recuperation for poor 
women. Yet, I argue that the surrogacy process is one wherein the surrogate body is 
depleted through an act of sovereign consumption undertaken by intended parents. This 
cannibalisation of the surrogate body consolidates her as differentially human while 
accruing ethical value for the intended parents that confirms their own humanness. As 
such, I will explicate the surrogacy market as an instantiation of the postcolonial 
condition par excellence.  	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chapter 4 
‘i s  there  a Groupon for i t?’ 60 
on surrogacy and the production of value in-difference in India 
The documentary, Made in India (Haimowitz & Sinha 2010), follows the journey of Texan 
couple, Lisa and Brian Switzer, to parenthood. Lisa, aged forty, speaks of her seven-year 
attempt to get pregnant – an endeavour that had to be terminated when she was 
diagnosed as having a pre-cancerous uterus. In search of an affordable means to have a 
child, the couple are directed towards Planet Hospital, a medical tourism company that 
outsources reproduction to India and its ever-expanding surrogacy market61. The film 
now turns to Aasia, a young mother of three, who is contracted by a clinic in Mumbai to 
be a surrogate for the Switzers. Aasia’s story, too, concerns a desire to realise maternity. 
Here, however, maternity is not merely a bioaffective relation but, more crucially, is the 
exercise of socio-material competence. In other words, Aasia’s arrested maternity 
pertains to her inability to guarantee the emancipation of her children from poverty – 
that is, to advance for them appropriate conditions of existence that would guarantee 
their recognition as human. She therefore enters the surrogacy market in order to 
provide her children a form of life that would accord them social recognition. This story 
underscores the dynamic of desires that materialises the surrogacy market in India.   
Surrogacy is a medico-social relationship wherein a woman, the surrogate, is sought to 
bear a child for a third-party parent or parents – commonly referred to as intended 
parents. Here, eggs are fertilized in vitro (literal translation: in a glass) and then planted 
into the surrogate’s womb to be carried to term. Surrogacy generally takes two forms: 
traditional or genetic, and gestational. In the former, the surrogate’s own eggs are 
fertilised by a donor or an intended father’s sperm and she, the surrogate, carries the 
baby to term. Here, the surrogate may be the intended mother or a third-party surrogate. 
The second form is where the surrogate merely ‘rents her womb’ to carry another’s eggs – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  The title derives from a comment made by one of my students in a course on Business Ethics that I 
teach in London. When discussing the issues at stake in the growing interest in a market for surrogacy, 
he quipped, “Is there a Groupon for it?” – a cheeky yet, perhaps unwittingly, discerning question – one 
that points precisely to the entanglements of ‘human’ and ‘commodity’, of being and thing that structure 
economic transactions under capitalism. This chapter seeks to unpack these implications of his question.  
61  A report from Al Jazeera America states that, as of January 2014, Planet Hospital has removed surrogacy 
from the list of services it provides (Cooper et al. 2014). Indeed, since 2014, Planet Hospital has been 
under federal investigation for fraud and its founder, Rudy Rupak (interviewed in the film) filed for 
involuntary bankruptcy. Other than India, Planet Hospital also had surrogacy connections in Thailand 
and Mexico (Lewin 2014).  
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whether an intended mother’s or a donor’s – to term. The surrogacy market in India is of 
the latter (gestational) kind.  
The past few years have witnessed an increasing interest in surrogacy. This is an effect, 
primarily, of the availability of new reproductive methods, especially gestational 
surrogacy, that have made possible genetic reproduction through non-sexual means. That 
is, gestational surrogacy splits the sites of genetic and biological reproduction, so that one 
need not coincide with the other. In fact, the surrogacy market affirms genetics as a 
primary register of reproductive desire. As Lisa and Brian note, the actualisation of 
parental desire entails for them the sharing of a genetic bond with their child. This bond, 
however, is not easily attainable since procedural complexity and especially the cost of 
gestational surrogacy in many countries is prohibitively high. In countries like India, on 
the other hand, the process and the cost are relatively manageable.  
The surrogacy market in India is not yet properly regulated. The Indian Parliament has 
been debating an Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) Bill since at least 2008. 
However, given the relatively recent dispersal and marketisation of these technologies, 
the ethical issues pertaining to the form and responsibilities of the market still require 
extensive evaluation. Even so, there are some particularities of the Indian market that 
have been fixed that make it attractive to potential intended parents. As already noted, 
the surrogacy market in India is only gestational. That is, even when donor eggs are 
needed, these cannot be provided by the gestational mother (Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare 2010). This is quite explicitly intended to eschew any possibility of a 
genetic tie between the surrogate mother and the baby. This, as I will argue later in this 
chapter, consolidates the surrogate’s position as a mere service-provider, without any 
rights, whether biologically naturalized or legally defined, over the baby. Indeed, the 
splitting off of genetic versus gestational maternity, with genetic maternity being the 
privileged, legally recognised form, is a particularity of the Indian market that makes it 
especially popular62. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62  This separation is not as juridically clear, as for instance, in the US. The competing rights of intended 
parents and surrogate mothers are adjudicated autonomously by each state. Given public(ised) 
precedents, wherein surrogate mothers have claimed the children they have borne, U.S. couples are 
often wary of entering surrogacy contracts at home. Much of this legal ambiguity around surrogacy 
contracts resides in the distinction between genetic and gestational ties and debate around which tie is 
foundational to the determination of maternity. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the 
gestational mother is considered legal mother of the child she has given birth to. Intended parents are 
required to file a Parental Order (PO) in order to gain custody of the child. However, a PO cannot be 
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Moreover, the costs associated with surrogacy in India are substantially lower. For 
example, surrogacy in the U.S. can cost between $60,000 to $150,00063. By comparison, 
in India the process costs about $25,000-30,000. A primary reason for this cost 
differential is the difference in surrogate pay. Whereas in India a surrogate may be paid 
between $6,000-$9,000, surrogates in the U.S. are paid at a significantly higher rate of 
$25,000-$35,000. Moreover, surrogates in India are paid in five instalments, with a 
substantial portion, about 75%, made after delivery of the child (Deonandan & Bente 
2012). In the case of a miscarriage or an otherwise necessary termination the surrogate is 
not owed the full payment promised her. This minimises the financial risk of the 
intended parents while increasing that of the surrogate mother. Even so, the surrogate 
pay is considered relatively high where, on an average, surrogates can make over 9 
months what would normally take them 9 years (Markens 2012; Vora 2009a). This is a 
significant motivating factor in Indian women volunteering to be surrogates.  
Predictably, surrogate mothers in India tend to be recruited from poor or working class 
circumstances. While in some cases clinics advertise through local newspapers, given the 
limited literacy and access of the target audience, word-of-mouth recruitment proves to 
be a more effective practice. Here, ‘brokers’ – former surrogates, women who are unable 
to be surrogates, and midwives – are crucial to recruiting new surrogates. For, in addition 
to dispensing information regarding the market, brokers are able to address the 
misinformation and any prevailing stigma associated with surrogacy (Pande 2010). This is 
the strategy that introduced Aasia (in)to the market as well – particularly because, as she 
notes, the intervention of a former surrogate helped allay her husband’s anxieties about 
her sexual integrity. Indeed, the nature of the surrogate relation recalls anxieties 
surrounding the ‘selling’ of the body so that surrogacy comes to be mis/understood as a 
version of prostitution, albeit in a more ‘respectable’ form. This respectability is 
associated with the ‘altruistic’ sharing of maternity that the practice is deemed to imply 
(Pande 2010).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
filed within 6 weeks after the birth and should a surrogate mother decide to keep the child, she has the 
legal right to do so (Norton et al. 2013, p.273). Consequently, surrogacy contracts in the US or UK are 
always open to future litigation. 
In many European countries, including France, German, Italy and Spain, surrogacy remains illegal. (An 
overview of surrogacy laws of EU Member States is available at: http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/a-
comparative-study-on-the-regime-of-surrogacy-in-eu-member-states-pbBA0313138/).  
63  This includes the payment to the surrogate mother, the cost of the medical treatment – including IVF 
and the medical care of the surrogate during gestation – as well as any legal and other administrative 
costs.  
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The purpose of the preceding overview is to establish the surrogacy market in India as an 
instantiation, par excellence, of the postcolonial condition. I have defined the postcolonial 
condition as the circumstance wherein the reproduction of capital proceeds as the 
eradication of excess authorised by the figure of the human. As previously stated, those 
existences that appear as materially deprived are posited as excess. The eradication of this 
excess proceeds through the intervention of capital which presents itself as recuperative 
in the materialisation of the body of the poor – imagined as un-/underproductive – as 
productive. This, I have suggested, is the circumstance of all objects of development. 
This chapter takes as its point of departure the surrogate body as a productive body. 
Indeed, I will demonstrate the appearance of excess as the condition of possibility for the 
emergence of the surrogate mother. This excess pertains not only to the appearance of 
the surrogate as materially deprived but also to her body as hyper-reproductive. I will 
therefore consider India’s history of sterilisation in order to reveal this practice as the 
lineage of surrogate mothers. The surrogacy market thereby reveals itself as a biopolitical 
mechanism intended toward the disciplining and control of excess, specifically that 
objectified in the female body dispossessed of all but its reproductive capacities. More 
crucially, this power is manifest not through the subjection of labour to an alienated 
means of production but through the instantiation of the surrogate body itself as the 
means of production – as both labour and raw material. In other words, I will explicate 
the surrogate body as the complete(d) capitalisation of the bodies of poor women. This, 
in turn, renders the surrogate as a thing64. 
In making this argument, I write against accounts of ‘choice’ and ‘agency’ that posit the 
market as an opportunity for recuperation (Teman 2008; Teman 2010; also cf. Markens 
2012). Given that the surrogacy market is organised through contractual relationships, 
the formation of the surrogate body is considered as motivated by choice. Indeed, the 
ethical viability of the surrogacy market is affirmed as an effect of its advancement as a 
site produced through, and productive of, the mobilisation of subjecthood. Instead, my 
argument in this chapter will proceed from critiques of the contract (Pateman 1988; 
Williams 1991; Wiegman 2003) to establish the falsity of this presentation. Here, I will 
explicate surrogate labour as that tenuous expression of subjecthood that defers, albeit 
imperfectly, its being tipped over, or subsumed as, the thing. As such, I argue that the 
formation of a body as surrogate, regardless of the (putative) exercise of choice, is in fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  Refer fn. 7 in the introduction for an explanation of the distinction between Silva’s use of Thing and my 
use of thing in our encounters with the racial and sexual subaltern.  
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a moment of annihilation. Here, annihilation refers not to the destruction of living 
matter – i.e. to corporeal death – but rather to the destruction of subjecthood. To be 
certain, akin to the circumstance of Nandigram and Bhopal already discussed, this 
annihilation also proceeds through matter.  
In this chapter I suggest that the depletion of the surrogate body – of its vital matter and 
energies – during gestation is the material trace of the annihilation of subjecthood. I will 
reveal depletion as productive consumption in so far as it facilitates the production of 
value. Although the surrogacy market entails the reproduction of capital – i.e. the 
accumulation of economic value for the owners of clinics and associated medical 
agencies – I am concerned in particular with the reproduction of ethical value. That is, 
building on critiques of the family as a bourgeois institution (Donzelot 1979; Foucault 
1990), I will demonstrate how the surrogacy market fulfils for the intended parents the 
heteropatriarchal imperative of genetic procreation. This implies the accumulation of 
ethical value for the intended parents – a confirmation, I suggest, of their humanness. 
Moreover, the surrogacy contract demands the alienation of affect from the surrogate 
mother (Vora 2009b; Pande 2010). I posit this as a form of injury – the experience of 
pain – that confirms the differentiated, indeed negated, selfhood of the surrogate while 
simultaneously affirming the desires of the intended parents as the only pertinent truth65.  
This chapter thus attests to the foundation of the surrogacy market on the transaction of 
ethical value – i.e. between the human and differentially human that is contingent upon 
the final reduction of the latter to a thing. This transaction establishes the surrogacy 
market as concerned with the preservation of value as objectified in both, the human and 
capital. Furthermore, the exchange of ethical value – which is in fact the preservation of 
value – proceeds through matter wherein the materialisation of the surrogate body is 
itself a violation – through depletion and the experience of pain – in contradistinction to 
the integrity of the bodies of the intended parents. Consequently, this chapter affirms the 
surrogacy contract as the instantiation of the differential mattering of bodies under the 
postcolonial capitalist condition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65  I think it necessary, at this juncture, to highlight that my critique in this chapter is emphatically not a 
value or ethical judgment of the intended parents as agents. The issue of reproductive desire is 
profoundly complex on a subjective level and I do not think it possible, or necessary, to evaluate 
pertinent decisions of individuals. Rather, the critique that is being offered is systemic, one that 
proceeds from a recognition of the differentiated interpellation of intended parents and surrogate 
mothers. 
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The chapter begins with a brief overview of the discourses that structure the surrogacy 
market. The first half of the section focuses on the production of surrogate mothers as 
‘mother-workers’ (Vora 2009a; Pande 2010). That is, it highlights the mobilisation of 
maternal affect in the production of surrogate mothers as workers. I outline, on the one 
hand, the affective and economic descriptions that surrogate mothers use to affirm their 
participation in the market. Here, surrogate mothers approach their labour as an effect of 
their own maternal imperative – providing for the wellbeing of their own children – as 
well as an act of womanhood – sharing the gift of maternal/parental joy with intended 
mothers/parents. This maternal womanhood can be enlisted in the market only so long 
as it does not extend to the product (the child) at stake. That is, even as surrogacy clinics 
recruit women by appealing to their motherhood, once recruited their maternal affect 
must be curbed, so that it is detached from the child they produce. In this, surrogacy 
clinics attempt to produce the mother-(as)-worker. The next half of the section turns its 
attention to the affective desire of intended parents. Here, I provide an overview of the 
ethical and economic negotiations that intended parents undertake in order to participate 
in the surrogacy market (Norton et al. 2013; Inhorn & Patrizio 2009; Inhorn & 
Birenbaum-Carmeli 2008; Lewin 1995). In so doing, I seek to highlight how intended 
parents approach surrogacy as a means of self-actualisation. The section thus emphasises 
the role of choice and agency in relation to both, surrogate mothers and intended 
parents, in mobilising the market.  
The second section approaches the differential ethical stakes that enable the activation of 
choice in the market. The argument recognises the enactment of choice, from both 
perspectives, as a self-recuperating gesture. However, in the case of surrogate mothers, 
this recuperation is a function of their institution, in the first instance, as excess. The first 
half of the section substantiates this argument through an engagement with history of 
stratified reproduction – i.e. the differential value of women’s reproductive capacities 
(Solinger 2007). In particular, it looks at the history of sterilisation in India as a strategy 
of controlling (reproductive) excess (Chatterjee & Riley 2001). Developmental logic, 
however, transforms the imperative of eradication into that of recuperation, producing 
surrogacy as the newer manifestation of the biopolitical control of excess. This 
contention is developed in the latter half of the section through the concepts of 
bioavailability and operability that, by positing biological matter as property, enable its 
transfer (Cohen 2008). Indeed, the accrual of property relations with one’s body, and the 
ability to fragment and alienate the same as a means of economic value production (i.e. 
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through sale) is posited as a means towards gaining ethico-economic subjectivity. In this 
light, the ability of the surrogate mothers to harnesses their biological matter and 
capacities (heretofore descriptors of their ethical excess) in order to convert them into a 
means of economic production, institutes the surrogacy market as the site of their ethico-
economic recuperation. The section contests this proposition, however, through a 
critique of the contract relationship that structures the surrogacy relation (Pateman 1988; 
Rao 2000; Wiegman 2003). That is, I demonstrate the contract – as the formalisation of 
bioavailability – as a replication of sexual and economic subjugation. I thereby highlight 
objectification, rather than recuperation, as the condition that actualises the surrogacy 
contract. Through this objectification, instantiated in the commodification of excess, the 
surrogacy market restages the ethical degradation of surrogate mothers instead of 
recovering their ethical value. 
In the final section of this chapter, I suggest that the objectification of the surrogate 
mother through the commodification of her excess represents in fact the consumption 
of her ethical possibility. The production of value in the surrogacy market is contingent 
on the ethical depletion of the surrogate mother. This depletion, however, accrues as 
ethical value, as objectified in the child, to the intended parents. This accrual signifies the 
consumption of the surrogate mother by the intended parents. I make the first part of 
the argument – i.e. that the attainment of the child reifies the ethical value of intended 
parents – by presenting a political genealogy of the family as a juridico-economic unit 
(Foucault 1990; Donzelot 1979; Jordanova 1995). The second part of the argument 
unfolds through a discussion of surrogate labour as a form of accumulation by 
dispossession (Federici 2004; Harvey 2005). Dispossession, in this context, pertains not 
merely to economic deprivation but, more significantly, to the ethical denial instantiated 
in the capitalisation of the surrogate mother’s reproductive capacity. This capitalisation 
situates her not merely as labour power but as a means of production. The child born of 
surrogacy, then, is the product of the depletion of the surrogate mother. Or, more 
pertinently, the reification of intended parents as ethical beings is an effect of the 
productive consumption of the surrogate mother as thing (Marx 1956; Baudrillard 1998). 
This relationship of accumulation-via-consumption is an instantiation of the relationship 
between the sovereign and the servile.  
This chapter thus establishes the surrogacy market as the scene of ob/ab/jectification 
intended towards the preservation of the ‘hetero-class’ subject qua human. Given that 
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this preservation proceeds through the capitalisation of matter, it confirms the 
differential mattering of bodies under the postcolonial capitalist condition.       
on the surrogacy market and its viability as a ‘win-win’ situation 
Given the growing interested in the U.S. in the practice of international surrogacy, Lisa 
and Brian Switzer were invited onto The Today Show to discuss their experience with 
surrogacy in India. Following this televised interview, their story was featured on the 
show’s website. The filmmakers follow Brian as he browses through the comments on 
the story. The exchange there spanned the spectrum of interested support to vehement 
condemnation. Defending their decision against those that question the ethicality of 
‘farming out’ reproduction and creating ‘a baby mill’ in ‘third world countries’, Brian 
writes: ‘I have seen poverty unlike anything I could’ve imagined and knowing what this 
process is going to do for the surrogate and her family in the long-run makes me realise 
that this is a very good thing for all parties involved’ (Haimowitz & Sinha 2010, 
min.47:51). This is, in fact, true of Aasia. At the end of the film, up receipt of final 
payment, she explains her plan to put this money into savings accounts for her child. She 
intends to save a larger proportion for her daughter, for her marriage. Moreover, despite 
the pain she expressed of being away from her own children as well as the medical 
complications of her pregnancy, she admits that she is considering being a surrogate 
sometime in the future.  
Narratives such as these legitimise the surrogacy marker as a ‘win-win’ situation (Markens 
2012) wherein the arrested maternal/parental desires of intended mothers/parents find 
resolution in the benevolence of the (Indian) surrogate mother who ‘pays forward’ the 
joys of her own maternity while being provided the means to realise her socio-material 
responsibilities as mother. The viability of the surrogacy market as such is premised on 
the notion of the market as a site of economic activity premised on the idea of free and 
equal exchange. That is, it imagines intended parents and surrogate mothers alike as 
‘divinely-willed, rationally inspired, invisibly handed economic actor[s]’ (Williams 1991) 
concerned with the shared end of self-actualisation.  The stated desires that drive both 
parties into the surrogate market seem, no doubt, to validate this end. Yet, the question I 
am concerned with in this section is the possibility of positing the surrogacy contract as a 
free and equal – in fact, a ‘win-win’ – exchange.  
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Susan Marken’s (2012) investigation of U.S. media stories on surrogacy, conducted 
between 2006 and 2010, reveal that reactions to the ‘outsourcing’ of surrogacy mainly fall 
along two frames: exploitation/inequality v/s opportunity/choice. In the case of the 
former, critiques revolve around the persistence of global income inequalities that enable 
the commodification of women and children. The latter, however, adopt a ‘half-glass full 
narrative’, that, even while acknowledging inequality, dismisses the charge of exploitation 
and replaces it with a discourse on opportunity and agency – ‘You have plenty of money. 
They don’t. It’s their call how to use their bodies’ (quoted in Markens 2012). Indeed, as I 
will demonstrate below, the stated motive for undertaking surrogacy, in most cases, is the 
social and economic betterment of one’s own family, especially one’s children. A 
surrogate’s decision, then, to enter the contract becomes read as a moment of gender 
empowerment, enacted, in particular, through the exercise of reproductive autonomy. As 
such, the surrogate is posited as self-determined, ‘enterprising’ subject. This 
characterisation, of course, applies to intended parents as well.  
For instance, remarking upon the financial challenges associated with choosing 
surrogacy, Lisa Switzer states:  
I’ll work two jobs, three jobs. I don’t care. I [may]66 get tired but I’m not scared 
of a lot of work, ‘coz I know what the reward is. We’ve put up our house, we 
sold it, we took the equity out and we’re gonna gamble it on a baby. And we may 
end up with nothing to show for it. Even though you don’t see me as heartfelt, I 
am. I’m determined. I won’t give this up. I can’t give this up. It’s… it is my dream. 
This what I need to be whole. (Haimowitz & Sinha 2010, min.15:10) 
Thus, as Marilyn Strathern (1992) notes, assisted reproductive technologies interpellate 
intended parents as subjects who not only seize these technologies as a means to self-
actualisation but also as those for whom ‘there is, in a sense, no choice not to consume’ 
(1992, p.37; original emphasis).  
In this section, I juxtapose the conditions under which surrogate mothers and intended 
parents can emerge as enterprising subjects. In particular, I read how ‘choice’ and 
‘agency’ manifest in their participation in the market. In so doing, in the first half of this 
section I provide an overview of ethnographic accounts that describe the motives and 
experiences of surrogate mothers in India (Pande 2010; Vora 2009a; Vora 2009b; 
Wadekar 2011). I do so with particular reference to surrogate hostels where surrogates 
are housed by clinics during the entirety of the gestational process. Using the research 	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conducted therein, I will argue that these houses serve as a space of discipline – i.e. of 
producing surrogate mothers as docile subjects, or what Pande calls ‘good mother-
workers’. Consequently, the first half of the section will reveal the surrogacy market as 
exercising a coercive force on the bodies of poor women materialised as surrogates.  
In the second half of the section, I shift my gaze to forces that drive intended parents 
into the market. Drawing especially from feminist and queer scholarship (Strathern 1992; 
Lewin 1995; Mamo 2007), I outline how intended parents view ‘having a child’ – i.e. the 
birthing of themselves as parents – as a moment of self-actualisation. For those who 
cannot reproduce biologically, ART comes to represent the possibility for such 
actualisation. Consequently, the second sub-section aligns itself with accounts that 
propose participation in the surrogacy market as the expression of a rational and moral 
subjectivity.  
Overall, my purpose in this section is neither to affirm nor challenge the motivations 
articulated by either party. Instead, I seek to illustrate how participation in the market is 
(made to appear as) the assertion of ethical subjectivity.  
surrogate mothers 
Surrogacy India is a leading reproductive services agency that describes itself as the first in 
India to provide comprehensive surrogacy services. Its website offers detailed 
information to potential intended parents and surrogate mothers about what they can 
expect during the surrogacy process. A page on the website directed at recruiting 
surrogates list the criteria that a potential surrogate mother must fit thus: She must be 
• between the ages of 21-35 years. At SI, we usually limit them to below 30 
years. 
• having a sincere desire to help infertile couple achieve parenthood. At SI, 
we do SM psychological evaluation 
• has experienced the joy of having her own child. At SI, we limit 
Surrogates who have less than 3 previous children. 
• takes care of herself and her family's health and is willing to undergo 
physical evaluation and tests. At SI, we repeat all tests for both SM and 
her husband, including hysteroscopy. 
• is aware of the hazards of addiction (smoking / tobacco / alcohol) on 
pregnancy and the baby. At SI, we do dental evaluation to confirm any 
drug / tobacco abuse  
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• did not experience any major pregnancy complication. At SI, we request 
for past delivery records.  
• believes in families and has full emotional support from your husband / 
partner, who also understands the implications of the surrogacy program 
and is willing to participate in any which way required 
• Compliant to sign all documents pertaining to relinquishing her rights 
over the child. At SI, we ask our Lawyer to counsel SM in the language 
she understands and only then get documents signed. (Surrogacy India 
2010a) 
This list a curious mixture of biographical, physiological, psychological, affective and 
intellectual requirements. As such, it explicates the complexities of the surrogacy process 
from the point of recruitment to its culmination in the handing over of the child. In the 
first half of this section, I will attempt to address each of these requirements highlighting 
their role in the production of poor women as surrogates. In so doing, I seek to 
underscore the disciplinary aspects of the surrogacy process. Let me begin with the 
moment of recruitment.   
In her ethnographic study of the Indian surrogacy market, Amrita Pande (2010) discusses 
the strategies deployed by clinics in attracting potential surrogates. She notes in particular 
the discursive techniques directed at poor women that tap into anxieties about being a 
‘bad mother’ – one who is unable to provide for her children, not just materially, but also 
according to cultural and social norms (e.g. procuring a suitable mate for her child). This 
strategy is evidenced on the Surrogacy India website where it addresses the ‘win-win’ 
possibility promised by the market. It notes: ‘This surrogacy process for you and your 
surrogate is about children. You use services of a Surrogate Mother (SM) to have your 
own child(ren), the surrogate provides these services to give a better future to her 
child(ren)’ (Surrogacy India 2010b). Indeed, as Pande notes, it is precisely the anxiety of 
being a bad mother that is the condition of possibility for producing a ‘good surrogate’. 
A good surrogate is one who, in enacting her own maternal love and duties – i.e. the 
social and economic betterment of her own children – simultaneously resolves the 
maternal/parental desires of intended mothers/parents, therein ‘paying forward’ the joys 
of her own maternity.  
But, the production of a ‘good’ surrogate necessitates the deployment of a disciplinary 
project. Based on an analysis of the discourses used to train and counsel surrogates, 
Pande demonstrates that ‘[t]he perfect surrogate is one who is constantly aware of her 
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disposability and the transience of her identity as a worker and yet loves the product of 
her transient labour (the foetus) as her own’(2010, p.978). As one of the doctors 
interviewed by Pande notes:  
I tell them, “You have to do nothing. It’s not your baby. You are just providing it 
a home in your womb for nine months because it doesn’t have a house of its 
own. If some child comes to stay with you for just nine months, what will you 
do? You will take care of it even more, love it even more than you love your 
own, because it is someone else’s. This is the same thing. You will take care of 
the baby for nine months and then give it to its mother. And for that you will be 
paid.” I think, finally, how you train them – that is what makes surrogacy work. 
(2010, p.978) 
This discourse is reflective of a general form of surrogacy training in India where, as 
Kalindi Vora notes, ‘women who want to be surrogates are encouraged by doctors to 
think of their bodies through the western medical model, where the body operates like a 
machine composed of parts and exists largely separate from the self’ (2009a, p.271). 
Consequently, any trace of affective attachment that the surrogate might experience 
towards the child she carries is pre-emptively counselled away to guarantee the realisation 
of her responsibility towards the intended parents helping them fulfil their dreams. As 
one surrogate quoted in Pande’s study states, ‘I think the legal contract says that we will 
have to give up the child immediately after the delivery – we won’t even look at it. Black 
or white, normal or deformed, we have to give it away’ (2010, p.977). This is one half of 
the disciplinary process of constituting the surrogate as, what Pande calls, the ‘mother-
worker subject.’  
Once a woman has been accepted into the surrogacy program and contracted as such, 
she is subject to various medical procedures that prepare her body for pregnancy. These 
include, suppressing the surrogate’s own ovulatory cycle, through birth control pills and 
hormone shots, to match that of the intended mother; and the provision of oestrogen 
shots to build the surrogates uterine lining. After impregnation, the surrogate is 
administered daily injections of progesterone until her body realises it is pregnant. Once 
pregnant, most clinics encourage surrogates to live in ‘hostels’ where their medication, 
diet and other daily routines can be closely monitored. Pande describes one of the 
hostels from her field visits thus:  
Surrogates typically have two kinds of living arrangements during their nine 
months of pregnancy: living in the rooms above the clinic under Khanderia's care 
or living in the hostels financed by the clinic. 
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In the clinic the surrogates live in groups of eight to a room. The rooms are lined 
with single iron beds with barely enough space to walk in between. One end of 
each bed is kept raised with a wooden block so that the surrogate can have her 
legs up after the embryo transfer. The women have nothing to do the whole day 
except pace back and forth on the same floor (they are not allowed to climb the 
stairs and have to wait for the nurses to operate the elevator), share their woes 
and experiences with the other surrogates, and wait for the next injection. The 
surrogacy hostels located in towns close to the clinic are less sterile: the 
surrogates have fewer restrictions on their movement and have a kitchen (along 
with a cook), a television, and a prayer room at their disposal. Husbands are 
allowed to visit but are encouraged not to stay the night, to emphasise the 
requirement that the surrogate not have any sexual relations during the nine 
months of pregnancy. (2010, p.981) 
These hostels, and the associated regimented lives, are legitimised through the 
positioning of surrogates as unfamiliar with, and thus unqualified in, modern ways of 
being a ‘good mother’. The afore cited clinic doctor affirms as much: 
In a way it's also very good for all the mothers to stay together, laugh, play, and 
stay happy. It’s a good way of passing time for them. And it prevents them from 
always wanting to go home. If we send her home, she is bound to start doing 
housework. She doesn’t know any better. But here we can ensure that she gets 
complete rest. When the surrogate has her own children, she has them without 
even realising what happened – in fun and games. But in this pregnancy a lot 
depends on her actions. And we want nothing to go wrong. In the other hostel, 
we’ve also started English and computer lessons for them. We want them to 
learn something, some skills to face the world better after staying with us. We 
can’t take care of them forever! (2010, p.283; emphasis added in original text) 
Thus, the hostel, as a disciplinary space, serves not only to produce the surrogate as a 
‘good mother-worker’, but it is also posited as a space for the institution of a modern 
worker subjectivity, in general. This worker subjectivity, however, is not one that the 
surrogates themselves relate to easily.  
In her critique of the surrogacy market in India, Vora suggests that, among the 
surrogates she interviewed, most believed that their undertaking exceeded the bounds of 
mere work. Many used religious discourse to describe their actions – ‘of being able to 
give a gift to an infertile couple that is a gift usually given only by god’ (2009a, p.273). 
Such affirmations, of course, are not so much a denial of the financial motivations of 
their undertakings, as a subsumption of the economic under the altruistic. That is, while 
the women do not characterise their decision in terms of choice – one surrogate mother 
is quoted as calling it ‘majboori’ (a compulsion) (Pande 2010, p.988) – they, concurrently, 
shun describing the contract in terms of a business transaction. On the one hand, then, 
surrogates view their work, coerced though it may be, as ‘god’s gift’; on the other, they 
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recognise it as, ultimately, a function of mothering. Thus, the reality of the surrogate 
activity, Pande argues, lies ‘somewhere between contractual labour and motherly 
altruism’ (978). As one mother interviewed by Vora noted, she had decided to be a 
surrogate precisely so that her own children ‘could become educated and wouldn’t have 
to do such things’. She said that she ‘would not want her daughters to experience that 
pain’ (2009a, p.274). This pain, as Vora notes, can be assumed to be more than simply 
physical.  
With reference to the counselling received by surrogates, to mitigate any affective bonds 
forged during pregnancy, another doctor interviewed by Pande asserts: 
It’s because of this counseling that we have had no problem with the surrogate 
not wanting to give the baby up. Our surrogates are not like the surrogates you 
find in the U.S., who feign attachment just to make some extra bucks. That is one 
of the big reasons why we get so many international clients. (2010, p.977) 
Indeed, this denial of affective subjectivity – i.e. the insistence on constructing surrogates 
as ‘empty-wombed’ service providers – is designed, also, to impress upon them the 
importance of eschewing greed (i.e. of cautioning them against negotiating higher pay). 
However, the (inevitable) failure of attempting to train desire thus is captured in a 
poignant example provided by Vora. Writing of the interaction between an intended 
father, David, and a surrogate, Puja, (the child was to be conceived through egg 
donation), she describes the negotiation of business and affect in their relationship. 
During their first meeting, the well-trained Puja responds to David’s questions regarding 
herself as surrogate in a ‘self-possessed’ and ‘business-like manner’. However, when 
David attempts to construct the relationship as more than just a business transaction – 
he invites Puja to come visit them in the U.S. – this affective pretence reveals itself as 
such. For, when Puja asks whether he would be willing to find her and her husband jobs 
in the U.S., he deflects the question back to her role as surrogate. Further, David later 
intimates that, during a moment alone, Puja had asked him, in English (Vora had been 
translating much of their conversation), for additional money, in response to which he 
had pretended not to understand her. Nine months later, David and his wife return to 
India to pick-up their child. When they spoke with Puja over the phone, once they had 
returned to the States, she told them that she cried every night at the thought of not 
seeing the child again. David also mentioned to Vora that while they were hoping to have 
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siblings for their new-born daughter, they were not sure if they could ‘put another 
surrogate through the process’. Vora concludes this account, stating: 
David did not mention whether he intends to fulfill the wish he expressed to 
bring Puja and her family to the United States someday, though they clearly do 
not intend to work with Puja if they have another child. However, David is 
clearly still sorting out his ongoing relationship to her and is wary of the affective 
impact of surrogacy on the surrogate’s life. (2009a, p.275) 
Vora’s account is instructive because it highlights how tensions between the economic 
and the affective, between business transactions and personal relations, need negotiation 
on both sides of the surrogacy contract. Indeed, as will be outlined in a later section, the 
heteronormative underpinnings of ethico-political subject formation give credence to the 
materiality of the desires of intended parents as much as they recognise the financial 
compulsions and ‘altruistic’ wishes of the surrogate mothers. 
Certainly, notions of ‘choice’ and ‘agency’ are just as significant, if far less contested, to 
the circumstance of intended parents. The possibility of exercising these through the 
consumption of ART is not universally available and is, in the first instance, dependent 
upon one’s socioeconomic capacities. Yet, even where the possibility of using surrogacy 
exists, the exercise of choice is not without material and emotional cost, and significant 
enough to require various forms of deliberated sacrifice on the part of intended parents. 
The next half of this section thus addresses the structure of participation of intended 
parents in the surrogacy market. By positing ART as a site for the mobilisation of 
reproductive choice (in this case, the choice to have children), I describe the figurations of 
choice and agency from the perspective of the intended parents67.  
intended parents 
In her analysis of ‘Motherhood under capitalism’, Barbara Rothman (2004) suggests that 
the desire to ‘become a parent’ has varied meaning. For some, it is purely an affective 
desire – to care for and raise another life. This may or may not include a desire of the 
embodied experience of birth. In other cases, the embodied experience – for the mother, 
to carry the foetus to term, and for the father, to share in the experience of pregnancy – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67  I must emphasise at this point, that my research looks solely at the issue of commercial surrogacy as 
structured through the market. It does not address the dynamics of ‘altruistic’ or unpaid surrogacy. To 
wit, this research is guided by an interest in comprehending surrogacy as a particular capitalist formation 
that is enabled by and sustains postcolonial difference. Thus, this research is not merely interested in the 
question of commodification as posed by the surrogacy market, but also how markets, in general, and 
the surrogacy market, in particular, affect a ‘recuperative’ role in the production of postcolonial 
modernity. I take this up in the latter half of this chapter.  
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is a crucial aspect of the desire. Finally, the desire to reproduce may be related specifically 
to a desire for reproducing one’s self – i.e. the genetic tie is the central aspect of 
reproductive desire. This proliferation of meaning with respect to ‘having children’ has 
facilitated, as Rothman notes, the emergence of various reproductive markets that cater 
to the multiplicity of desires. Surrogacy, then, represents the possibility of fulfilling the 
genetic aspect of reproductive desire.  
Studies on the emergence of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) remark upon how 
these technologies, in facilitating a denaturalisation of reproduction (although not 
necessarily of reproductive desire), (re-)move reproduction from the realm of biological 
fact and function to that of individual agency (Mamo 2007; Strathern 1992). The 
implications of this dearticulation of reproduction as biological are especially crucial to 
the recognition of same-sex couples and single individuals as ethically viable parents. 
Indeed, gay couples, in particular, form a growing share of intended parents in the 
surrogacy market in India. Reflecting, for instance, on her ethnographic study of 
surrogate and intended mothers, Elly Teman notes: 
Contrary to one popular assumption that women hire surrogates as a luxury, to 
avoid pregnancy and birth, the intended mothers in my study arrived at the 
decision to pursue surrogacy only after they had explored every other option 
possible to become pregnant and give birth themselves. (2010, p.107) 
Along similar lines, Nicky Hudson and Lorraine Culley (2011) critique scholarly and 
media portrayals of intended parents as ‘a cohesive group, marked by their desperation 
and/or selfishness and propensity towards morally questionable behavior’ (2011, p.573). 
Contrary to these representations, then, it is imperative to acknowledge that infertility 
and involuntary childlessness can be emotionally and socially taxing for intended parents. 
It is for this reason that the exploitation/inequality framework is often rejected as overly 
reductive and unable to account for the complex deliberations that intended parents go 
through before opting for surrogacy.  
Writing about infertility travel in general, Marcia Inhorn and Pasquale Patrizio (2009) 
take issue with the description of participant flows as ‘reproductive tourism’. Such 
terminology, they argue, creates the image of a leisurely holiday – one that is in stark 
contrast to the realities that constitute reproductive travel. Instead, they propose the use 
of the term ‘exile’ as it better captures the stress and desperation that provoke such 
travel:  
	   164 
The term exile has two meanings: either forced removal from one’s native 
country or a voluntary absence. Both meanings are accurate to describe how they 
feel “forced” to leave their home countries to access safe, effective, affordable, 
and legal infertility care. Their choice to use ARTs to produce a child is 
voluntary, but their travel abroad is not. (2009, p.905) 
Indeed, cost is not the only consideration in the decision of intended parents to travel 
abroad. Even where commercial surrogacy is legal, there are numerous ambiguities in the 
law that deter intended parents from undertaking the process in their home countries68. 
Besides the economic and legal reasons that drive reproductive travel, the notion of 
‘reproductive exile’ also underscores the force of pronatalist norms that undergird 
constructions of ethico-political order. I will address the ethico-social implications of 
childlessness and reproduction later in this chapter. However, at this point, it is necessary 
to acknowledge how these stresses, (bio)politically effected though they may be, manifest 
in the individuated lives of those who are involuntarily childless.  
In her study of lesbian motherhood, Ellen Lewin notes that motherhood is often ‘the 
foundation from which women [can] construct a position in the wider social world’ 
(1995, p.103). Given the normalised equation of ‘womanhood’ and ‘motherhood’, and 
the ‘non-natural’ (non-procreative) nature of lesbian sex, Lewin describes how lesbian 
women have historically been barred from the ethico-social category of ‘woman’. 
Consequently, for lesbian women in particular, the aspiration towards motherhood can 
represent a powerful claim towards ethical recognition. For many of the women 
interviewed by Lewin, motherhood provided ‘access to sources of goodness, enabling 
them to construct satisfying identities for themselves’ (1995, p.110). Similarly, writing of 
the choice to be a mother as a means of self-fulfilment, Lauro Mamo (2007) notes: 
‘[human reproduction] is not only about making persons, parents, and social relations; it 
is also about making oneself recognisable as a person or parent, then demanding 
recognition of one’s inclusion’ (2007, p.94; added emphasis)  
This conditioning, however, extends beyond the desire for motherhood. In a study of 
gay men who choose to become fathers, Wendy Norton et al. (2013) describe a story 
similar to that of lesbian women. The notion of ‘gay father’ is perceived as oxymornonic, 
and has been consigned to deviancy – ‘[g]ay men wishing to become fathers were 
perceived as deviant or paedophiles, or as wishing to reproduce homosexuality’ (2013, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  See fn. 2. 
	   165 
p.272). Thus, while research on gay parents is relatively limited, it might be argued that 
the decision of gay men to enter parenthood parallels the claims to subjecthood made by 
lesbian mothers. The legal complications surrounding surrogacy contracts, as well as the 
persistent prejudice against same-sex couples and queer-identifying individuals, 
intensifies the emotional and economic risks for lesbian and gay intended parents 
undertaking surrogacy contracts in their home countries69.  
The ethical overtures evident in decisions taken by lesbian and gay parents also run 
through the decision-making processes of heterosexual couples and non-partnered 
individuals. It is estimated that, globally, infertility affects more than 15% of all 
reproductively-aged couples, or approximately 80 million people (Inhorn & Birenbaum-
Carmeli 2008, p.179). Infertility rates are generally thought to be highest in the 
developing world owing to issues such as sexually transmitted and other untreated 
infections, hormonal and nutritional imbalances, and complications arising from previous 
pregnancies (Wadekar 2011). The concern with infertility, then, is not isolated, and while 
anxieties surrounding it might be differently manifest, they are pervasive across 
communities and cultures. The introduction of ART has opened up the possibility for 
individuals confronted by this issue to take control of their reproductive capacities. Of 
course, this possibility is neither universally nor uniformly available. I will take up the 
question of this differential shortly. Even so, the marketisation of ART marks a 
significant transformation in how individuals can manage their reproductive possibilities.  
Despite the socio-ethical coercions described thus far, the exercise of choice and agency 
is a crucial aspect of the decisions undertaken by intended parents. For instance, referring 
to the decision-making process of lesbian mothers Lewin remarks upon ‘the powers of 
the individual, on the importance of achieving goals through action on one’s behalf’ as a 
central aspect of American socialisation. Furthermore, the exercise of individuality is 
grounded in the drive to ‘“find oneself,” a quest that rests on self-reliance, on leaving 
home and earning one’s way in order to “‘make something of yourself’ through work”’ 
(1995, p.110). Given, then, that the achievement of motherhood is posited, and 
experienced, as the actualisation of the female self – and this structure of actualisation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69  It must be noted here that India does not issue medical visas for the purpose of surrogacy to gay and 
lesbian couples. However, in May 2013, the government announced that, while this ban would continue, 
it would now allow single people to access surrogacy services in the country. An ingenius solution, no 
doubt, to maintaining an official prejudicial stand on same-sex relationships, while enabling its 
circumvention for economic reasons (Tripathi 2013). 
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may be extended in a gender non-specific way to parenthood – engagement with ART 
represents the exercise of a rational self-determination.  
As noted above, Marilyn Strathern (1992) suggests that the enabling of reproductive 
choice by ART interpellates the enterprising self, i.e. the one who is not just ‘able to 
choose between alternative ways, but one who implements that choice through 
consumption (self-enhancement) and for whom there is, in a sense, no choice not to 
consume’ (Strathern 1992, p.37; original emphasis). Strathern borrows this notion of the 
‘enterprising self’ from Russell Keat’s discussion on ‘enterprise culture’ (1991), a 
discourse that emerged in the 1980s, effected by British government’s project of 
economic and institutional reform that ‘encouraged or required the reconstruction of the 
institutions concerned along the lines suggested by the model of ‘the commercial 
enterprise’ – the privately owned firm or company operating in a free market’ (1991, p.2). 
The concurrent positing of enterprising individuals as self-reliant, non-dependent, goal-
oriented, and optimistic, engenders discerning consumers and producers, keenly attuned 
to the market. To be sure, the geohistorical specificity of this term aside, the enterprising 
self merely refers to the ideal subject of the market, one who is a ‘divinely-willed, 
rationally inspired, invisibly handed economic actor’ (Williams 1991, p.220)  
The preceding discussion confirms intended parents as enterprising individuals – those 
who, as Strathern notes, seize the possibilities opened up by ART since ‘[t]o imagine an 
absence of desire would be an affront to the means that exist to satisfy it’ (1992, p.37). 
Similarly, the participation of surrogate mothers in the market installs them as 
enterprising as well. As illustrated above, the participation of surrogate mothers in the 
market is, in the first instance, an effect of the responsibility of motherhood as an 
affective and socio-economic project. That is, the intention towards the well-being and 
betterment of their children is not merely a private investment but also signals the 
performance of ethico-economic duty towards one’s polity. By entering the market, 
surrogate mothers submit the means of production available to them – the body and its 
capacities – to ART thereby extracting the economic benefits available therein. 
Moreover, by fulfilling an ethical duty towards the intended parents, through the 
performance of a mother-worker subjectivity, they install themselves as desirable subjects 
in/of the modern polity. Thus, the decision of surrogate mothers to ‘‘construct’ and 
[make] what they will ‘out of’ the givens of existence and environmental constraints’ 
(1992, p.39) marks them as enterprising individuals.   
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To wit, the notion of enterprise is intended to underscore choice and agency as drivers of 
market participation. Yet, as should be evident from the above discussion, these do not 
exist apart from coercion or compulsion. The ‘magic’ of the market lies in its ability to 
rewrite control from an effect to direct, or sovereign, power, into that of the rationalised 
powers of responsibility and obligation. Consequently, as I will explicate in the following 
section, the surrogacy market is a site of biopolitical control. Recalling Foucault, 
biopolitics is concerned with the well-being of populations conceptualised as a 
collectivity formed of members of the human species (Foucault 2007). In order to 
explicate the surrogacy market as such, in the section below I will focus on the poor 
women who are incorporated into the market as a means of controlling their excess. 
The first half of the section seeks to describe how poor women have been described as 
excess as an effect of their sexuality. I begin by employing the work of Rickie Solinger 
(2007) to outline the historio-politics of stratified reproduction – that is, the differential 
valuation of reproductive capacities – in order to underscore how the well-being of a 
population is secured through the differentially mattering of bodies. Thereafter, I apply 
this argument specifically to case of India where I identify the country’s sterilisation 
policies as a biopolitical technique aimed especially at controlling the reproductive 
capacities of poor women. These policies, in fact, were officially authorised as a 
developmentalist strategy for the country’s population (Chatterjee & Riley 2001).  
The second half of the section seeks to demonstrate surrogacy as the other side of the 
reproductive coin. That is, I describe how the appropriation of excess by the market 
serves a biopolitical function similar to sterilisation. To make this argument, I introduce 
Lawrence Cohen’s (2008) idea of bioavailability – i.e. the circumstance wherein the 
fragmentation of one body is appropriated for use in another – to demonstrate how 
excess becomes a resource for the preservation of value in both, its ethical and economic 
registers. Cohen presents bioavailability as biopower that tends towards exercise as 
sovereign power intended towards the installation of the poor as ‘modern subjects’. As 
such, bioavailability confirms the ethical devaluation of the bodies of the poor. In the 
case of the surrogacy market, in particular, bioavailability is in fact the scene of 
annihilation. I will substantiate this proposition by showing how poor women offer 
themselves as bioavailable to the market on the pr(e)/(o)mise of personhood. To wit, the 
surrogacy contract authorises the subjection of the surrogate mother as voluntary. This, I 
will explain, is an effect of her (own) recognition as differentially human and her self-
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determined choice to exercise her property rights in her own body to actualise herself as 
human (Rao 2000; Wiegman 2003). However, using critiques of the employment and 
marriage contract (Pateman 1988; Williams 1991) – of which the surrogacy contract is a 
special type – I will argue that these, by their very structure, are not only a form of 
subjection but more precisely of alienation such that they are destructive of even the 
possibility of personhood. This, as I will show, is especially intensified in the case of the 
surrogacy contract wherein, the putative exercise of property relations and personhood 
effects a reduction of the self – an almost complete emptying out of the self. In other 
words, the surrogacy contract is the scene of the production of the surrogate mother as a 
‘becoming being for’ (Spillers 1987, p.67), the installation of her as thing.  
Consequently, the purpose of the following section is to outline how the appropriation 
of excess as a resource by the surrogacy market is in fact the annihilation of (the 
subjecthood of) poor women. It is only as such that the surrogacy market can preserve 
value in the form of capital (wealth for practioners) and humanness (family/parenthood 
for intended parents).  
on  ‘the poor woman of the south’ and the annihilation of personhood 
Lisa Switzer, as noted earlier, is ‘determined’ to have a baby. And so is Aasia. Yet, in the 
film it appears as though Aasia’s husband is not particularly supportive of her plan to be 
a surrogate mother. This is attributed to his lack of understanding of what the process 
entails. This, according to a doctor interviewed, is a common occurrence. She notes that 
husbands are especially concerned with how and whose sperm is to be injected into the 
surrogate. These concerns however are alleviated when she ‘educate[s] them and 
inform[s] them, look even the eggs are not hers. The baby is not hers. I’m just going to 
prepare a baby outside and just put it into her uterus… I only need her uterus. That’s 
when they are able to understand’ (Haimowitz & Sinha 2010, min.22:11). This 
explanation, however, may not have worked on Aasia’s husband for she had to trick him 
into signing the contract70. This fragment reveals the fundamental terms upon which the 
work of the surrogate mother is ethically viable – i.e. property and personhood. While 
Aasia, emphatically, does not hold property in the genetic material she is injected with 
nor the baby that culminates from it, she is deemed to hold property in her body71. It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70  Clinics require husbands to sign a contract as well in order to indicate consent to and compliance with 
the surrogate’s duties and responsibilities.  
71  This is, of course, debatable given the patriarchal power of a husband over his wife’s body and its 
products. Indeed, this is evident in the form of resistance of Aasia’s husband to her participation in the 
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only as such that she is able to ‘rent out’ her womb and her labour thereby materialising 
herself as surrogate. By thus exercising her property rights as a means to self-
advancement she is seen to express an ethical subjectivity, or personhood. In Aasia’s case 
this is all the more apparent in her ‘rational’, ‘self-determined’ act of trickery whereby she 
circumvented her husband’s power in the affirmation and exercise of her property rights.  
The surrogacy contract represents a viable exchange in so far as it acknowledges the 
personhood and property rights of both parties (Wiegman 2003) – the surrogate mother 
as well as the intended parents. But this contract is in essence an employment contract. 
The employment contract represents a relationship wherein a worker alienates her labour 
power in exchange for wages. The contracting out of labour power implies that the 
worker holds a property relationship with his bodily capacities that are, in fact, distinct 
from his person. Or more precisely, the self-determined separability and exchangeability 
of labour power from the social entity whence it emanates, establishes (the possibility of) 
personhood, and that of the subject as worker rather than a slave (Pateman 1988). 
However, the possibility of this separation, Pateman notes, is a dominating (as in both, 
primary and subjugating) fiction of capital. This is because labour power is an effect of 
the worker’s ‘will, his understanding and experience’ and is thus ‘an integral part of his 
self and self-identity’ (1988, p.150). Consequently, the employment relationship implies a 
dispossessed particularisation of the worker’s subjectivity as well as the alienation of the 
body and its capacities, voluntary and non-absolute though it might be.  
This is especially true of the surrogacy relationship wherein the surrogate is not merely 
dispossessed of her labour power, but also of her body as vital matter. Indeed, the 
surrogate’s body, as vital matter, and its functions, serve as the raw material and 
instrument of labour, respectively. Consequently, the surrogate’s body – as matter and 
capacity – is the primary means of (re)production. By alienating (‘renting out’) her body 
as the means of production, the (possibility of) ethical subjectivity of the surrogate 
mother is held in suspension while she functions as biological object intended towards 
another’s will. In the second half of this section, I will juxtapose these critiques of the 
employment contract – i.e. critiques of free labour – with Spillers’ (1987) engagement 
with slave labour,  in order to explicate the surrogacy contract as the scene of ethical 
destruction However, in order for this circumstance to be ethically viable, the surrogate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
surrogacy market. In general, however, this patriarchal relationship is both acknowledged (in the signing 
of the contract) and put under erasure (in positing the surrogate as a self-determined market actor) by 
the structure of the Indian surrogacy market.  
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mother must first be posited as ethical excess herself. Below I outline how this excess 
comes to be described through discourses of stratified reproduction and the practice of 
sterilisation.  
stratified reproduction 
In order to approach the attribution of excess through reproduction as a site of 
biocontrol, I suggest to undertake an engagement with the discourse of reproductive 
rights. Rickie Solinger describes reproductive politics as the question of ‘[w]ho has power 
over matters of pregnancy and its consequences’ (2007, p.3). Eschewing the history of 
patriarchal/state control over women’s bodies, (western) feminist discourse has asserted 
the self-determination and autonomy of women with reference to their own bodies, its 
functions and its intensities. This is especially significant given that, historically, policies 
governing reproduction have attempted to distribute reproductive capacities – through 
the moralisation of reproductive responsibilities, prohibition and criminalisation of 
abortion, mandatory/forced sterilisations, etc. – along race and class lines, so as fulfil the 
state’s socio-economic and ideological purposes. This, remarks Solinger, is an effect of 
the construction of women’s reproductive capacities as a ‘social resource’ (2007, p.9) – 
something to be managed in the service of a healthy nation. The feminist response, 
therefore, has been to reclaim one’s reproductive capacities from the social/public 
sphere into that of the individual/private through a discourse of ‘rights’. 
Of course, this notional ability to privatise one’s fertility – i.e. to appeal to ideas of 
‘ownership’ and a ‘right to privacy’ – is denied, or at least severely restricted, among 
those deemed incapable of achieving personhood. For instance, with respect to the Roe v 
Wade decision in the U.S., Solinger notes: 
In retrospect, it seems paradoxical that seven justices in the majority could have, 
at that historical moment, imagined a woman’s reproductive decisions as private 
at all. On the one hand, in the waning years of the civil rights movement, 
granting women reproductive privacy was a way of acknowledging the human 
dignity of women and of defining their self-ownership. But on the other hand, 
women’s fertile, reproducing bodies had never been so visible or publicly 
consequential in American society as in this era: the reproducing body had 
become everybody’s business. (2007, p.186) 
Indeed, the granting of ‘human dignity’ through this decision was coupled with, and 
contingent upon, an ascription of the ability to make good choices. That is, in the 
context of the civil rights movement and consequent debates on desegregation, welfare 
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and citizenship, the ‘reproducing body’ was differentially produced with respect to the 
exercise of personhood as defined through economic capacity. Whereas middle class, 
predominantly white, women were favourably viewed as consumer citizens, poor women 
and women of colour were portrayed not only as economic burdens but also as ‘poor 
choice makers because they became mothers without being able to afford children, 
economically’. Thus, Solinger notes: 
Giving birth while poor became a sign of failure to benefit from women’s new 
economic opportunities. Middle-class women were supposed to achieve personal 
liberation by achieving economic self-sufficiency. Any women who didn’t achieve 
economic self-sufficiency had only herself (and her contraceptive ineptitude) to 
blame. 
In this way, the escalating rates of women’s workforce participation became a 
reason to disqualify poor women from proper status as mothers. Women who 
earned enough at work (or who had husbands who did) were the ones who earned 
the right to choose motherhood. Even though women of color as a group had always 
had higher rates of workforce participation than white women, those who didn’t 
work – or who didn’t “earn enough” – did not merit the right to choose 
motherhood. … 
In a society especially worried in the 1960s and 1970s about the relationship 
between rights, individuality, selfishness, and depravity, poor mothers became the 
emblem of what could happen when wrong people got rights. (2007, pp.189–190; 
original emphasis) 
In drawing a connection between the possibility of rights (to choice, to motherhood, etc.) 
and economic capacity, Solinger’s observations underscore how personhood – the 
descriptor of legitimate(d) ethico-political existence – is inextricably tied to issues of 
‘property’ and ‘ownership’. While access to these in the realm of the economic liberates 
the possibility of a similar exercise in the realm of the psycho-corporal, those that lie 
outside of, or in excess of, this order are deemed incapable, and thus unworthy, of the 
rights and privileges associated with such ownership. I will elaborate on this point further 
on in this chapter in my discussion of Donzelot’s account of the family as an ethical 
formation. However, what is of note here, is that the discourse of ‘rights’ and ‘choice’ 
has limited pertinence to the question of reproductive politics – i.e. the question of 
power.  
This is especially evident in concurrence with the history of sterilisation policies 
worldwide. The recent history of sterilisation reveals how the evocative rhetoric of 
‘population bomb’ and ‘population explosion’ has been deployed, especially with 
reference to the global south, to justify the sterilisation of poor populations whose sexual 
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practices and fertility rates are deemed unedified in their excess(iveness) – a subsequent 
drain, therefore, on natural resources, the cause of their lasting impoverishment, and 
ultimately, a hindrance to economic growth (Hartmann 1987). Sterilisation is one of, if 
not the, most popular forms of birth control globally. However, as Hartmann argues, this 
practice is relevant to the issue of population control only where it is performed 
coercively. Indeed, while government-funded sterilisation programs, supported by 
international aid agencies, are nominally run on a voluntary basis, the forms of 
compensation offered (cash, clothes, food, etc.) and penalties levied (docking pay, 
restricting access to food rations, etc.) render the process involuntary. Sterilisation 
policies, then, mark not a disavowal of the possibility of choice (and hence, personhood), 
but instead a definite denial of it. Moreover, while the eugenicist underpinnings of 
contemporary sterilisation policies are perhaps less palpable, the association between 
economic capacity and reproductive choice is made blatant.  
Contemplating the case of India, in particular, Nilanjana Chatterjee and Nancy E. Riley 
(2001), posit the state’s fertility control programs as a tool for the domestication or 
‘selective indigenization’ of modernity (2001, p.811) – i.e. the negotiation of a modernity 
that balanced Enlightenment ideals of scientific rationality with values instituted as 
‘traditional’. Here, even while the ideal(ised) female subject abided by the imperative of 
motherhood (and thereby, the guardian of culture), the modernisation of this subject 
entailed the cultivation of a ‘rational preference for child “quality” over child “quantity”’ 
(2001, p.820). Thus, while pre-independence debates on birth-control considered its 
compatibility with religious or other traditional values, in post-independence India, the 
equation of population control to the promise of social prosperity and national progress, 
produced fertility as a legitimate site for developmentalist intervention by the 
postcolonial state.  
In 1952, India became the first country in the world to institute an official population 
control program (2001, p.811). In its early years, the program focused on the 
dissemination of information about and means for contraception. However, given the 
limited effectiveness of these policies, combined with the financial crisis of 1966, the 
family planning program was transformed from ‘one providing voluntary services into an 
incentive- and target-driven population reduction program’, including sterilisation 
practices, and in particular, compulsory sterilisation for men (2001, p.824). The political 
fallout from these policies resulted in a recommitment to an educational and voluntary 
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family planning policy. Even so, as Chatterjee and Riles note, ‘the family planning 
program continues to use “compensation” payments to acceptor for lost wages and 
medical costs and for community incentive packages (offering funding for community 
improvements if a certain percentage of residents accept contraception)’ (2001, p.825). 
Furthermore, the rearticulation of these policies, from family planning to family welfare, 
has enabled focus on adolescent girls who are ‘“targeted for special attention… so that 
they grow up as better young women, and are able to make informed decisions in their 
roles as mothers and individuals”’ (ICPD Country Report 1995, 18; quoted in 2001, 
p.827). 
In fact, as the authors note, this ‘training’ directed towards girls and young women is a 
distinctly modernising strategy: 
Planning is a hallmark of modernity: if you plan you are modern; if you are 
modern you plan. This approach emphasizes the importance of rational thinking, 
of individual agency, and setting goals. […] Having identified the fertility of the 
underprivileged as a dangerous result of “poverty, ignorance and cultural 
inhibitions”, the government directs its efforts at them to teach them the benefits 
of planning and rational thinking. Its goal is to transform people’s behavior for 
their own good and for the good of the nation. (2001, p.832) 
The benefit of such planning, as advertised in state-produced literature, entails the 
achievement of an Indian middle-class life-style, represented by access to ‘electricity, 
piped water, glasses of milk, sewing machines, bicycles, tractors, and televisions’ (2001, 
p.831). Furthermore, even as family planning is described within the constraints of 
Indian traditionalism and patriarchal norms, women are summoned to become 
empowered agents, choosing to have fewer, i.e. one to two children, overriding 
traditionalist demands to bear more.   
The preceding outline of fertility control practices in India reveals how state intervention 
occurs at the intersection of the economic and the ethical – i.e. where the ethical 
excess(es) of the dispossessed is disciplined within ethical bounds. This is, also, precisely 
the point at which the surrogacy market becomes possible. For, the confluence between 
economic capacity and ethical value structures, albeit differentially, both sides of the 
surrogacy contract. The final section of this chapter will reveal how the production of 
value in the surrogacy market unfolds through the consumption of the bodies of power 
as excess. In fact, it is only by assenting to this consumption that poor women can 
materialise themselves as surrogates. Consequently, it will be suggested that the 
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differential humanness of poor women bears use and exchange value which is actualised 
only by its consumption in the (re)production of ethical value for intended parents. In 
order to set-up this argument, the next sub-section addresses how the consumption of 
excess as commodity is authorised through the notion of bioavailability as presented by 
Cohen (2008). Here, I use the critique of contracts (Pateman 1988; Williams 1991; 
Wiegman 2003) to describe how the mobilisation of abstract liberty and equality through 
the affirmation of self-possessed subjects puts under erasure the ethically reductive 
tendency of this mode of biopower. The discussion below thus aims to move towards an 
articulation of the surrogacy market as the transfer of ethical value from surrogate 
mothers to intended parents. There, returning once more to Spillers (1987), I will 
explicate this transfer, which institutes the surrogate mother as thing, as the annihilation 
achieved by capital in the preservation of value under the postcolonial condition.  
bioavailability  
In his article on ‘Operability, bioavailability and exception’, Lawrence Cohen (2008) 
defines bioavailability as the condition of being ‘available for the selective disaggregation 
of one’s cells or tissues and their reincorporation into another body (or machine)’ (2008, 
p.83). Using it to describe the circumstance of the global market for human organs, he 
posits bioavailability as a form of ‘exceptional life’ wherein the valu(e)/ation of biological 
life determines not only its control, but also its (re)distribution. Cohen’s account of 
exceptionality differs from the state of exception as proposed by Giorgio Agamben, in 
that the situation of bioavailability ‘is less one’s reduction to a zone of indistinction in 
which political life and bare life collapse together, but a more articulated zone in which 
one trades in one’s bare life… in order to remain a political subject of sacrifice and love’ 
(2008, p.83). Cohen’s reference here is to the ‘gift economy’ that underlies the organ 
market in India, where ‘donors’, although paid, are positing as sacrificial subjects 
impelled by love rather than financial need. Even so, as Cohen asserts, bioavailability, in 
its contemporary articulation, is an effect of an ethico-political sensibility wherein the 
political subjectivity of donors (sellers) is contingent upon market participation, activated 
here by the exercise of property relations with one’s body. I will elaborate on this 
situation of holding property in one’s body later as well. What precedes this neoliberal 
institution of such property relations, however, is a redescription of life itself.  
The circumstance of bioavailability emerged through advancements in medical practice 
and technology – such as extracting and grafting tissue, transfusion and immunology 
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techniques, drug development, etc. – as a means of dividing, detaching and exchanging 
parts of the body. The safe exchange of parts, however, relied on finding suitable 
matches. This necessitated the availability of a substantial population whose bodies could 
be sourced for likely matches. The refinement of transfusion and immunological 
techniques around the period of World War II signalled an opportunity for the creation 
of just this circumstance through the presence of the ‘almost dead, bodies still yet barely 
alive’ (Cohen 2008). Yet, given that transplantation required the availability of ‘living’ 
organs, a definition of death was required that did not rely upon the ceasing of the 
body’s respiratory functions and heartbeat. The in(ter)vention of the category of ‘brain-
dead’ named the dissociation of biological life from ethical life, thereby producing the 
extraction and redistribution of organs from breathing, beating bodies as ethically viable. 
Although, the primacy of brain death in determining bioavailability, notes Cohen, created 
a new moral economy of the waiting list.  
The problem of scarcity, as signified by the waiting list, is addressed through a neoliberal 
logic materialised in the development of an organ market. Nancy Scheper-Hughes thus 
locates the contemporary valence of bioavailability in the institution of patients as 
medical consumers [who] have begun to challenge the old battlefield triage and 
are demanding an end to “war-time” rationing based on scarcities that could be 
addressed by applying neo-liberal market principles to organs harvesting and 
thereby legally tapping into the bodies of the living. (2008, p.15)  
The refusal of the logic of scarcity authorises a market for human organs premised on a 
‘democraticisation of life’. Indeed, as both Cohen and Scheper-Hughes note, this 
democraticisation becomes substantiated through an ethics that find currency in the 
‘juridical concepts of the autonomous individual subject, equality (at least, equality of 
opportunity), radical freedom, accumulation, and universalism, expressed in the 
expansion of medical rights and medical citizenship’(2008, pp.17–18).  
I suggest in this section that the concept of bioavailability signals the possibility of 
dealing with excess through the intervention of property relations. Property designates an 
object that is external to, yet stands in possessive relation with, another entity, animate or 
non. Within a social context, property is that which is held in custody by an individual. 
An individual holds an object as property insofar as he can exclude others from it, use it 
at will and exchange it for another commensurate object. Despite the notion of belonging 
to, property is not constitutive of its holder – indeed, this comprises the alienability of 
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property. To hold property in one’s body, then, implies the separability of the body from 
the individual without any violation of its ethical subjectivity. This separability, as 
material and ethical possibility, is a pre-condition for bioavailability. As Radhika Rao 
notes in her article on ‘Property, Privacy and the human body’, what follows from this 
institution of body as property is the ability to ‘disaggregate rights in the body and assign 
them to different parties… [thereby] allocating rights and responsibilities among all of 
those who share an interest in a precious resource’ (2000, p.364). This disaggregation and 
redistribution of the body is not considered to impact the ethico-political subjectivity, or 
personhood, of the associated entity. In fact, as I will demonstrate later, the ability to 
alienate the body as property signals an intention towards, and reification of, 
personhood.  
Property relations with the body function differently in relation to the living and dead. 
As Rao remarks, ‘[d]eath marks the ultimate boundary between persons and things’ 
(2000, p.446). In the case of the dead body, property rights cannot accrue to the 
associated person, precisely because death signifies a dissolution of personhood, and the 
body is rendered an absolute thing. This reduction to thing extinguishes any right to 
personal privacy in relation to the body. Under the privacy framework, the body is 
conceived as ‘integrally connected to the person such that invasions of the physical being 
endanger its essential personhood’ (2000, p.428). Consequently, the right of personal 
privacy with regards the body implies ‘the right to resist forced invasions of one’s body 
and the right to prevent its physical alteration’ (2000, p.389). Any intervention by an 
external force becomes a violation of personhood. Since death signifies the termination 
of personhood, privacy rights over the body no longer hold. Indeed, the body, as no 
longer fundamental to personhood, is rendered an object.  
The productivity of the category of ‘brain dead’ lies in an expedited rendering of this 
objectification, one that facilitates the external mediation of bodily matter. The 
circumstance of bioavailability is created by assuming property rights in a (brain-)dead 
body as held in common72, so that the possibility of ‘saving a life’ not only helps alleviate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72  Bodily mediation for medical purposes is not without its challenges. As Rao demonstrates in her 
overview of U.S. case law, wherein organs were extricated from dead bodies without the consent of 
family, the property rights that a family has over their kin’s dead body could prevent intervention or at 
least require consent. Even so, in certain instances, the dead body is posited as being held in common, 
so that it falls within the purview of the state, especially where the interest of the state trumps individual 
interest.  
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any moral discomfort with bodily intrusion but, more significantly, assists in creating a 
moral imperative in contributing to this possibility. Thus, in the first instance, the ethical 
possibility and imperative signified by bioavailability addresses itself to pure biological 
life as excess. However, as Cohen suggests, in its contemporary articulation, 
bioavailability is the ‘voluntary’ reduction to pure biological life in order to manifest an 
ethico-political subjectivity. The deployment of property as a means of capitalist 
accumulation and exchange is a hallmark neoliberal ethics. Under this logic, the body, as 
that which is held in property by the individual, is a legitimate object for commoditised 
exchange. Moreover, the exercise of embodied property relations for economic gain is 
viewed as an ethical act of ‘love and sacrifice’ intended towards not only one’s kin, but 
also towards the patient-customer.  
Writing, for instance, on organ transplants in India, Cohen notes that the regulations 
require that the ‘donor’ be family or a close friend – one whose ties with the recipient 
qualify the organ – indeed, the act of giving itself – as a gift. Potential donors and 
patients then become positioned within new forms of biosociality that cloak the 
essentially financial nature of the transaction. In fact, despite the ‘bio-technological 
optimism and biomedical triumphalism’ (Cohen 2008) of the market – i.e. allusions to/of 
its ‘enterprising’ nature – the market remains a complex mix of the affective and the 
political. As Cohen’s work reveals, even where an organ match exists among family and 
friends, patients often choose to go with a ‘donor’ so as to avoid jeopardising the well-
being of their loved ones. However, in refusing this ‘sacrifice of love’, a new affective 
relationship is to be conjured up with the ‘donor’ – the giver of the gift of life – one 
who’s bio-ethical sacrifice can be compensated but never be recognised as such. Indeed, 
while from the perspective of the patient, the exchange of payment for an organ is the 
expression of a will to life, the transaction offers no such subjective position to the seller: 
‘the seller is not only taken out of the relational frame of being a person, but he or she is 
denied the recognition of sacrifice’ (Cohen 2008). Even more profoundly, what the 
assumption of autonomy and freedom elides is the violation of one’s personal integrity as 
an abjected gesture towards an otherwise deprived personhood. Indeed, what such an 
exchange effectively entails is the violation of one’s own right to personal privacy. 
Privacy rights are intended towards the exclusion of external interference, but they do 
not grant the individual the right to use and transfer at will; that is privacy rights do not 
include ‘the affirmative exercise of power over the body’ (Rao 2000, p.389). The exercise 
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of property relations with one’s body may then represent the violation of privacy, and 
thus of one’s bodily integrity. Indeed, the material transaction undertaken in the organ 
market – organ for cash – is simultaneous with an ethical one – the suspension of bodily 
integrity in one location for the consolidation of bio-political life elsewhere. As Cohen 
remarks  
…bioavailability has a distinctly modern provenance overdetermined by the 
longue durée of its imaginary double – the vampiric and usurious extractions and 
transposed parts that have constituted and been constituted by the body of value 
and the value of body. (2008, p.83) 
We can better comprehend the connection between excess and bioavailability as a 
‘vampiric transaction’ through Cohen’s description of operability. He describes 
operability as ‘the degree to which one’s belonging to and legitimate demands of the state 
are mediated through invasive medical commitment’ (2008, p.86). Using the examples of 
sterilisation, ungendering surgery and cataract operations, in addition to transplants, 
Cohen suggests that operability marks a putative recuperation enacted by the state to 
rescue its pre-modern subjects into developed modernity. In the case of sterilisation, for 
example, the violation of bodily integrity undertaken by the state is enacted as an effect 
of necessity – an eradication of those modes of existences that lie in excess of, and hence 
pose a threat to, the modern ethical order. Thus Cohen writes:  
…the operation [sterilisation] works within (among other things) a discursive 
field that presumes that the proper subjects of development are peasants or 
slum-dwellers marked by the excessive passion and limited reason, prone to 
pathology rather than discipline of the will. From nationalist debates over mass 
will to the past five decades of Indian family planning, the operations as a proxy 
for a presumptively failed project of reason and will has continually been 
asserted. … The operation is thus necessary to remake one’s mindful body in 
accordance with the demands of developmental modernity, to remake one as if 
one were modern. (2008, p.87) 
With respect to sterilisation, then, the operable body may be brought under relations of 
force with the state to amend its functionality in accordance with an imposed morality. 
However, when operability is mediated by a commercialised bioavailability, as with organ 
transplants, the state merely abides by its ideological (market) imperative, allowing for the 
harnessing of ethical excess into modes of production and consumption compatible with 
economic (capitalist) modernity – i.e. the unfolding subjects of modernity.  
The concepts of operability and bioavailability provide a potent ethical critique of the 
surrogacy market in India. Bioavailability in the market is contingent on the fertility of 
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young poor mothers, who are posited as operable precisely because of a presumed, and 
heretofore undesirable, prolificacy. Sterilisation and surrogacy are thus two sides of the 
same bio-ethical coin – whereas in the former, fertility is banished, in the latter, it is 
harnessed, but both intended towards the eradication of excess. The eradication of 
excess is the condition of possibility for the institution of an ethical existence. As 
asserted in previous chapters, this eradication is achieved through biopolitical control 
tending towards outright violence. While coerced sterilisations typify the latter 
manifestation of force, the surrogacy market is an instantiation of the former. The 
violence of the surrogacy market, however, is elided by the translation of the rule of 
force into that of property (as freedom), so that the repudiation of excess becomes the 
exercise of ethical subjectivity. Indeed, as Cohen notes, bioavailability is the exchange of 
biological life for recognition as a subject of sacrifice and love. In the case of surrogacy, 
this exchange is authorised through the surrogacy contract, which outlines the financial 
rather than affective contours of the transaction. The primacy of affect – the mother 
who sacrifices for the sake of her children as well as to share her maternal joy – is 
maintained, despite the transactional obligations of the contract, by the activation of 
property relations incumbent therein. That is, the valorisation of the alienation of 
property held in one’s body as an effect of love and sacrifice elides the contract as a 
dominating force. Yet, the force of obligation imminent in the contract renders it a 
disciplinary tool against subjectivities marked by excess and hence always already suspect. 
I develop this argument in the remainder of this section through an elaboration of the 
contract as a mechanism of ob/ab/jectification. 
Carole Pateman describes the contract as ‘a principle of social association and one of the 
most important means of creating social relationships…’ (Pateman 1988, p.5). This 
description of the contract originates from the account of the social contract as the 
founding fiction of modern society. Here, man in the state of nature is assumed to be 
born free and subject only to himself. The insecurity that accrues from this absolute 
freedom compels man to freely subordinate himself to the law of the state or to collective 
political participation. Freedom, thus described as the condition of voluntary subordination, 
is the condition of possibility for political subjectivity. The primary condition for being 
instituted as a political subject – i.e. from being subject to oneself alone to being subject 
to another – is that of holding property, in the first instance, in one’s own person. This 
condition extends itself to the contract, in general, as a determinant of juridico-social 
relationships. Indeed, the contract entails the recognition of each entity party to the 
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contract as a person. That is, each contracting entity must be recognised as the holder of 
property relations, first in themselves, and there-after/by, in other objects external to 
themselves. This is the recognition of personhood. Furthermore, the possibility of such 
property relationships implies a universal circumstance whereby parties can contract with 
each other for the free and equitable exchange of property.  
The situation of exchange objectified in the surrogacy contract recognises the surrogate 
as holding property in her own body. She owns the means of production by having 
property in her body. This authorises her to use, exclude, and exchange parts of her body 
and its capacities without any ethical dissonance. Indeed, the prospect of a woman 
appropriating, in order to alienate (‘rent out’), her body as the means of production 
becomes thus posited as ethically viable. The surrogacy contract thus materialises the 
circumstance of bioavailability. Yet, as outlined earlier in reference to the right of privacy, 
the surrogacy contract merely puts under erasure relations of domination and subjection 
inherent in it. The relations reveal themselves as such particularly when the contract, 
approached as a relationship of mutual and voluntary exchange, is breached. 
In ‘Intimate publics: Race, property and personhood’, Robyn Wiegman (2003) addresses 
the case of Anna Johnson, a black woman who was contracted to be a gestational 
surrogate for Crispina and Mark Calvert, a Filipina and white couple. Johnson sued the 
Calverts for custody of the child and lost because of the invocation of her contractual 
obligations to the Calverts. Analysing the discourse around the case, Weigman highlights 
how Anna Johnson’s subject position was dichotomised between her construction as a 
‘slave mother’ and a ‘welfare cheat’. The latter description, deployed to assert her 
incapacity for good citizenship, was intended towards substantiating her inevitable failure 
at upholding her contractual obligations. This failure revoked the possibility of ethical 
personhood signified by Johnson’s inclusion in the contract, casting her outside its 
bounds. This is of particular significance given the ethical difference always already 
presumed by Johnson’s blackness. The surrogacy contract, as already indicated, 
recognises property held in one’s own body and its capacities. For Johnson, this 
recognition marks a restoration of property relations denied under slavery through the 
institution of the black female body as depersonalised (re)productive property. The 
surrogacy contract thus comes to represent the possibility of reclaiming black 
personhood. The breach of contractual obligations, however, signals an incapacity for its 
proper performance. Indeed, while the accruement of property relations as objectified in 
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the contract announces personhood, its fulfilment is contingent upon the conclusion of 
its obligations. The contract thus reveals itself as an instrument for the control and 
distribution of ethical subjectivity. 
Consequently, in her own critique, Patricia Williams likens the surrogacy contract to a 
form of enslavement. Contract law, she notes 
reduces life to fairy tale. The four corners of the agreement become parent. 
Performance is the equivalent of possessive obedience to the parent. Passivity is 
valued as good contract-socialized behaviour; activity is caged in retrospective 
hypotheses about states of mind at the magic moment of contracting. Individuals 
are judged by the contract unfolding rather than by actors acting autonomously. 
Nonperformance is disobedience; disobedience is active; activity becomes evil in 
contrast to the childlike passivity of contract conformity. (1991, p.224) 
The imperative of conformity eminent in a surrogacy contract is an effect of the bio-
objectification of the surrogate mother, that is, of the conceptual yet obligatory separability 
of the surrogate mother, as a psycho-affective entity, from her labour power. Here, 
obligation functions as a check on her autonomy, frozen precisely in the moment of 
activity that implies alienation. This is patent in the case of Anna Johnson, whose 
attempt at asserting property relations over the object of her means of production 
contravened the limit to property posed by the surrogacy contract. The violation of 
contract, even within the exercise of autonomy, was thus deemed to confirm her ethical 
deficiency – i.e. her determined refusal to subject herself to, and for, social order. This 
severance of autonomy and the suspension of property relations73 restages the theft of 
the body eminent in reproduction under slavery. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73  The surrogacy contract represents, in fact, the encounter of two conflicting sets of property relations. 
Wiegman, for instance, describes a custody battle between the Fasanos and Rogerses, a white and black 
couple, respectively, over a child, Joseph/Akiel, born through IVF. The battle was the consequence of 
an error by a fertility clinic where both women, Donna Fasano and Deborah Rogers, were to be 
artificially inseminated. Both women had had their eggs fertilised, using their partners’ sperm, through 
an IVF procedure; however, Fasano was mistakenly inseminated with both women’s eggs. 
Consequently, Donna Fasano gave birth to ‘twins’, one of whom was genetically related to the Rogerses. 
The two couples initially agreed that Rogerses would have primary custody over the child that was 
genetically related to them – Joseph, who the Rogerses re-named Akiel – so long as both children borne 
of Fasano could be raised as brothers. However, claiming a breach of trust, the Fasanos filed for 
custody soon after. The dispute was settled when the courts decided in favour of the Rogerses, positing 
Deborah Rogers as the biological, and therefore legal, mother.   
Given that biology epistemologically naturalises reproduction, the law generally recognises the rights of 
gestational mother as primary. In the Rogers-Fasano case, however, this primacy was disrupted because 
of the complementary notion of genetic material as property. Thus, Wiegman notes, ‘The understanding 
of the racial complications of the Rogers-Fasano case, where genetics replaces gestation as the 
foundational language of property-as-life, and maternal affect is rerouted in the language of the law 
from the discourse of the body to the property life of the gene’ (Wiegman 2003, p.304). The Rogers’ 
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Recall that Hortense Spillers describes the theft of the body as ‘a wilful and violent (and 
unimaginable from this distance) severing of the captive body from its motive will, its 
active desire’ (1987, p.67). Under these conditions,  
1) the captive body becomes the source of irresistible, destructive sensuality; 2) at 
the same time – in stunning contradiction – the captive body reduces to a thing, a 
becoming being for the captor; 3) in this absence from a subject position, the 
captured sexualities provide a physical and biological expression of “otherness”; 
4) as a category of “otherness,” the captive body translates into a potential for 
pornotroping and embodies sheer physical powerlessness that slides into a more 
general “powerlessness,” resonating through various centers of human and social 
meaning. (1987, p.67) 
While the surrogacy contract cannot be made to comprehend the severing of motive will, 
at least in the first instance, precisely because of the notion of personhood that 
authorizes it, what it does manifest is the ‘becoming being for’, here, in relation to the 
intended parents. It is precisely this form of subjection – the primacy of the will of the 
intended parents and the suspended will of the surrogate – that is the core of Pateman’s 
critique of the contract, in general. In the Indian context, in particular, where surrogate 
homes serve as spaces of discipline and surveillance, the subject position of the surrogate 
is effectively one of powerlessness. The autonomy of the surrogate mother over her own 
body – that which she premised to hold property in – is largely suspended. Moreover, 
the suspension of maternal affect and kinship ties that a surrogate must commit to in 
order to be a ‘mother-worker’ signifies a dissolution, voluntary and temporary though it 
may be, of her intimate subjectivities and its consequent rearticulation for intended 
parents. Indeed, the form of training and counselling surrogates receive as regards proper 
meanings and manifestations of health and sexuality, as well as the very fact that they are 
viewed as appropriate sources of surrogate labour, implies an othering of their bio-
affective selves.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contract with the fertility clinic ensured the extension of property relations to the genetic level, enabling 
them to claim Fasano’s gestational labour, despite the lack of a contract between them.  
The significance of this case also lies in how it recodes the relationship between blackness and property. 
The cancellation of gestational labour and maternal affect affirms the Rogerses as property-owners of 
their genetic material. Here, even though the child, Akiel, and the Rogerses themselves, are returned to 
the logic of property relations, this return is an affirmation, rather than a negation, of their personhood: 
‘In this new economy of the body… this differentiation… functions to place liberal personhood within 
the progress narrative of modernity, transforming the violence of “bodily theft” under slavery into the 
seemingly benign social relations of autonomy and choice that the contract is made to speak’ (2003, 
p.304).  
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Market theory, notes Patricia Williams, 
takes attention away from the full range of human potential in its pursuit of a 
divinely willed, rationally inspired, invisibly handed economic actor. Master-slave 
relations… took attention away from the full range of black human potential in a 
somewhat different way: it pursued a vision of blacks as simple-minded, strong-
bodied economic “actants.” Thus, while blacks had an indisputable generative 
force in the market-place, their presence could not be called activity; they had no 
active role in the market. …[b]oth bourgeois and slave systems regarded certain 
attributes as important and disregarded certain others, and that such regard and 
disregard can occur in the same glance, like the wearing of horse blinders to 
focus attention simultaneously toward and away from. The experiential blinders 
of market actor and slaver go in different directions, yet the particularizing 
ideologies of each makes the act of not-seeing an unsocializing, if unconscious, 
component of seeing. (1991, p.220) 
Thus, Williams posits the market as a liberal instantiation of human particularisation as 
deployed under slavery. Indeed, as has been stated before, the market conjures the 
pr(e)/(o)mise of liberty and equality. To wit, by putting relations of domination and 
subjection under erasure, the market is in fact the site of objectification tending towards 
abjection. The theft of the body enacted in the surrogacy contract epitomises this 
circumstance. Indeed, if the body, as articulated by Spillers and as asserted before, is the 
substance of ethical subjectivity, then the theft of the body implies the severance of 
ethical existence. The body of the surrogate is instituted through the theft of the body of 
the poor woman. Indeed, the body of the surrogate mother is merely bioavailable matter, 
raw material without ethical implication. As such, it is itself the revelation of the 
hieroglyphics of flesh imprinted in the originary materialisation of the bodies of the poor 
as ethical excess.  
In the following section I will argue that the ethical destruction of the bodies of poor 
women is the condition of possibility for the production of value. In particular, I will 
focus on the production of ethical value for intended parents. In keeping with my 
description of the surrogacy market as a space of biopolitical control, the first half of the 
section will describe how biopower interpellates intended parents. That is, in so far as the 
market mobilises participation in it, it is through the promise of providing some form of 
value – whether use or exchange. In the case of the surrogacy market, this value is 
objectified in the child. However, given that the child cannot be approached as a 
commodity, I argue below that the value accrued to intended parents is an ethical value 
objectified in the formation of kinship. That is, using the work of Michel Foucault 
(1990), Ludmilla Jordanova (1995) and Jacques Donzelot (1979), I demonstrate how the 
	   184 
family emerges in modernity as a space of discipline intended towards the production of 
the bourgeois subject. As such, participation in the rituals of kinship signifies the ethical 
value – indeed, the humanness – of the individual. The incapacity to create kinship ties, 
then, signals a failure to actualise one’s ethical value. Following from the discussion of 
stratified reproduction, it is evident that this experience/presumption of failure is 
especially true of subjects otherwise recognised as human as an effect of their economic 
and consumptive capacities. Consequently, in the first half of the section below I show 
how the surrogacy market exerts biopolitical control on non-reproductive bourgeois 
subjects by materialising them as intended parents.  
The second half of the section demonstrates how this materialisation – and indeed the 
ensuing accrual of ethical value – is an effect of the productive consumption of the 
bodies of poor women by intended parents as sovereign subjects. Recall that according 
to Bataille, the sovereign is she who consumes the products of another’s labour. More 
crucially, the sovereign affirms herself through a luxurious existence effected by 
participating in exuberant consumption (i.e. consumption without regard to utility). I 
explain how the possibility of such sovereign consumption relies on the symbolic and 
material dispossession of poor women. I make this argument using Silvia Federici’s 
(2004) discussion on the primitive accumulation of women’s reproductive capacities by 
capital and David Harvey’s (2005) concept of accumulation by dispossession. This 
engagement with dispossession makes patent the transfer of ethical value – the emptying 
out in one location for accumulation in another – that structures the surrogacy market.  
The chapter concludes with reference to Jean Baudrillard’s (1998) description of 
consumption as a miracle in order to demonstrate how the objective relations that effect 
the transfer of value, are put under erasure through the figure of the child that culminates 
the process. This marks the final disappearance – annihilation – of the poor woman (as) 
surrogate. 
on matters of value in the surrogacy market  
As a few weeks prior to her due date, Aasia starts bleeding and has to be rushed to the 
hospital for an emergency C-section. There, all alone, she delivers the Switzers’ twins. 
Upon being notified of the emergency, Lisa travels back to India by herself to meet her 
babies. It is then that she, for the first time, and accidentally, meets Aasia. The film 
provides both Aasia’s and Lisa’s narrative accounts of this encounter. What becomes 
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apparent here is that the meeting – occurring in a moment of happiness represented by 
the birth of babies – is marred by the uncomfortable talk about payment. Aasia, it seems, 
has not been paid the full amount promised by the clinic. And, moreover, she hopes that 
the doubled happiness she provided to the Switzers at serious cost to her own well-being 
will merit additional compensation ‘out of happiness’. Speaking to this issue, Lisa notes, 
‘I don’t know how I got brought into the middle of her payment history… but now I’m 
in the middle of it. So now I have to go be an advocate for Aasia because I certainly 
don’t want to be a non-advocate for Aasia. … I want to give her a little extra money. I 
think what she has done is admirable. … I don’t mind giving a little extra. I just can’t 
give this huge amount of money.’  Lisa’s sentiments, here, underscore the internal 
conflict of the surrogacy relation – wherein the product (the child) is invaluable but the 
labour that produces the child must have a restricted price. For Aasia, on the hand, there 
is nothing but her labour. This, to her, is invaluable because it produced an invaluable 
product. The money she receives is not a measure of her service but a tangible return for 
the happiness she provided. This character of the transaction, I suggest, can the 
attributed to its basis in immaterial labour.   
In their seminal work, Empire, Hardt and Negri describe the current economic paradigm 
as postmodern wherein ‘providing services and manipulating information are at the heart 
of economic production’ (2001, p.280). This moment of postmodernisation is defined by 
the ascension of immaterial labour as the primary mode of the production of economic 
value. Immaterial labour is that which produces an immaterial, or intangible, object such 
as ‘a service, a cultural product, knowledge or communication’ (2001, p.290). Hardt and 
Negri pose two distinct instantiations of the objects of immaterial labour – information 
and affect. The former, which I will assume as mostly self-explanatory, is an effect of the 
technologisation of labour. While this is of interest to surrogacy as a bio-medical practice, 
affective labour bears greater significance when considering the possibility of the market. 
Affective labour is that which demands ‘human contact and interaction’ (2001, p.292) in 
the process of creating ‘a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement or passion – 
even a sense of connectedness and community’ (Hardt 1999, p.97). Indeed, affective 
labour entails, primarily, the work of social reproduction. 
Consequently, surrogate labour may be described as affective (cf. Vora 2009) precisely 
because of its description as being motivated by, and enabling the creation of, 
relationships founded in love and desire. Of course, this labour exceeds the affective for 
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it involves the actual consumption of the surrogate body – as matter and signification. I 
will address this ‘productive consumption’ aspect of social reproduction, in general, and 
surrogacy, in particular, in the second half of this section. There I will argue that the 
surrogate market involves, in fact, through the conduit of the child, a transfer of ethical 
value. It is the possibility of this transfer that engenders the market as an economic 
transaction. More significantly, contrary to Hardt and Negri’s determination of affective 
labour as a form of immaterial labour, surrogate labour is not immaterial. The ‘creation 
and manipulation of affects’ (Hardt & Negri 2001, p.293) is mediated through a material 
product – the child. The child is the materialisation of labour, affective and physiological, 
and itself materialises affect. Moreover, the value of the child exceeds its affective power 
and signifies an ethical value for the intended parents.  
I begin this section, therefore, by outlining the emergence of this value through an 
engagement with the family, and thus reproduction, as the locus of the exercise of 
biopower in the establishment of the bourgeois state. In particular, I demonstrate how 
reproductive markets signify the naturalisation of the ethical and economic imperatives 
of the state as reproductive desire. The specificity of the gestational surrogacy market, 
such as that in India, lies in the possibility of manifesting (biogenetically) ‘natural’, and 
hence ‘authentic’, kinship through the securing of the genetic tie. By thus enabling the 
restoration of a certain property right to (intended) parents, the surrogacy market reifies 
the ethical value of economic subjects.    
owning 
In his exegesis on sexuality, Foucault notes that prior to the question of family and 
reproduction, lies the question of sex: 
In the space of a few centuries, a certain inclination has led us to direct the 
question of what we are, to sex. Not so much to sex as representing nature, but 
to sex as a history, as signification and discourse. We have placed ourselves under 
the sign of sex, but in the form of a Logic of Sex, rather than a Physics. … 
Whenever it is a question of knowing who we are, it is this logic that henceforth 
serves as our master key. (1990, p.78) 
Indeed, the priority of sex in interrogations of ethico-political subjectivity lies in its 
transformation from a bio-mechanics of generation (a Physics) into a political, economic 
and moral site and signifier (a Logic) that has effected the institution of ‘the family 
organisation’ – ‘a system of marriage, of fixation and development of kinship ties, of 
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transmission of names and possessions’ (1990, p.106) – as the distinguishing feature of 
human existence (life and living). Thus, as Ludmilla Jordanova’s (1995) account of 
reproduction in eighteenth century Europe explicates, from the enlightenment onwards, 
‘reproduction’ no longer merely represents a concern with the propagation of the human 
species but more so with questions of production (i.e. of ‘making’, of labour and 
technology) and reproduction, (i.e. the harnessing of the mimetic potential of living 
things). Indeed, the connection between labour and mimesis that lies at the heart of 
reproduction is not only generative of the modern moral and political order, but, as I will 
later argue, also constitutes the scene of reproductive desire.  
The activation of reproduction, then, and more broadly, of sex, marks the emergence of 
biopower as the most penetrating and coercive technology of power in the modern 
(capitalist-colonial) state. As Foucault notes, that ‘population’ represented wealth as 
labour capacity, and hence the prosperity of society necessitated control in the balancing 
of population growth versus consumption, was not an idea unique to the biopolitical era. 
Rather, what was new was the intervention of the state in the question of sex: ‘…it 
[became] essential that the state know what was happening with its citizens’ sex, and the 
use they made of it, but also that each individual be capable of controlling the use he 
made of it’ (Foucault, 1990: 26). This was achieved not merely via the policing of 
sexuality (through education, medicine and religion), but also of the family itself.  
‘The family’, writes Donzelot, ‘is an agency whose incongruity with respect to social 
requirements can be reduced, or made functional, through the establishment of a 
procedure that brings about a “floating” of social norms and family values, just as there 
is established, concurrently, a functional circularity between the social and economic’ 
(1979, p.8). Thus, in the anti-monarchist/theist turn of the enlightenment era, the 
concept of ‘family’ was made to intervene in the formation and regulation of the moral 
order through the demarcation of legitimate versus illegitimate sex and reproduction. 
Indeed, the concern with the form and function of kinship relations established through 
reproduction was intimately tied to the establishment of the modern European state.  
By the late seventeenth century, according to Jordanova, the link between reproduction 
and inheritance was at the heart of Western political thinking: 
For patriarchalists inheritance mattered because the right to rule was transmitted 
from father to son. For liberals it was the mechanism through which property 
was transferred, and property was the basis of political rights. The kind of material 
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continuity that existed between generations was thus a matter of some 
importance. (1995, p.375) 
As the phrases highlighted above suggest, questions regarding family ties, and, in 
particular, those related to the position of the child, were rooted not merely in concerns 
with the inheritance of wealth but, more significantly, with the inheritance of ‘rights’. For 
the patriarchalists, this right was that of rule (within whichever pertinent politico-
economic configuration); for liberals it was the right to political participation in the state 
(i.e. the inheritance of the social contract). In either case, the child was posited as the 
bearer either of latent rights or of ‘a complex potentiality that needs to be educated into 
responsible citizenship’ (1995, p.375)74. 
Yet, as Donzelot’s work demonstrates (as well as that of Foucault), these concerns were, 
in the first instance, limited to the aristocratic and bourgeois classes. That is, the 
patriarchal logic of the feudal state was (pseudo-)democratised in the modern (capitalist) 
state through the intervention of property/capital. Concerns regarding material 
inheritance and, indeed, that of rights – and consequently that of ‘proper’ sex, 
reproduction and kinship – were deemed of little pertinence to the working classes and 
the poor. This, of course, does not imply that the latter were not subject to state 
intervention, or objects of biopolitical control. Rather, what differed was the form that 
this took. While the state intervened among the wealthy through the medicine of sex and 
family, the working and poorer classes, especially children, were subject to philanthropic 
projects or made wards of the state. Indeed the projects aimed at the working classes 
were intended to transform ‘social ills’ into economic gains for the state.  
Describing this process in the context of eighteenth century France, Donzelot writes:  
What troubled families was adulterine children, rebellious adolescents, women of 
ill repute… By contrast, what worried the state was the squandering of vital 
forces, the unused or useless individuals. So, between these two types of 
objectives there was indeed a temporary convergence on the principle of the 
concentration of the family’s undesirable members; … Functioning as a surface 
of absorption for the undesirables of the family order, the general hospitals, 
convents, and foundling hospitals served at the same time as a strategic base for a 
whole series of corrective interventions in family life. These assembly points for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74  It is important to note here that questions of ‘inheritance’ and ‘rights’ were pertinent only to male 
children. While these passed from father to son due to political association, mother, due to their natural 
association were deemed the teachers of citizenship, albeit within the confines of the home. To the 
extent that girl children had any possibility of inheritance, it was of this domestic(ised) role, passed from 
mother to daughter. (cf. Pateman 1988) 
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society’s misfortunes, miseries, and failures facilitated the mobilisation of 
philanthropic energies, providing it with a point of support, serving as a 
laboratory for working class behaviour, as a launching ramp for tactics designed 
to counter the socially negative effects of this behaviour and to reorganise the 
working-class family in terms of socio-economic urgencies. (1979, pp.25–26) 
Such efforts, however, at regularising working class families and harnessing their vitalities 
came at a large financial cost to the state. Consequently, it became necessary to re-affirm 
the propriety of marriage and legitimate kinship among the working classes as well – a 
project aimed primarily at ‘preserving children’ (from ill health, vagrancy and early death). 
Thus, just as with the bourgeoisie, albeit in differential registers, marriage and family 
among the working classes became sites for educational intervention in the realm of 
hygiene, self-care and social (class and gender) subjectivity. In each case, however, the 
regulation of marriage, procreation and family was intended, ultimately, towards (the 
preservation of) the child – the bearer of (future) political and economic interests of the 
state.  
Consequently, Foucault argues, the questions of procreation and family were 
transformed from ‘deployments of alliance’ to ‘deployments of sexuality’. Contrasting 
these two distinct, yet overlapping, apparatuses of control, he writes:  
For the first, what is pertinent is the link between partners and definite statutes; 
the second is concerned with the sensations of the body, the quality of 
pleasures… . [If] the deployment of alliance is firmly tied to the economy due to 
the role it can play in the transmission or circulation of wealth, the deployment of 
sexuality is linked to the economy through numerous and subtle relays, the main 
one of which, however, is the body – the body that produces and consumes. In a 
word, the deployment of alliance is attuned to a homeostasis of the social body, 
which it has the function of maintaining; whence its privileged link with the law; 
whence too the fact that the important phase for it is “reproduction.” The 
deployment of sexuality has its reason for being, not in reproducing itself, but in 
proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, and penetrating bodies in an 
increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly 
comprehensive way. (1990, pp.106–107) 
The deployment of sexuality, then, was key to the expansion of social norms and ‘family 
values’ amongst the working classes without an overinvestment of economic and political 
resources by the state. Indeed, the productivity of the deployment of sexuality, rather 
than the authority of alliance, lay in the illusion of autonomy that it granted the family – a 
key cause, argues Donzelot, for the adoption of this (conservative) organisation by 
classes traditionally antagonistic to the established political order. Furthermore, it enabled 
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the pretext of a democratisation of wealth and rights – an overriding of the juridical 
guarantees of alliance.  
More importantly, however, in interpellating the body – its functions and intensities – as 
the fundamental and ultimate site of control, the deployment of sexuality re-constituted 
the family, from a juridico-economic unit, into the ‘obligatory locus of affect, feelings 
and love’ (ibid.: 108). This is evidenced not only in the domesticisation of family through 
education but also in the increasing psychoanalysation of kinship relations (as well as the 
relationship with one’s own body) and the eventual valorisation of desire and recognition 
therein. Thus, the displacing, but not disavowal, of the juridico-economic by the sexual 
and affective, enables a (re-)imagination of reproduction, or merely of ‘having children,’ 
as an autonomised act, even while it remains squarely within the purview of the state. 
Indeed, as Foucault and Donzelot demonstrate, while biological reproduction might 
initially have become naturalised, the family, as materialised by reproduction, remains 
within the purview of the ethical and economic concerns of the state. The family is 
instituted first as a juridico-economic entity and hence of concern only to those ascribed 
political subjectivity. The emergence of a capitalist order, however, transforms the family 
into a site of political and economic control, and, hence, of ethical concern. While the 
family might thus have been normativised, it is only through the deployment of sexuality 
and its various techniques – medicine and psychoanalysis, in particular – that the idea of 
family acquires its sheen of naturalness. It is in this context that reproductive desire, as 
pertinent to the surrogacy market, may be comprehended as an intention towards ethical 
subjectivity. 
The desire to have a child is not merely affective – i.e. to care for and be cared for by 
another being – but, more so, the politico-psychic desire of subjectivation, for socio-
political recognition, through kinship. As David Eng notes with reference to adoption, 
‘the possession of a child, whether biological or adopted, has today become the sign of 
guarantee not only for family but also for full and robust citizenship – for being a fully 
realized political, economic, and social subject...’ (2003, p.7). This marks the 
transmutation of biopower into individuated desire that mobilises, and is mobilised in, 
the reproductive market. To be certain, then, the ‘product’ of the market bears, in the 
first instance, ethical value. Without this, it could not project economic value, sublated 
though it might be from itself to ART and its practitioner labour. This is of even greater 
significance in a gestational surrogacy market wherein the ethico-economic subjectivity 
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of the intended parents is reified through ‘owning’ – i.e. intended parents actualise 
themselves through the activation of property in both, genetic material and financial 
wealth. Of course, this manifestation is an effect not of the investment of (re)productive 
labour but rather of capital. That is, intended parents supply their accumulated financial 
and genetic property in order that they (the property) be transformed into an object of 
value that accrues to them. The accrual of this value, of course, is contingent upon the 
actualisation of capital through the expenditure of another’s labour power. Yet, as already 
noted, the surrogate mother is not merely a labourer but also a raw material, herself. 
Thus, the production of value in the surrogacy market, as objectified in the child, follows 
from the depletion of her body as such.  
Under a capitalist description, the positing of the surrogate mother as a means of 
production implies capitalisation of the bodies of poor women. In the next section, I will 
demonstrate how this circumstance is an effect of primitive accumulation (Federici 2004) 
and accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2005). Indeed, capitalisation is the condition 
of possibility for the production of value – not, however, for poor women as owners of 
this capital but for the clinics (economic) and the intended parents (ethical). Production, 
as Marx notes, proceeds through the consumption of the means of production – i.e. the 
depletion of labour power, the ingesting of raw materials, and the wearing down of the 
instruments. Consequently, I will argue that the production of value in the market is an 
effect of the consumption – material and symbolic – of the surrogate mother. In 
particular, continuing with my focus on the production of ethical value for intended 
parents, I will suggest that the depletion of the surrogate mother – both, subjective and 
objective – is the materialisation of sovereign consumption by the intended parents.   
mattering 
In a feminist rearticulation of Marx’s description, Silvia Federici posits primitive 
accumulation as a  
set of historical phenomena that are absent in Marx, and yet have been extremely 
important for capitalist accumulation. They include (i) the development of a new 
sexual division of labor subjugating women’s labor and women’s reproductive 
function to the reproduction of the work-force; (ii) the construction of a new 
patriarchal order, based upon the exclusion of women from waged work and 
their subordination to men; (iii) the mechanization of the proletarian body and its 
transformation, in the case of women, into a machine for the production of new 
workers. (2004: 12)  
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Federici thus seeks to illustrate how capitalism’s original sin – the forced separation of 
workers from their means of production – incorporated, and proceeded through, the 
dispossession and devaluation of women’s reproductive labour. Indeed, the 
proletarianisation of labour through primitive accumulation necessitated the management 
and control of labour reserves so as to maintain them in a relationship of subjection to 
capital. Given that reproduction is the primary source of labour power, it was imperative 
for capital that women be divested of control over this capacity. This dispossession, as 
Federici illustrates, operated though a gendered division of labour that relegated women’s 
labour to the domestic (non-economic).  
In the context of Europe, proletarianisation created a struggle over the absorption of 
labour. In the ensuing competition for inclusion, patriarchy and misogyny effected the 
pushing out of women from the labour force in favour of the mass of newly ‘freed’ male 
labour. Moreover, the transformation, or co-option, of subsistence labour into wage-
labour implied that women became limited primarily to activities intended towards 
reproducing life – i.e. to the labour of social reproduction. The institution of a 
commodity-driven market necessitated the valorisation of labour, i.e. it required that 
labour be value-producing. The non-‘value-producing’ nature of socially reproductive 
labour implied, then, that women’s work was devalued. Indeed, as Federici highlights: 
In the new monetary regime, only production-for-market was defined as a value-
creating activity, whereas the reproduction of the worker began to be considered 
as valueless from an economic viewpoint and even ceased to be considered as 
work. … [T]he importance of the reproduction of labor-power carried out in the 
home, and its function in the accumulation of capital became invisible, being 
mystified as a natural vocation labelled “women’s labor.” (2004, p.75) 
As already noted, the degradation of women’s work, and especially their reproductive 
labour, did not imply that women’s capacities were exempt from capitalist-state 
intervention. Instead, women’s bodies and their capacities came under intensified 
regimes of discipline and control. 
The thesis of Federici’s text is built, in fact, upon the history of the witch-hunts in 
Europe. Indeed, she seeks to demonstrate the witch-hunt as a strategy of capital in 
controlling those bodies that were a threat to its functioning. This is borne out, as well, in 
the title of her work, Caliban and the witch, wherein Caliban stands as the ‘embodiment of 
a world of female subjects that capitalism had to destroy: the heretic, the healer, the 
disobedient wife, the woman who dared to live alone, the obeah woman who poisoned 
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the master’s food and inspired the slaves to revolt’ (2004, p.11). Caliban is thus the 
figuration of women yet untamed by capital. But where capital succeeds at disciplining 
women, it does so, Federici notes, through the socio-sexual contract. This suggestion 
follows from Carol Pateman’s work in The Sexual Contract (1988). As noted above, 
Pateman’s work seeks to establish the contract as a coercive and unequal relationship. 
Yet, the substance of her text is concerned primarily with illustrating the social contact as 
fundamentally structured through men’s sexual right over women.  
Pateman outlines how the ontoepistemological description of women in the state of 
nature as outside the realm of freedom and equality conceives a natural right of men over 
women. The social contract transforms this natural right into a civil patriarchal right 
through the inauguration of a sexual contract. The sexual contract is an agreement 
among men wherein, as subjects party to the social contract, they undertake to protect 
women in exchange for sexual and domestic propagation. Given this circumstance, 
Pateman posits the marriage contract as a form of an employment contract founded on 
women’s sexual and domestic work (1988, pp.135–136). Yet, far from indicating the 
privatisation of women’s work, that this labour is effected through the socio-sexual 
contract, signals, according to Federici, its communalisation:  
According to this new social-sexual contract, proletarian women became for male 
workers the substitute for the land lost to the enclosures their most basic means 
of reproduction and a communal good anyone could appropriate and use at will. 
… [I]n the new  organization of workers every woman (other than those privatized by the 
bourgeois men) became a communal good, for once women’s activities were defined as 
non-work, women’s labor began to appear as a natural resource, available to all, 
no less than the air we breathe or the water we drink. (2004, p.97) 
Thus, the primitive accumulation of women’s reproductive labour marks their 
subjugation to patriarchal capitalism, or a capitalist patriarchy. Within this context, the 
valorisation of women’s reproductive labour in the surrogacy might appear as a moment 
of liberation. Yet, as Federici notes with regards the privatisation of land and the 
production of ‘free labour’, it is not the worker who is liberated, but rather the land itself, 
which is now ‘“free” to function as a means of accumulation and exploitation, rather 
than as a means of subsistence’ (2004, p.75). Similarly, what is liberated by the surrogacy 
market is not the (poor) woman as subject but rather her reproductive matter as a site of 
accumulation and exploitation rather than autonomous action. Indeed, the surrogacy 
market is an instantiation of what David Harvey designates ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (2005).  
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Capitalist expansion, or the growth of capitalist accumulation, is enabled through the 
creation of new markets and access to cheaper inputs. Global capitalism names the 
process whereby these opportunities are manufactured in regions of the world that have 
not yet been totally subsumed by, and thus mark the outside of, capital. Indeed, as 
indicated in the previous chapter, the deliberate suppression of capital in the colonies is 
the condition of possibility for contemporary capitalist expansion. This process of 
accumulation is not equivalent to primitive accumulation as the primordial act of 
capitalist violence. Rather, as Harvey notes, the unfolding of capitalism through an 
‘inside-outside dialectic’, and hence the maintenance, or manufacture, of particular zones 
(peoples and places) as the outside, constitutes the process of accumulation by 
dispossession. Thus, citing Hannah Arendt’s work in Imperialism, he notes: 
The processes that Marx, following Adam Smith, referred to as ‘primitive’ or 
‘original’ accumulation constitute, in Arendt’s view, an important and continuing 
force in the historical geography of capital accumulation through imperialism. As 
in the case of labour supply, capitalism always requires a fund of assets outside of 
itself if it is to confront and circumvent pressures of overaccumulation. If those 
assets, such as empty land or new raw materials, do not lie to hand, then 
capitalism must somehow produce them. (2005, p.143) 
Further,  
The disadvantage of [Marx’s] assumptions [as regards primitive accumulation] is 
that they relegate accumulation based upon predation, fraud, and violence to an 
‘original stage’ that is considered no longer relevant or, as with [Rosa] 
Luxemburg, as being somehow ‘outside of’ capitalism as a closed system. A 
general re-evaluation of the continuous role and persistence of the predatory 
practices of ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ accumulation within the long historical 
geography of capital accumulation is, therefore, very much in order… (2005, 
p.144) 
Thus, the theory of accumulation by dispossession as proposed by Harvey seeks to 
identify the practice whereby capital, first, removes itself from circulation so as to, next, 
bring the now dispossessed into a relationship of bondage with it. The examples that 
Harvey provides range from the institution of predatory lending and debt markets, the 
use of patents and intellectual property to monopolise food production to the 
commodification of cultural forms and histories (2005, pp.147–148). But this theory may 
be applied, as well, to the development of the surrogacy market. 
The primitive accumulation and concurrent devaluation of reproductive labour under 
capitalism, dispossessed women of their economic and political capacities (Federici 
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2004). This subjugation, reproduced by the persistence of patriarchal capitalism, is 
intensified by the increased proletarianisation and subsequent impoverishment of 
communities now confronted by capitalist subsumption. The dispossessed circumstance 
of women provides capital the opportunity to create both, a new market and access 
cheap labour, using women’s essential productivity, i.e. their reproductive capacities. 
Thus, while primitive accumulation instituted, as Federici notes, the woman’s uterus as a 
reproductive machine, the surrogacy market actualises this machine, finally, as capital. Of 
course, the valorisation of reproductive labour does not imply a re-valuation of the 
surrogate mother as woman. Rather, as I have been arguing, the capitalisation of her 
reproductive capacities indicates, in fact, an ethical devaluation manifest, I suggest, in her 
circumstance as the object of sovereign consumption by the intended parents.   
Production, as Marx notes, is essentially an act of 
dual consumption – subjective and objective consumption. Firstly, the individual, 
who develops his abilities while producing, expends them as well, using them up 
in the act of production, just as innatural procreation vital energy is consumed as 
a consumption of life forces. Secondly, it is consumption of the means of 
production, which re used and used up and in part (as for instance fuel) are 
broken down into simpler components. It similarly involves consumption of raw 
material which is absorbed and does not retain its original shape and quality. The act of 
production itself is thus in all its phases also an act of consumption. (1970, p.130; 
added emphasis) 
Marx’s reference to the consumption of vital energy in the process of procreation 
includes, in fact, the consumption of the instrument of production and raw material. In 
the context of ‘natural procreation’ – i.e. where the genetic, gestational and pastoral 
mother are the same – this consumption might appear as predominantly subjective – the 
creation of woman as mother. Indeed, objective consumption – i.e. the consumption of 
the body as biological matter and capacities – appears simultaneous with the subjective. 
This simultaneity persists in the context of surrogacy; here, however, through the priority 
of objective consumption. In the surrogacy market, the labour power of the surrogate 
mother is directed at her own body as raw material and instrument of production. 
However, the object of her production, the child, is alienated, and so is her subjective 
creation – i.e. the creation of the mother. Indeed, the subjective product of the surrogate 
mother’s reproductive labour is the creation of intended parents qua parents and it is 
contingent upon the consumption of her body as capital. More pointedly, the 
capitalisation of the surrogate mother is fulfilled through the diminishing of her 
subjectivity (as evidenced through the theft of the body described above). Consequently, 
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I affirm that objective consumption in the surrogacy market includes the productive 
consumption of (the possibility of) ethical existence. 
Following the argument in this section it may be suggested that the ethical devaluation of 
the bodies of poor women – the fact of their non-mattering – is the circumstance wherein 
their (raw biological) matter matters. Indeed, this circumstance is the condition of 
possibility for the valorisation of intended parents as subjects, and bodies, who do matter. 
This mattering of intended parents – i.e. both their appearance and value as human – is 
confirmed by the end of consumption in the surrogacy market. Consumption, according 
to Baudrillard, is an act that gives meaning to, and a process that gives order to, social 
life. It does so by facilitating the accumulation of ‘signs of happiness’ as the projection of 
affluence (Baudrillard 1998: 31); and that which, by producing new needs fulfilled by new 
objects, maintains a structure of social ‘distinction and differentiation’ (1998, p.5). 
Echoing Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism, Baudrillard suggests that, in thus 
realising social order, consumption appears not as an effect of social relations, but rather 
as a miracle: ‘In everyday practice, the blessings of consumption are not experienced as 
resulting from work or from a production process; they are experienced as a miracle. … 
And, more generally, once severed from its objective determinations, the profusion of 
goods is felt as a blessing of nature, as a manna, a gift from heaven’ (1998, pp.31–32).  
In the context of surrogacy, the child appears as this miracle, as manna. In the final 
instance, the accrual of this sign of happiness does not present itself as a relation of 
production, or indeed, consumption. This is the final and absolute erasure of the body of 
the poor woman as surrogate, confirming, once more, this annihilation as the condition 
of possibility for the preservation of value under the postcolonial condition. 	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conclusion 
I would like to end this thesis with two anecdotes. 
story 1 
A few years ago, I found myself in a seminar being lead by a prominent Marxist feminist 
scholar. This was one of many seminars I had been attending as part of a critical social 
theory summer school. As is often the case, I was one of about 5 (not-so-)brown faces 
(none at all black) in a sea of whiteness. I use the word whiteness, rather than white 
faces, deliberately and provocatively, to underscore the epistemological righteousness 
that constituted the room. I also use it to highlight that in a summer school on critical 
social theory, the only seminar leader who addressed anything approaching a 
racial/postcolonial critique was self-righteously and gracelessly disparaged as lacking any 
political content or urgency – and most vehemently so by one voice from the south. As I 
sat through these seminars, I found myself wondering out loud why some in the class 
seemed to experience a castration anxiety with regards postcolonial thinking while having 
an orgasmic response to run-on seminars on the etymology of ‘democracy’. It was in this 
context – of feeling angst, perhaps anger, on my skin – that I had this encounter with the 
white Marxist feminist. 
I do not recall the set-up to it, nor the specific content or extent of the words exchanged.  
All I recall is her insistence that the subaltern can speak – I see them speaking everywhere and my 
violent response in a notebook, underlined and screaming, over again, stop trying to make 
the subaltern speak.  
story 2 
Quite a few years prior to story 1, I was at the airport in Kuwait, awaiting a transfer on 
my flight from Bombay to London. While seated in the waiting area, I observed a young 
woman who appeared to be my age hesitantly trying to approach me. When I looked 
over and smiled with curiosity, she walked over and asked if she could use my phone to 
text her mother in the Philippines. As we struggled over figuring out how to feed in the 
number and type in a message, she told me that she was on her way to Oman (if I recall 
correctly) to work for a business family as a live-in domestic. She was hopeful, she said, 
because she was expecting to save enough money over the next few years so as to go 
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back home and attend college. As she waited to board her own flight, she wanted to let 
her mother know that she was OK.  
This encounter – this young woman – has stayed with me, because she is me, and yet 
not. More painfully still, her mother is mine, and yet not. During my brief conversation 
with her, I imagined her in all the tropes about women and migration that I, as an ethnic 
studies scholar, was familiar with. Every time I think back to her, I wonder about her 
under precisely the same rules – I wonder about her safety, whether she ever made it 
back home; but most of all, I think about her mother in the language of pain and 
resilience. 
The subaltern cannot speak.  
In that brief and strangely intimate encounter for two people who had just met, I could 
not hear her because I had already heard about her, indeed spoken about her too. And I 
still cannot hear her because I have already chosen to designate her as subaltern. 
*********** 
I met this young woman years ago just as I was beginning to consider my research for 
this degree. To suggest that my encounter with her was my opening into this project 
would be giving too much significance retroactively to what is in fact a return. She came 
back to me, in fact, only as I was contemplating the conclusion to this project. And, yet, 
because of this return, I am compelled to ask whether she had been there all along.  
I do not know if my instinct – my plea against the white Marxist feminist – to stop trying 
to make the subaltern speak is correct. In fact, as Spivak notes, to try to get a speaking 
subaltern to not speak is just as problematic as trying to make the subaltern speak 
(Spivak 1999).  
And so I do not know what to do with the young woman. Perhaps, therefore, I have 
chosen in these pages to speak of that which separates us – to write of that which makes 
me, not. I have named it capital under the sign of development; I designated us as 
separable in our differential humanness. I have already marked her for destruction – in 
fact, did I not already think it, even before I wrote this thesis? – in the service of my 
preservation. But now I wonder if that is all too easy; a simple ‘self-implicating’ (guilt 
ridden?) method of analysis that is just that… and even then perhaps wrong. 
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The truth is, after months of thinking and writing – after the demonstration, hopefully, 
of some sort of proficiency – I still do not know what to do with the subaltern. May be 
that is why all I have left to give here is a weak effort at some form of poetics. 
I conclude, then, with a final attempt to comprehend the subaltern as she constitutes our 
conditions of living. Borrowing the words of Offred, the protagonist of Margaret 
Atwood’s A handmaid’s tale (1986), perhaps contemporary questions of differentiation, 
violence and ethics are 
no longer about control. Maybe it isn’t really about who can own whom, who can 
do what to whom and get away with it, even as far as death. Maybe it isn’t about 
who can sit and who has to kneel or stand or lie down, legs spread open. Maybe 
it’s about who can do what to whom and be forgiven for it75. 
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